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ABSTRACT
FROM NO CHOICE TO FORCED CHOICE TO SCHOOL CHOICE:
A HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS IN MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
by
James K. Nelsen
The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2012
Under the Supervision of Dr. Amanda I. Seligman

Americans cherish freedom and value local control of education. The issue of
“school choice,” a movement that supports publicly funded tuition vouchers for students
who attend private schools, appeared on the public agenda in the 1980s and has remained
a controversial topic into the twenty-first century. Milwaukee had one of the first and
most expansive school choice programs in the United States. If one is to understand
school choice, one must understand its origin in Milwaukee. Milwaukee moved through
three eras of choice—the eras of “no choice,” “forced choice,” and “school choice.” The
Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) followed a “comprehensive” model and a traditional
neighborhood assignment pattern in the first era. Schools were racially segregated in that
era. Lloyd Barbee led the protest movement and legal challenge to end segregation in the
1960s and 1970s, and Superintendent Lee McMurrin and the school board responded by
creating a magnet school program that offered students more choices than any other
district in the United States. Magnet schools were supposed to racially integrate students

ii

and provide them with a variety of quality educational options. But the program was
difficult to implement and not well received by many parents, either African American or
white. Many families wanted to keep their children in neighborhood schools, but if not
enough students volunteered to attend an integrated school, then some had to be “forced”
to choose one in the second era of school choice. And while many of the magnet schools
were excellent, they did not improve education in Milwaukee as a whole. Civic and
community leaders tried to remedy low academic achievement in the 1990s by
introducing more forms of choice, including charter schools, vouchers to private schools,
open enrollment in suburban districts, and neighborhood schools and small schools
within MPS. Despite all these choices, education has not improved in Milwaukee.
Nonetheless, Milwaukee parents and students have a level of choice, for good or for bad,
that is not available in any other school district in the United States. These choices would
not be possible if it were not for Milwaukee’s unique urban history.
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Advanced Placement (AP)—a program in the United States sponsored by the College
Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) that offers standardized courses to high
school students that are generally recognized to be equivalent to undergraduate
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high enough scores on the exams to qualify
alternative school—a school that uses nontraditional teaching methods to provide
educational services to “at-risk” students; often characterized by small size and
close relationships between students and teachers
at-risk students—students who are “at risk” of failing academically for one or more
reasons, such as behavior problems, truancy, poverty, or family problems
compensatory education—supplementary programs or services designed to help children
who are cognitively or economically impaired reach their full potential; oftentimes
associated with corrective measures following a lawsuit
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training
feeder school—a school that provides a significant number of graduates to a specific
school
fundamental education—education that emphasizes a “back-to-basics” approach; stresses
reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies; popular in the 1970s
and 1980s
gifted and talented—elementary school program for students with high intelligence,
academic ability, achievement, and creativity; it is usually a flexible program that
meets a wide variety of needs
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teachers into academic departments, unlike in a middle school
intact busing—the process by which students who were assigned to an overcrowded
elementary school boarded a bus at their school with their teacher and were bused
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high school students to complete a series of rigorous courses and exams and earn
college credits while in high school
magnet school—a public elementary and secondary public school of choice that offers
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learning
multiplex—a building that used to house a comprehensive high school but is reconfigured
to accommodate three to six small high schools
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
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and still exists in various forms in the twenty-first century; contrasted with
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work instead of traditional teacher-directed learning and textbooks; also
emphasizes community involvement, good citizenship, and the psychological
well-being of the student
school choice—a program in the state of Wisconsin that allows low-income students in
the city of Milwaukee to attend private schools on tuition vouchers
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senior high school—a high school that contains grades ten to twelve; often paired with a
junior high school that contains grades seven through nine
Superior Ability Program—the program for gifted and talented students in some middle
schools and high schools in Milwaukee; succeeded by the Program for the
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of choice is a basic concept in America. In order to contribute
fully and freely to our society, a citizen must be able to choose, from a
wide range of occupational options, the career best suited to his or her
needs. Education is an essential prerequisite in this process of choice.
Children, as well as adults, have a variety of talents and needs. No single
educational program can meet the needs of all students. Thus, freedom of
choice as adults largely depends on the opportunity to choose educational
settings best suited to development of the unique potentials of each child.1
Americans cherish freedom of choice, as the quote above indicates. Yet many
Americans take freedom of choice for granted. “Freedom” and “choice” are related but
are not the same. Freedom is a concept, a goal. It is something that is achieved and has
various degrees, which have been debated throughout time. Choice is the act of using
freedom. Most people think choice makes people happy, and the more options, the better,
or so they think.
If freedom is a good thing and more freedom is a better thing, then one might
wonder why Americans had to fight for it and why they still fight over it. As renowned
historian Eric Foner states:
The Declaration of Independence lists liberty among mankind’s
inalienable rights; the Constitution announces as its purpose to secure
liberty’s blessings. The United States fought the Civil War to defend the
Free World. Americans’ love of liberty has been represented by poles,
caps, and statues, and acted out by burning stamps and draft cards, running
away from slavery, and demonstrating for the right to vote. If asked to
explain or justify their actions, public or private, Americans are likely to
respond, “It’s a free country.”2

1

“Alternative Education in Wisconsin,” n.d. (but sometime after 1967 and probably around 1971)
in Kathleen Mary Hart, Milwaukee Public Schools Desegregation Collection, 1975–1987, UWM
Manuscript Collection 90, Golda Meir Library, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, box 1, folder 5.
2

Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1998), xiii.

2
Foner points out in The Story of American Freedom that the United States is
known as “the land of the free” and “the cradle of liberty.” He says that most Western
countries place prominent value on civil and economic equality, but that, if given a
choice, most Americans would choose liberty over equality.3 Foner examines the history
of freedom by using three interrelated themes: “the meanings of freedom; the social
conditions that make freedom possible; and the boundaries of freedom—the definition,
that is, of who is entitled to enjoy it.”4 He then traces the history of freedom through
various eras of United States history: the original thirteen colonies, the American
Revolution, western expansion, the Civil War, the rise of organized labor, the Progressive
Era, the New Deal, the civil rights movement and related movements of the 1960s, and
“conservative freedom” as represented by the presidency of Ronald Reagan.5
Other historians also have written on the history of freedom. Political historian
Michael Kammen, for example, writes that freedom can best be understood in a particular
historical period when it is contrasted with some other quality. For example, freedom can
be cast against authority in the eighteenth century, property in the first half of the
nineteenth century, order in the second half of the nineteenth century, and justice in the

3

Foner, xiii–xiv.

4

Foner, xvi.

5

See Alpheus Thomas Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest of Freedom: American Political
Thought and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959 and 1972) and Leon Whipple, The Story
of Civil Liberty in the United States (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927; reprint, New York, Da Capo Press,
1970) for classic works written under similar themes. See Lee Quinby, Freedom, Foucault, and the Subject
of America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991) and Richard Stivers, The Illusion of Freedom
and Equality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008) for intellectual histories of freedom in the
United States. See John W. Danford, Roots of Freedom: A Primer on Modern Liberty (Wilmington, DE:
ISI Books, 2000) and R.W. Davis, ed., The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1995) if interested in comparing American intellectual history to the history of
freedom in a European context.

3
twentieth century.6 Richard King follows up by demonstrating how the civil rights
movement refocused and revitalized the definitions of freedom and citizenship. He draws
upon the writing and speeches of Martin Luther King, Ella Baker, Stokely Carmichael,
James Forman, and political thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Frantz Fanon.7 More
recently, David Hackett Fischer has written a history that examines the multiple means of
freedom and the struggle to define it throughout history. He argues that this struggle is
what is most important in United States history: “What made America free, and keeps it
growing more so, was not any single vision of liberty and freedom but the interplay of
many visions. Together, these ideas made America more free than any one American
ever was, or wished to be.”8
While freedom is ubiquitous in United States history, the history of choice—the
act of using freedom—is less studied and is usually the purview of social scientists.
Political scientists, for example, may quote the writings of John Locke, Montesquieu,
Rousseau, Condorcet, Adam Smith, and other “enlightened” philosophers, who believed
that human beings were rational and capable of making their own decisions without
government interference.9 According to many social scientists, the Founding Fathers of

6
Michael Kammen, Spheres of Liberty: Changing Perceptions of Liberty in American Culture
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 5.
7

Richard H. King, Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom (Athens: University of Georgia Press,

8

David Hackett Fischer, Liberty and Freedom (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,

1996).

2005), 15.
9

See Gordon S. Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States (New
York: Penguin Press, 2011) for an accessible account of the link between the Enlightenment and early
United States government. Other works include Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy
of the Founding Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Frank Shuffelton, ed., The American
Enlightenment (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1993); and Paul Merrill Spurlin,

4
the United States believed that free choice was good for both individuals and society. In
theory, if each individual acts on his or her own, he or she will prosper, and if all
individuals have this free choice, then society will prosper. Kenneth Arrow was one of
the first social scientists to postulate this theory and is considered the founder of the
resultant philosophy of “social choice theory.”10 Social choice theory is related to “public
choice theory,” which applies economic principles to choice in voting and governmental
decision making.11 However, social choice theory is broader than public choice theory in
that it encompasses a broader range of choice, not just voting. Few historians have
chosen to embrace social choice as an analytical lens through which to view history.
Norman Schofield, who has attempted to explain United States history through the
framework of social choice, is a notable exception,12 as is D. L. d’Avray, who has applied

“Montesquieu in America, 1760–1801" (master’s thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1940; New York:
Octagon Books, 1969).
10

Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1963).
See John Bonner, Introduction to the Theory of Social Choice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986) and Jon Elster, ed., Rational Choice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) for two basic textbooks on
social choice theory.
11

Classic works on public choice theory include Duncan Black, Theory of Committees and
Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1962); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957);
and Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1965). See James M. Buchanan, Choice, Contract, and
Constitutions (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), and Jac C. Heckelman et al., eds., Public Choice
Interpretations of American Economic History (Kluwer Academic, 2000) for more recent collections of
essays on nine historical events. See Iain McLean and Arnold B. Urken, eds., Classics of Social Choice
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995) for a collection of primary sources dating from A.D. 105
through 1884 that could be used to form a theoretical historical basis for social choice.
12

Norman Schofield, Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social
Choice Theory (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

5
social choice theory to the comparative history of religion and the philosophy of law.13
Social choice, public choice, and other choice theories can connect to education.
Specifically, when one combines “freedom” and “choice” into “freedom of choice” and
then applies freedom of choice to education, one may think of the “school choice”
movement, which supports publicly funded tuition vouchers for students who want to
attend private schools. Voucher proponents argue that providing students with choices
outside the public school system spurs competition, which improves the quality of
schools. They point to the competitiveness of the business world as proof that
competition breeds success. Milwaukee has the oldest voucher system in the United
States and has been a model for other school districts and other states.14
Many scholars have examined school choice, and many have traced the origins to
Milwaukee, but none have studied the deeper history of choice within Milwaukee.
Milwaukee’s choice movement is rooted in Milwaukee’s African American civil rights
movement of the 1960s and its magnet school movement of the 1970s and 1980s. The
magnet school movement was a response to the civil rights movement and an attempt to
give Milwaukee students quality educational opportunities in racially integrated schools.
Unlike the magnet school movements in other cities, where only a few magnet schools
were established, all Milwaukee high schools and many of the elementary schools and

13

D. L. d’Avray, Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison (Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and D.L. d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian
Analysis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
14

“Publically Funded School Voucher Programs,” National Conference of State Legislators,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/school-choice-vouchers.aspx (accessed May 26, 2012), and
“School Vouchers: Issues and Arguements,” School Choices, 1998, http://www.schoolchoices.org/roo/
vouchers.htm (accessed May 26, 2012).

6
middle schools were given magnet statuses. The magnet program did not succeed in
racially integrating schools and was only marginally successful at improving academic
achievement. As the quality of Milwaukee schools declined in the 1980s and 1990s, the
movement to provide other choices outside of the magnet schools accelerated under the
leadership of Howard Fuller, who supported black community control of schools in black
neighborhoods. Other choices also emerged, including charter schools, open enrollment
in suburban districts, neighborhood schools, and small high schools, which gave
Milwaukee students more choices in school selection than any other city in the United
States. As with the earlier magnet program, expanding choice was supposed to spur
competition and improve quality of education, but academic achievement has still not
made the long-hoped-for gains. So perhaps choice is not actually as good as some people
believe.
This dissertation is about choice in Milwaukee in all its forms. It goes back to the
beginning of public education and breaks the history of educational options into three
periods—“no choice” (prior to 1976), “forced choice” (1976–1995), and “school choice”
(after 1987), which overlaps with the forced choice era. It unites two distinct areas of
scholarship by bridging historical writing on education and the civil rights movement
with the work done by social scientists and education scholars on busing, magnet schools,
and the school choice movement. Milwaukee is used as the case study because
Milwaukee has more varieties of educational choice than any other city in the United
States. Milwaukee students attended neighborhood schools within a racially segregated
school system in the era of no choice. Schools had theoretically identical programs in this
era. Milwaukee’s African American children were expected to choose to attend white
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schools and racially integrate them, whether they wanted to or not, in the forced choice
era. Choice in this context centered around magnet schools. And finally, in the third
phase, Milwaukee students were offered a wide variety of choices in the forms of charter
schools, school choice, open enrollment, neighborhood schools, and small schools.
Milwaukee, like other cities, based school assignment on neighborhood
boundaries during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. Cities were “walking
cities,” so anything else would have been impractical. Nineteenth-century students rarely
attended school past age fourteen, and when they did, they probably attended a high
school offering a “classic” college preparatory curriculum. By World War II, children
were more likely to have attended a “progressive” school or a “comprehensive” school.
This is the era of “no choice,” which lasted until 1976 in Milwaukee. Students had no
choice in schools and little choice in curriculum, with one exception—some students
were allowed to attend vocational schools outside their neighborhoods in some cities.
The no choice era began to wane after 1960 as scholars and educational theorists began to
question the hidden purposes of education when social history became prominent in the
1960s and 1970s.15 This is the subject of chapter 2.
Civil rights advocates also challenged the system of no choice. Many other
historians have written about the struggles of African American students to attend racially
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integrated schools in the 1950s and 1960s.16 The legal importance of Brown v. the Board
of Education of Topeka, Kansas, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Swann v. the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education are well documented. Richard Kluger’s
book Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black America’s
Struggle for Equality, for example, was one of the first and is still one of the best books
written on the legal history of racial integration, covering everything from Plessy v.
Ferguson to Brown. Kluger argued school segregation was only one aspect of the racial
caste system held in place by statutory regulations and judicial decisions. He also broke
down the overthrow of segregation into two confluences—one coming from community
organizers and another from African American jurists. James T. Patterson’s Brown vs.
Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy is a similar legal
history, but Patterson goes further than Kluger by examining the legal history that
followed Brown. He argues that the Supreme Court began to scale back court-ordered
busing plans as conservative justices were appointed in the 1970s and 1980s, while rightwing policymakers claimed that the failure of African American students to achieve was
the result of the failure of African American families rather than segregated schools.
Meanwhile, according to Patterson, whites fled to the suburbs, which resegregated the
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schools. Thus, Patterson casts doubt on the courts’ ability to force social change.17
Several histories have been written about organizing integration movements.
Steven J. L. Taylor did a comparative study of Buffalo and Boston that argued that the
keys to achieving peaceful integration, as in Buffalo, and avoiding violence of the type
experienced in Boston, were to involve local leaders, both black and white, and to make
integration voluntary whenever possible.18 Similarly, Clarence Taylor researched black
organizing strategies in New York and found two distinct camps—one that wanted racial
integration and another that fought for community control of black schools19—just as
their were two distinct groups of African Americans in Milwaukee.20 Finally, Dionne
Danns has researched African American boycotts of public schools in Chicago during the
civil rights movement as a means to desegregate schools, relieve overcrowding, and gain
access to equitable resources. As in New York and Milwaukee, what began as a
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movement for integration ended as advocacy for community control of schools.21
Milwaukee was both similar and different when compared to those cities.
Milwaukee’s neighborhoods were racially segregated, as were most other northern cities,
due to segregative zoning laws, restrictive covenants, and discriminatory mortgagelending practices. Ostensibly, students attended segregated schools because school
assignments were based on geography.22 But a number of things set Milwaukee
Milwaukee apart from other cities. For one, Milwaukee was one of the most segregated
cities in the United States in the 1960s,23 and Milwaukee would rely much more on
magnet schools than other city in the United States. The history of racial segregation in
Milwaukee and efforts to eliminate it are the subject of chapter 3.
Jack Dougherty and Bill Dahlk are two historians who have written about
integration in Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS). Dougherty examines three overlapping
and competing strands of the school reform movement in his book More Than One
Struggle: The Evolution of Black School Reform in Milwaukee. The movement began

21

Dionne Danns, Something Better for Our Children: Black Organizing in Chicago Public
Schools, 1963–71 (New York: Routledge, 2003). See also Mary J. Herrick, The Chicago Schools: A Social
and Political History (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971).
22

See John A. Powell, “Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education” in In Pursuit of a
Dream Deferred: Linking Housing & Education Policy, ed. J. A. Powell, G. Kearney; V. Kay (New York:
Peter Lang, 2001) and the special section of the Journal of Urban History 38, no. 2 (March 2012) for the
relationship between segregated housing and schools; and Harvard Sitkoff, “Segregation, Desegregation,
Resegregation: African American Education: A Guide to the Literature,” Magazine of History 15, no. 20
(Winter 2001): 6–13 for an overview of legal history.
23

See Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) for the best study of segregation in Milwaukee in the
1960s. See John L. Rury, “The Changing Social Context of Urban Education: A National Perspective,” in
Seeds of Crisis, ed. John L. Rury and Frank A. Cassell (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1993), 15–16, 19, for an explanation of how Milwaukee fits into the national context. See Dougherty and
Joe William Trotter Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915–45, (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1985 and 2007).

11
with an older black elite that advocated the hiring of African American teachers, a young
movement that wanted to integrate schools, and a third movement that advocated
community control of schools. According to Dougherty, “activists from various
generations interpreted [the Brown decision] in different ways as they encountered
changing forms of racism over time.”24 Dougherty’s work is biographical, telling the
story of reform through the lives of William Kelly of the Milwaukee Urban League;
attorney Lloyd Barbee, who led the legal challenge to the segregated school system; and
activists Marian McEvilly and Howard Fuller.
Bill Dahlk followed up on Dougherty’s work in Against the Wind by examining
what Dahlk calls “educational proprietorship.”25 Whereas Dougherty examined three
distinct streams of black advocacy and attributes the differences among those three
streams to generational divides, Dahlk sees deindustrialization as key to understanding
the shifting priorities of Milwaukee’s black community. He also uses a biographical
approach but examines other black reform movements, such as curriculum reform,
superintendent Howard Fuller’s administration, and vouchers, in greater detail than
Dougherty.26 Both books are very important works in the history of education, but, like
other historical scholarship, their sections on magnet schools could use elaboration.
Chapter 4 is about the planning of Milwaukee’s magnet plan. Magnet schools are
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“public elementary and secondary public schools of choice”27 that offer a specialized
curriculum designed to attract students from all parts of a school district.28 They were
supposed to integrate school districts by attracting white students to inner-city schools.
Magnet schools come in many varieties. Most magnet schools specialize in particular
areas, such as math and science, computers, trade and technology, or fine arts. Also,
some magnet schools use nontraditional teaching approaches, such as open classrooms,
individualized instruction, or the Montessori method. Magnet schools were the hope of
black and white Americans for voluntary integration and are the main form of educational
choice in this dissertation. This dissertation is unlike other scholarly works, in that most
other studies of magnet schools have been written by social scientists, many of whom
lack historical training.
The Milwaukee case was distinct because the trial Amos v. Board of School
Directors of the City of Milwaukee lasted thirteen years, much longer than trials in other
districts. People speculated that federal judge John Reynolds took so long because he
wanted time for people to prepare for integration and avoid the violence that had plagued
Boston’s integration.29 The Milwaukee school board had a difficult task when Judge
Reynolds ruled against it in 1976. The board and school administration had formerly
been concerned with curriculum matters and school construction. They were now asked
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to venture into an area with which they were not familiar. The conservative majority of
the board asked new Superintendent Lee McMurrin to prepare a voluntary integration
plan after obtaining community input. The final plan relied mostly on magnet schools,
which were part of a national trend in school integration and were something with which
McMurrin had a lot of experience. But the board never completely embraced the plan
and implemented it only reluctantly. The fractured school board also filed an appeal.
Several major studies have been written on implementing integration. Most of
these studies focused on busing and were written in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Gary
Orfield, the director of UCLA’s Civil Rights Project (at Harvard University until 2007)
for the past couple decades, is one of the leading scholarly proponents of busing. He
writes about the legal basis for busing, public attitudes toward it, the economics of
busing, and the alleged conflict between racial integration and bilingual instruction for
Latinos, among other subjects. He also pays significant attention to the role the federal
government played in hampering busing, but in doing so, he ignores resistance
movements by local citizens and offers only a pro-busing perspective. Furthermore,
Orfield does not study magnet schools, which are key to understanding busing in
Milwaukee and other cities.30
Coming from a different perspective, one finds Christine Rossell, a political
scientist at Boston University who is an expert on educational policy. Her most important
book is The Carrot or the Stick for School Desegregation Policy: Magnet Schools or
Forced Busing (1990), which involved research into racial integration and “white flight”
30
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in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Los Angeles; and Boston.31 Rossell’s argument that white
parents are willing to send their children to schools in African American neighborhoods
only under certain conditions is provocative and shows multiple dimensions to the causes
of white migration. In Los Angeles, for example, distance was almost as important as
racial composition of a school when parents decided whether to keep their children in
particular schools. Racial composition was the third most important criterion in Baton
Rouge, right behind reading test scores. Level of income (social class) was also an
important factor in all three districts. In other words, when desegregation is carefully
planned, white migration is not the result.32 This dissertation supports Rossell’s point but
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will do so with a historical perspective, instead of the view of a quantitative social
scientist.
Chapter 5 examines unique challenges to implementing Milwaukee’s magnet
plan. The magnet school plan was supposed to give students a wide variety of choices in
where they would attend school, but students did not volunteer in the expected numbers.
Thus, integration did not happen at the expected rate. Many students—both black and
white—wanted to stay in their neighborhood schools. Therefore, school administrators
forced African Americans to choose southside schools. Hence, the period from
1976–1987 may be thought of as the era of “forced choice.” During this time, MPS relied
on a complicated, inefficient, and expensive busing plan. Curricula proved difficult to
implement in some schools, and there was much dissatisfaction with the plan in both the
black and white communities.
Chapter 6 is about the reaction to the magnet plan, which was not well received by
many students or parent and community groups. African American students who
volunteered or were forced to attend southside schools were sometimes met with
hostility. African American community groups, under the leadership of Howard Fuller,
attempted to end busing and take control of their neighborhood schools. Fuller echoed
the community control movement of the 1970s and believed that forcing African
Americans students to choose southside schools made it appear that African American
could not get a good education unless it was in a white school. Fuller believed the
opposite was true—African Americans could educate their children more effectively than
the existing school system if they were allowed to do so in their own neighborhoods.
Meanwhile, white parents feared that the quality of their children’s education would
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suffer if their children were to attend school with people of low financial worth. Many
white families left Milwauke for more affluent suburban districts.
But magnet schools did not effectively improve educational opportunities for
urban students. Chapter 7 is about the failure of the magnet plan to live up to integration
or academic expectations. Milwaukee’s demographics changed in the 1970s and 1980s,
as the white birthrate declined and white families left the city for the suburbs.
Milwaukee’s economy also sharply declined in that period. Milwaukee was no longer the
manufacturing city it had once been. In fact, it lost more jobs than almost any other city
in the United States, and many of its residents were left in poverty. African American
students were among the city’s poorest inhabitants and failed to make significant
academic improvement. Parents, community groups, and business interests responded by
advocating for more choices. Parents and community groups again said they could
improve education if busing was discontinued and students were kept close to home.
Business interests supported market-driven reforms—the idea that choice in school would
spur competition and improve education while lowering costs. Howard Fuller emerged as
the leading advocate for the end of busing and the increase in choice. He eventually
became MPS superintendent.
The choice movement continued after Fuller left office in 1995. Hence, the period
from 1987–present is the era of “school choice” and is the subject of chapter 8. As in the
case of magnet schools, few of the school choice studies have been written by historians.
School choice, being a contemporary issue, is the subject of social scientists or political
commentary. At best, these studies lack historical perspective; at worst, they seek to
promote a political agenda. One of the objective ones, for example, is Gayle Schmitz-
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Zien’s dissertation in urban education, “The Genesis of and Motivations for the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 1985–1995.” She interviewed sixteen participants
in the school choice movement, ascertained their motivations, and then grouped those
motivations under one of three themes—racial equality, economics or market theory, and
religious school survival—and then discussed the universal theme of social justice. But
while some historical references are made, the framework is fundamentally one of social
science.33
Milwaukee is unique in that it offers a wider variety of choice than any other city
in the United States. Some of these choices—charter schools, a “school choice” voucher
system, and open enrollment—are external choices. In other words, they give students
options outside of MPS. Other choices—neighborhood schools, small schools, and a
smaller number of magnet schools—represent choices available within MPS. These
choices were supposed to improve the quality of education for Milwaukee students, but
recent studies show that education has not improved at all. Students in MPS perform at
about the same level as non-MPS students, if one adjusts for poverty, which leaves one to
wonder whether the expansion of choice was really worth the investments of time and
money that were devoted to it.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ERA OF NO CHOICE:
EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS PRIOR TO THE 1970S
Schools exist to educate students. But while virtually everyone agrees that
students deserve the best possible education, teachers, administrators, school boards,
parents, politicians, and theorists cannot agree on much else. They constantly debate
subject matter, teaching methods, scheduling patterns, and types of schools children
should attend. For example, schools all over the United States eliminated art, music,
physical education, and other specialty classes in the early twenty-first century in favor of
English, mathematics, science, and social studies, because decision makers, facing tight
budgetary restraints, believed their money should be devoted to learning “the basics.”
But other schools refused to eliminate electives on the grounds that nonacademic classes
help develop well-rounded children and engage some students in ways the four core
academic areas do not, thus motivating students to attend school and be successful in all
subjects. Even when there is consensus about course offerings, there is much debate
about what should be taught within individual courses. For example, a United States
history class might emphasize patriotism, academic knowledge, or life skills such as map
reading, civil rights, and the American economy. Furthermore, one teacher may teach
through lecture and discussion, while another prefers cooperative learning, and a third
uses an inquiry approach. Some teachers require a lot of reading and writing, while
others believe in visual learning and expression. The debate over phonics versus whole-
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language education in elementary school may rage into the twenty-second century.1
The fact that these issues are so vigorously debated is a testament to the now
commonly accepted notion that all children should attend school. Indeed, only 2.7
percent of all American children were educated at home (“homeschooled”) in 2007.2
Almost all other children attend school, either public or private.3 But near-universal
enrollment in school was not achieved until the mid-twentieth century. Most children did
not attend school throughout most of United States history, and when they did attend
school, their options for the kinds of schools they could attend either were limited or did
not exist. Hence, the period prior to the 1970s may be thought of as the era of “no
choice.”
The Jamestown colony was established in 1607, the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth
in 1620, and Boston was founded in 1630, but the American colonies did not get their
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first school until 1635, when Boston Latin opened.4 Students who attended Boston Latin
were expected to matriculate to Harvard University, which was established one year after
Boston Latin, when John Harvard donated money and books to the people of
Massachusetts.5 The curriculum at Boston Latin was, not surprisingly, Latin—and to a
lesser extent Greek—and was probably patterned after Harvard’s entrance requirements,
which were to demonstrate proficiency in both classical languages.6 The curriculum was
organized around a seven-year program that consisted of at least twenty-seven subjects,
most of which involved Latin or Greek. Grammar was very important, but theology was
also required, as were small amounts of history and science. Nearly all subjects were
based on the study of ancient writers.7 Though the curriculum was originally intended to
last seven years, some students completed it in less time and were admitted to Harvard as
early as age fourteen. The day lasted from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. in summer and 8:00
a.m. until 5:00 p.m. in winter, with a two-hour lunch break provided no matter the season.
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This schedule was followed from 1635 until sometime into the mid-nineteenth century.8
Schoolmasters placed high priority on memorization and recitation,9 and corporal
punishment was used to enforce discipline.10 Exams were given on Fridays, Saturdays
were for writing, and Sundays were devoted to religious exercises.11
Most children were excluded from Boston Latin. Admission to the school
required students be able to read and write, skills that were usually acquired from literate
parents or private tutors, two things rarely found among poor families. Middle-class
children, on the other hand, were usually literate but would have received no benefit from
attending Boston Latin—the curriculum was designed to prepare students for Harvard,
not farmwork, skilled trades, or shop keeping. Furthermore, the school’s lengthy
schedule precluded poor and middle-class students from attending school, as their labor
was needed at home. Girls were completely excluded until 1789.12 The school was
publically supported but only for Boston residents. Students from the surrounding area
were expected to pay tuition.13
Curriculum changes came slowly. Harvard changed its admissions standards in
1803 so that mathematics and geography were required, but even then, students took less
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than one year of each subject at Boston Latin until about 1823, when ancient history,
English history, geography, arithmetic, geometry, and algebra were listed in the course
catalog as separate subjects. Even then, the geometry text was by Euclid. English classes
appeared for the first time in the 1826 catalog. The entrance age was set at nine at that
time for the then-five-year curriculum, thus continuing the possibility of entering Harvard
at age fourteen. French was introduced in 1852, and American transcendentalist writers,
astronomy, chemistry, physics, one German book, gymnastics, drawing, and an optional
music class came into being by 1870. The admissions age increased to twelve by then,
and a six-year course of study meant graduation at age eighteen. Finally, in 1876, a
modern curriculum was introduced that resembled what students take in high school in
the twenty-first century. Students studied between nine and eleven subjects per year.
Latin, English, history, mathematics, and gymnastics and military drill were required
every year; science and geography were required for the first six years; French was
required in years three to eight; Greek in six to eight; and German in seven and eight. In
other words, five languages, including English, were required in the senior year of high
school. Fine arts classes were required in the lower grades.14
Boston Latin is still one of the best schools in the United States. Even in the
twenty-first century, it still requires four years each of English, Latin, a modern foreign
language, and mathematics, plus three years of history and two years of science to
graduate. It boasts twenty Advanced Placement classes,15 and all students are expected to
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attend college after graduation, be it Harvard or some other prestigious university.16 To
graduate from Boston Latin is to join an elite group that includes Samuel Adams, Henry
Ward Beecher, Leonard Bernstein, Ralph Waldo Emerson, John Hancock, Joseph
Kennedy, Henry Knox, Cotton Mather, Edward Charles Pickering, George Santayana,
and Charles Sumner. Five signers of the Declaration of Independence, including
Benjamin Franklin (who attended but did not graduate), went to school there.17
Boston Latin became the model for colonial schooling and a “classical” education.
Massachusetts had twenty-three schools by 1689,18 and New England as a whole had
thirty-nine by 1700.19 There also were some schools following the Boston model as far
south as Virginia.20
Private academies were the only other option available to the male children of the
wealthy. Benjamin Franklin proposed the creation of private academies in 1743 to teach
practical subjects such as penmanship, drawing, arithmetic (including accounting,
geometry, and astronomy), and English language (including grammar, oral reading, and
composition), natural science, history, geography, civil government, logic, morality, and
religion. Franklin, who attended Boston Latin for only one year, became a sharp critic of
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the traditional or “classic” curriculum, as it is also called. Franklin had read the works of
long-forgotten English radicals John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, and Algernon Sidney,
and possibly Robert Molesworth and Joseph Priestly. These men all believed the
traditional curriculum, with its emphasis on obedience to the schoolmaster and adherence
to the classics, created citizens who were submissive to the state. Franklin believed an
educated citizenry was key to living in a republic and that such an education should be
utilitarian, along the lines of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s vision for education.21
Franklin’s ideas caught on and spread rapidly. Commerce grew after American
independence, and the new American elite wanted its children to learn things that would
be useful in making money. Private academies fit that need, and they had most of the
new republic’s students by 1800, though they did not have anything close to a majority of
American children due to their tuition requirements.22 Most children were excluded from
school because they were of modest means.
Access to schools improved slightly during the nineteenth century. Horace Mann,
Henry Barnard, and other reformers of the early nineteenth century were the chief
engineers of the “common school” movement,23 which began in Boston in 1821, when it
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established an English-only school that was supposed to provide a comprehensive
education, similar to what was found in the private academies, to all children.24 Once
again, however, most children had no time or need to attend school. Only sixty-five
children attended the English school 1822.25 The city, however, opened a school for girls
in 1826 to train them to be teachers.26
Common schools were mostly an urban phenomenon. Again, rural children had
no need to attend school. Rural communities also lacked a sufficient concentration of
children and an adequate tax base to support schools. Urban children typically attended
elementary school from about six to about age fourteen, roughly grades one to eight,
though grade levels rarely were used until the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Students, mostly male, who wanted to attend college matriculated to high school. The
high school could have been in a distinct building in the city or it might have been on the
upper (“high”) floor of the elementary school. Networks of elementary schools were
established to feed students into the high schools, when high schools moved into their
own buildings,27 and from these networks came the first school districts. Twenty-six
towns in Massachusetts, two in Maine, and one in New Hampshire had English-language
high schools by 1839.28 The number of private academies decreased, as parents chose
free public schools over “pay schools” (as private schools were often called) for financial
24
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reasons as well as the geographical factor—few people wanted to send their children
away to school when there was a perfectly good school in their town.29 One-hundred nine
towns had opened public high schools by 1865 in Massachusetts,30 and the other New
England states had opened seventy-one.31 This framework spread to the rest of the
country, and elementary schools and high schools were established in all cities from the
1830s to the 1870s.
These high schools were referred to as “comprehensive” schools in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries because they offered a variety of courses that could prepare
students for a variety of careers or post-secondary education. Comprehensive schools
were tied to neighborhood boundaries. In theory, if all schools were comprehensive, then
all students would have the same educational opportunities regardless of where they
lived. Meanwhile, other schools, such as Boston Latin, that offered specialized curricula
persisted and drew students from all parts of a city or school district.32 Such schools were
rare, however, in the age of a walking city.
On a related note, the term “neighborhood” was defined by United States Supreme
Court in 1826 as a “susceptible variation of the word ‘locality.’ Both terms are elastic
and, dependent upon circumstances, may be equally satisfied by areas measured by rods
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or miles.”33 The town of Stowe, Massachusetts, was probably the first in the United
States to divide its political jurisdiction into separate school districts, which were based
on neighborhoods, in 1805. Students were required to attend their neighborhood school,
except for certain notable families, which were allowed to send their children to any
school within the town boundaries. Dover, Massachusetts, set up an identical system in
1807. Courts overturned both school assignment systems in 1828 and 1831, respectively,
on the grounds that all students and families had to be treated equally—if some students
had to attend neighborhood schools, then all students had to attend schools in their
neighborhoods.34
But that ruling did not apply to African American students. In October 1787,
fourteen free African Americans, some of whom had fought in the American Revolution,
submitted a petition to the Massachusetts legislature protesting their children’s exclusion
from the Boston public schools. Deliberately echoing the protests of the Sons of Liberty,
they complained to the legislature of taxation without education. Nonetheless, the
legislature turned them down, so they set up their own private school. Tuition was twelve
and a half cents per week, and the school “year” lasted only three and a half months.35
The Boston School Committee eventually capitulated and admitted the students to
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the public schools. But African Americans still faced discrimination and harassment, so
the Boston School Committee gave them their own school in 1806 after receiving
petitions from African Americans in 1798 and 1800. Facilities were, not surprisingly,
inferior to white schools.36 Boston’s African Americans began to protest these conditions
in the 1820s, but their pleas for better schools fell on deaf ears. Finally, in 1849, a black
printer named Benjamin Roberts sued on behalf of his five-year-old daughter, Sarah
(referred to as Susan in some sources), who had to walk past five white elementary
schools on the way to the African American school. The case made it all the way to the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, writing for the majority of
the court in 1850, stated that the equal protection clause of the Massachusetts
Constitution did not mean schools had to be integrated. They could be separate as long as
they were equal. The United States Supreme Court used this decision as a precedent in
Plessey vs. Ferguson in 1896, which made “separate but equal” the law of the land.37
Nonetheless, abolitionists lobbied hard, elected candidates to office, and passed
legislation in Massachusetts in 1855 that outlawed school segregation on the basis of
“race, color, or religion.” The 326 African American students who had been enrolled at
Boston’s three black schools were reassigned to formerly all-white public schools
appropriate to their grades and residences.38
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Massachusetts, however, was the exception, for segregation laws were enacted in
New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Connecticut, Maryland, and most other parts of the
United States throughout the nineteenth century, and the courts upheld them all.39
Segregation was also bolstered by the Naturalization Act of 1790, in which Congress
declared that Native Americans and immigrants from Africa or Asia could not become
U.S. citizens.40
Schools continued to expand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The Civil War, which ended in 1865, confirmed the United States would have an
industrial economy. Americans moved to the cities, which enabled more children to
attend school due to the great concentration of school-age children and the decreased
need for agricultural labor. There were only two cities with five hundred thousand
residents in 1870 but twelve such cites in 1920, and the percentage of Americans living in
them increased from 26 to 51 in that same time span. The cities teemed with European
immigrants on the East Coast and Asians on the West. More than four hundred thousand
immigrants came from Europe, and more than thirteen thousand came from Asia in an
average year between 1866 and 1920. Most immigrants took factory jobs. Some
historians estimate that as much as 60 percent of the industrial labor force was foreign
born on the eve of World War I.41
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As the population increased, so did the demand for schools, and children also
stayed in school longer because child labor laws made it harder for them to work in
factories. There was also a growing sense that cities were breeding grounds for juvenile
delinquency. It was hoped that schools could change that by instilling character into
children and assimilating ethnic groups. The number of students in high school increased
from 358,000 in the 1889–90 school year to 7.1 million in 1939–40, and the percentage of
the school-age population enrolled in school increased from 57 to 93.42
In this age of mass production, it made sense to some people to standardize
curricula. There was, however, disagreement over what students should be taught. In
1892, the National Education Association (the NEA, when it was strictly a professional
organization and not a labor union) appointed a Committee of Secondary School Studies,
more commonly known as the “Committee of Ten” because it had ten members. Charles
Elliot was its most eminent authority. Born into a wealthy family in Boston in 1834,
Elliot attended the Boston Latin School and graduated from Harvard at age nineteen with
a degree in chemistry. He became a professor there and accepted the position of president
of the university at age thirty-five. Elliot believed there should be four aims to
education—social stability, employment skills, equal opportunity regardless of class, and
meritocracy—and that education should be the key to success in political and economic
life.43
Charles Elliot’s experiences at Boston Latin and Harvard shaped the direction of
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the Committee of Ten. The committee issued a landmark report the following year that
recommended four kinds of high schools, depending on a student’s interest. All students
would take mathematics and physical, natural, and social sciences. The schools would
diverge from there based on language. The four schools would be classical (two years of
Latin and two years of Greek), Latin-scientific (four years of Latin plus extra science
courses), modern languages (four years of French and German), and English (mostly
classical literature). The first two types of schools were considered college-preparatory,
while the other two were not. No place was left for art, music, physical education, or
vocational education. The Carnegie unit, originally 120 hours of class time, was invented
to evaluate high school transcripts for admission to college.44
The committee recommended a six-year course of study, but most high schools
lacked the space needed to add grades seven and eight. The most common solution to
this problem was to establish junior high schools for grades seven to nine. These schools
functioned in the same way as senior high schools (grades ten to twelve) but with simpler
subject matter.45 In 1910, Berkeley, California, became the first city in the United States

44

David L. Angus and Jeffrey E. Mirel, The Failed Promise of the American High School,
1890–1995 (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1999), 8–10; Brown, 381–384; Krug,
59–65; Spring, 223–224; and Walker and Soltis, 28.
45

See footnote 1 for sources. Junior high schools were just what their name implies—they were
structured as high schools for younger students, grades seven through nine. Teachers were organized by
academic departments, and students traveled all over a building to get to classes. The same students were
not necessarily in the same classes. Middle schools, on the other hand, are typically composed of grades six
through eight (though sometimes younger students are involved) and organize teachers by grade level.
There are typically four teachers (English, mathematics, science, and social studies), and students move
from teacher to teacher as a class. This keeps students together as a “family” or “unit” for most of the day,
with students splitting up only for electives. Most theorists believe middle schools are more
developmentally appropriate than junior high schools because middle schools increase teacher collaboration
in lesson planning and the monitoring of student progress. They also facilitate a transition between one
teacher and no movement in elementary school to seven teachers or more and a lot of movement in a high
school. See William M. Alexander and Paul S. George, The Exemplary Middle School (New York: CBS
College Publishing, 1981) and chapter 11 of Hayes for more information.

32
to try the new model of education. Students could choose from three courses of study:
general, commercial, or elementary industrial. Students were still assigned to
neighborhood elementary schools but were be able to choose their high schools.46 Those
options were available only in cities that had access to transportation by way of streetcar
and had large enough numbers of students to make multiple high schools possible.
The committee was criticized for being unrealistic. Only one committee member
was from a public high school. The other nine were college professors, college
presidents, or headmasters of private academies. None of them were women, so it cannot
be said that the committee represented the teaching corps.47 Public school
superintendents and teachers were angered and insulted by the committee’s
recommendations, because it looked like they were being told that they did not know how
to run schools effectively.48 The inclusion of so much foreign language for both collegebound and non-college-bound students and the rejection of vocational education
conflicted with public and industrial demands.49 Professors at Columbia University, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of Chicago, the University
of Minnesota, and other universities urged school districts to make vocational education
an option.50
Several school districts responded to the criticism. The Cleveland Public Schools,
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for example, began a two-track curriculum in its elementary schools in 1910, one track to
prepare students for vocational schools and one track to prepare them for classical
college-preparatory schools.51 In 1920, Grand Rapids, Michigan, became one of the first
mid-sized districts in the country to open a vocational high school. It also put trade
programs in two of its other high schools.52
Milwaukee also had its share of vocational education. The independent public
Milwaukee School of Trades opened in January 1906. It became part of the Milwaukee
Public Schools in 1907,53 and it was allowed to enroll students from all parts of the city
beginning in 1941, making it Milwaukee’s first magnet high school.54 A Girls’ Trade
School, which offered courses in cooking, sewing, and household management,55 opened
during the 1917–18 school year.56 All other high school students took a four-year
curriculum consisting of composition, rhetoric, literature, history, algebra, geometry, and
physics. Milwaukee students also took either four years of Latin or one year of Latin
followed by three years of Greek or German, according to a curriculum guide from
1899.57 A network of four “pre-vocational” junior high schools—two for boys and two
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for girls—was also established in the 1920s.58 There were 4,691 students in the
vocational junior and senior high schools by the end of 1928, which was more than 24
percent of the junior-senior high school population.59 An Agricultural School was
established in 1919 in cooperation with the Milwaukee County College of Agriculture for
boys who lived on farms and could not attend regular high school.60 Thus, a few choices
emerged midway through the era of no choice. But these schools were still inaccessible
for students who did not have transportation.
The most famous example of a vocational school, however, has to be Stuyvesant
High School in New York City. Stuyvesant High School opened in 1904 to teach
“manual training for boys,” and Dr. Ernest R. von Nardoff became principal in 1908.
Von Nardoff had a degree in mining engineering, not education, from Columbia
University and had been a physics instructor at Barnard College and head of the science
department at Erasmus Hall High School for eleven years before taking his position at
Stuyvesant. He recruited a top-notch faculty that had strong backgrounds in skilled trades
and/or science. He also maintained a fully equipped shop adjacent to his office, so he
could continue to be an active scientist. Extracurricular activities included French, Latin,
debate, philatelic (stamp collecting), short stories, swim, golf, fencing, chess, and drum
corps. Admissions requirements, including a test, were introduced in 1920, and
enrollment increased quickly. Students were attracted to the practical manual training
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and extracurricular activities at first, but many of them also found they enjoyed the
sciences. Staggered scheduling was introduced in 1920 to accommodate the number of
students who wanted to attend Stuyvesant, and a third shift was added in 1923.
Enrollment reached 5,000 in 1928, the same year new advanced science courses were
introduced. Between thirty and forty sections of physics were taught daily by 1934, the
year of von Nardoff’s retirement.61
The NEA recognized the criticisms that vocational educators had of the
Committee of Ten, so it organized the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary
Education in 1913 to reconsider Committee’s work. It was made of six education
professors, three representatives of normal schools, three people from the U.S. Bureau of
Education, three local school administrators, two public high school teachers, two state
high school supervisors, and one college president who had been a professor of education.
There were no representatives from academic disciplines.62
The Commission issued its final report, the Cardinal Principles of Secondary
Education, in 1918, which was much more progressive than the Committee of Ten’s plan.
The report was heavily influenced by the work of “progressive” education theorist John
Dewey, who believed education should be student centered and should prepare students
for useful things in life. He followed the same logic as Rousseau and Franklin.63 The
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Commission did not issue a list of recommended subjects; instead it called for
comprehensive high schools in which students could take whatever they wanted64 as long
as the overall high school experience met the following objectives: 1) health, 2) command
of fundamental processes (e.g., reading, writing, arithmetic, and expression), 3) worthy
home membership, 4) vocation, 5) citizenship, 6) worthy use of leisure, and 7) ethical
character.65
The commission made a hard push for vocational education. In its view, students
should be allowed to train in agricultural, business, clerical, industrial, fine arts, or home
economics—whatever their desires were.66 Vocational guidance counseling was key. In
as much as traditional school counselors helped students choose colleges, vocational
counselors helped non-college-bound students choose careers. Counselors would
administer various aptitude tests in the first year of junior high school to see what
students’ talents were. Also, each student would be assigned a home room teacher who
would guide the student’s socialization by steering him or her into clubs that related to
the student’s performance on the tests. The New York junior high schools, for example,
had 387 clubs and sixty-eight other after-school activities in 1922. Eighty-three clubs
centered on physical training, thirty-one were devoted to history projects, and most of the
rest were on career exploration. At the end of the first year of school, the vocational
counselor would use the test data, grades in vocational classes, and the clubs the student
joined to help him or her make the right career choice. Eighth and ninth grade electives
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were devoted to this one area. Students could then matriculate to a comprehensive senior
high school or could go directly into the workforce.67
Most school districts followed the recommendations of the Commission and
established comprehensive high schools, which could prepare students for either
employment or college. Comprehensive schools offer all the basic academic classes plus
electives in various vocations. Students may choose to take classes in several areas or
may specialize in just one, depending on school policies. Comprehensive schools were
hailed as a “prototype of democracy” in the mid-twentieth century because they were
supposed to represent a cross section of the United States. They were supposed to teach
the value of good citizenship through student involvement in sports and clubs, and they
emphasized school unity through colors, mascots, pep rallies, and assemblies.68
Comprehensive schools also were seen as a good way to assimilate immigrant groups
through courses on English language and United States history and patriotic clubs, such
as Junior Red Cross and victory garden clubs.69
Comprehensive schools continued to be the standard American high schools after
World War II and into the twenty-first century. With the rise of juvenile delinquency in
the 1950s and 1960s, comprehensive schools were seen as a way to reach troubled youth
through “life skills” classes, such as cooking, interior design, art in the home, health, and
everyday math. There were also “relevant” classes such as African American history,
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problems in democracy, and modern literature.70 Many students who were viewed by
their guidance counselors and teachers as having low levels of intelligence or
achievement were steered into the “life skills” and “relevant” classes. They were the
students who would not have enrolled in high school in the nineteenth century but were
now required to by law, and they needed classes to take.71
This last bit of information raises interesting questions about who takes what
kinds of classes in comprehensive schools. In 1910, when most high schools still had the
“classical” curriculum, girls accounted for slightly more than half of all students enrolled.
That means a sizeable portion of the female population was taking classes that would
prepare them for college—even if they did not go to college, they were still trained for
it.72 But as the number of vocational and life skills classes increased and vocational
guidance became mainstream, girls were channeled into “feminine courses.” For
example, a study of high school enrollments in nineteen states during the 1924–25 school
year revealed that girls were enrolled in 53 percent of all high school courses but only 49
percent were taking mathematics classes, compared to 63 percent of all boys. Likewise,
38 percent of girls were enrolled in science classes and less than 1 percent were in
industrial arts, while 50 percent of all boys took science and 29 percent took industrial
arts. Sixty percent of all girls were enrolled in “commercial” classes, compared to 30
percent of boys, and 28 percent of all girls took “household arts” classes, compared to a
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tenth of a percent of all boys.73 This tracking of students by gender effectively
undermined the opportunity for most girls to continue on to college.
Racial and economic tracking were evident too. For example, in Detroit, only 19
percent of all African American students were enrolled in the college-preparatory track in
1924–25, while 44 percent were in the “general” track. The enrollment for nonblack
students was almost equal in these categories—28 percent to 27 percent. Only 9 percent
of African American students were in the vocational track, compared to 15 percent of
nonblack students.74 In terms of class, a 1949 study of a “typical midwestern community”
by A. B. Hollingshead found that two-thirds of upper-class students were in the collegepreparatory track, while a majority of the lower-class students were in the “general” track.
Furthermore, a 1944 study by W. Lloyd Warner, Robert Havighurst, and Martin Loeb of a
“Yankee City” found all of the upper-class students were in the college-preparatory track,
as were 83 percent of the upper-middle-class students. But only 45 percent of the lowermiddle-class students, 28 percent of the upper-lower-class students, and 26 percent of the
lower-lower-class students were in these classes. Both these studies reflected national
trends in class-based differentiation of education.75
Thus, comprehensive schools, while greatly expanding access to school still did
not offer students much in terms of choice—students were tracked into particular courses
based on gender or class. Comprehensive schools also did nothing to address racial
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segregation. Elementary and secondary school enrollment was still based primarily on
neighborhood attendance patterns, which means northern cities with segregated
neighborhoods also had segregated schools. African American schools, comprehensive
or not, were frequently cited as being of low quality. Some African Americans and
liberal whites felt that racial integration would improve the education of the children of
both races. These people turned to protests and lawsuits in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
to force school districts to integrate students. Milwaukee is a good example of how both
protests and legal challenges were used to induce change and crack the framework of no
choice.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ERA OF NO CHOICE:
CHALLENGING SEGREGATION IN MILWAUKEE, 1963–1967
The city of Milwaukee was sharply divided by race in the 1960s. The Milwaukee
Public Schools (MPS) assigned students to schools closest to their homes, which seems
ostensibly fair, but Milwaukee’s neighborhoods were racially segregated, which meant
the schools were segregated. While James Groppi was the primary organizer behind the
movement to enact fair housing laws, by 1963, Lloyd Barbee emerged as the leader of the
movement to racially integrate the schools. Barbee took a two-pronged approach—he
sued the school district, and he also led a grassroots protest movement. He tried to prove
that the schools were segregated not just by residence pattern but through administrative
practices. But reform was difficult. Superintendent Harold Vincent and a majority of the
school board did not want to change, and Milwaukee’s African American leadership
could not agree on what goals they should pursue. Choice was one of the issues that
divided African Americans—they had to decide whether integration was their best option
or they would be better off taking direct control of their children’s schools.
Segregation was based on the neighborhood school system, which dated back to
the founding of the city. The original Town of Milwaukee, sometimes referred to as
“Juneautown,” after its founder, Solomon Juneau, a French furrier, was established as a
trading fort on the east bank of the Milwaukee River in 1818.1 Colonel George H.
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Walker, a transplanted Yankee, founded Walker’s Point south of the Menominee River in
1833, and Byron Kilbourn, a government surveyor, came to the area in 1834 and picked
out a choice piece of land on the west bank of the Milwaukee River, which he aptly
named “Town of Milwaukee on the West Side of the River.” This village, having a very
unwieldy name, was commonly referred to as “Kilbourntown.”2 These three communities
eventually became the east, south, and west sides of Milwaukee.
The residents of the three towns never really got along with one another. Each felt
the others were competitors. Juneau and Kilbourn competed fiercely for land sales.
Whenever either man made an offer to sell land to a particular individual, the other often
followed suit with a more attractive offer.3 But the cost of maintaining separate city
governments was prohibitive, so Juneautown and Kilbourntown merged into the Town of
Milwaukee in 1839, and Walker’s Point was annexed in 1845. Each of the old villages
became a ward in the new town, but the union of the villages did not put an end to their
rivalries. A kind of autonomy still existed. Each ward still competed for settlers, and
they were still physically separated by the rivers. Town ordinances varied from ward to
ward, and each ward was allowed to raise its own tax money and spend it on itself.
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Voting for delegates to the territorial legislature was split across ward lines. Roads were
laid so that when they reached a river they did not line up with the road on the other bank
in the rival ward, which made bridge construction difficult.4
When the city of Milwaukee was formally incorporated in 1846, it was divided
into five wards—one in Juneautown, two in Kilbourntown, and two in Walker’s Point.
Each ward was given its own elementary school, and the city’s Common Council
appointed the school board with equal representation from each ward. This was the birth
of MPS and the neighborhood school concept.5 Children walked to the school closest to
their homes, as they did in other nineteenth-century cities.6
After a few experiments in the 1850s and early 1860s,7 the first permanent high
school opened in 1867, when the state legislature authorized creation of the “Milwaukee
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High School” in Juneautown.8 The three-year high school was comprehensive in nature,
as befit the time period (see chapter 2). Students were divided into two tracks: general
and classical. The general curriculum included two years of mathematics; five trimesters
of various sciences; four trimesters of history; three trimesters of philosophy; courses in
bookkeeping, the U.S. Constitution, economics, rhetoric, grammar, and English literature;
a year of German, and two additional years of German, French, or Latin. The classical
curriculum included the same mathematics courses as the general curriculum, but the only
other courses offered were Greek, Latin, and German. There was no attention to history,
philosophy, or the natural and social sciences.9
Milwaukee High School became East Side High School after Kilbourntown and
Walker’s Point were given their own high schools—South Side High School in 1893 and
West Side High School in 1894, respectively (renamed East Division, South Division,
and West Division after 1899). As the city’s population grew and more students stayed in
school, it became necessary to build more high schools. North Division opened in 1907;
Milwaukee School of Trades (later, Milwaukee Trade and Technical High School and
now the Lynde and Harry Bradley Technology and Trade School), which had been an
independent school, became part of MPS that same year; Washington High School began
operation in 1912; Riverside, or the new East Division, was built in 1913 (with the old
East Division becoming the now-defunct Lincoln High School); and Bay View High
School opened in 1914. Several new junior high schools and elementary schools were
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built during this time as well.10
This school construction was necessitated by large numbers of immigrants and by
compulsory school laws.11 German immigrants had been flowing into Milwaukee’s ports
since 1848, and their children made up almost half the school-age population by 1851.
Being poor, most settled in the less affluent Kilbourntown. The Irish were the second
largest immigrant group and settled in the Third Ward, immediately south of the
Menominee River.12 They vacated the area in 1892 and moved north of downtown after a
fire swept though their neighborhood. Italians, being the poorest of Milwaukee’s
European immigrants, moved into the Third Ward neighborhood next,13 and Poles
immigrated to the south side in large numbers following the turn of the century.14
Czechs, Slovaks, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews also had their own enclaves.15
Milwaukee’s small African American population lived in the area of the north
side of the city bounded by Third Street, Sixth Street, Wisconsin Avenue (then called
Grand Avenue), and Kilbourn Street (then called Cedar Street). This nine-square-block
neighborhood in downtown Milwaukee on the west side of the river had been German
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until about 1900, when the Germans started moving north in search of better
neighborhoods. Russian Jews and Greeks, being newer immigrant groups, then occupied
the area until shortly before World War I, when they too began to move north. As
relative newcomers to Milwaukee, African Americans logically moved into the
neighborhood because it had low-cost housing. African Americans faced employment
discrimination and were relegated to low-paying service sector jobs, which forced them to
rent, rather than buy, their homes.16 The neighborhood would become the hub of the
city’s African American community, which spread out from there over the course of the
twentieth century as more migrants settled in Milwaukee.
African Americans faced discrimination in places of public accommodation, such
as theaters, hotels, and restaurants.17 As in other northern cities, Milwaukee’s African
Americans turned inward, in the tradition of Booker T. Washington, and developed their
own black institutions, including churches, stores, and social clubs. But Milwaukee was
different from other cities. As African Americans left the South in search of jobs at the
beginning of the twentieth century, many of them settled in Chicago if they were skilled
or semi-skilled laborers. African Americans without those skills sometimes continued on
to Milwaukee.18 This settlement pattern meant that Milwaukee’s African American
population was very small until well after World War II. In fact, among the twenty-five
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largest cities in the United States, Milwaukee had the third lowest percentage of African
Americans as late as 1960.19 This settlement pattern also meant that Milwaukee’s black
middle class grew very slowly. It also relied on close association with the white business
community for economic support, as the black community did not have the financial
resources to sustain black-owned businesses. As the number of new migrants increased
on the eve of World War I, some of Milwaukee’s small black middle class looked
unfavorably toward the migrants because the newcomers were of a lower economic class
and could potentially lower the social status of the black middle class in the eyes of
whites, upon whom the black middle class depended.20
As the city began to fill, Progressive leaders, such as Socialist mayor Daniel
Hoan, whose administration lasted from 1916 until 1930, and philanthropist Charles
Whitnall, became concerned about what they called “congestion” in the city.21 Basically,
they wanted residents to spread out, so they began a campaign to annex land and plan new
communities with public parks and other services.22 The city grew from 25 square miles
to 44 square miles from 1919 to 1932. It laid 296 miles of water lines at a cost of $13
million and laid 393 miles of sewer lines at a cost of $14 million.23 Talk of metropolitan
consolidation surfaced in the 1930s, when local governments looked to lower costs
during the Great Depression. This could have meant one countywide school district,
19
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which is common in southern states, but referenda were turned down in almost every
municipality, which historian John McCarthy attributes to a growing sense of
consciousness that the suburbs should be different and separate from Milwaukee.24 Also,
suburbs were able to provide school, water, and sewage services for themselves by the
1930s and were less likely to need the city.25
The suburbs and newly annexed parts of Milwaukee were almost entirely white.
Poverty continued to be a major impediment to African Americans’ finding better
housing, as Milwaukee’s Africans Americans continued to struggle to find good-paying
jobs in the 1920s and 1930s. And even if they could earn enough money to but a home,
Milwaukee real estate agents abided by a “gentleman’s agreement” to refuse to sell
property outside the central city to African Americans.26 According to an article in the
Milwaukee Journal in 1924, “Milwaukee will have a ‘black belt’ if the Real Estate Board
can find ways and means to make it practicable.”27 Banks also promoted segregation by
engaging in a practice called “redlining”—encircling poor/black neighborhoods in the
color red and denying the residents within the red area mortgage loans. The federal level
cooperated with the banks through the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which did not
guarantee mortgage loans to people who were in those redlined areas.28 Restrictive
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covenants, which were agreements that prevented land from ever being sold to African
Americans, were also used to keep African Americans out of the suburbs.29 One study by
an African American attorney in the 1940s found that 90 percent of the plats filed with
the county register of deeds after 1910 prohibited the sale of land to African Americans.
Additionally, an ordinance was enacted in 1920 that zoned the entire southern half of
Milwaukee’s black district for commercial and light manufacturing, effectively blocking
African American migration until World War II.30
The war drew more African Americans north in search of jobs.31 African
American migration continued after the war, and Milwaukee had the highest rate of
African American population growth in any Midwestern city in the period 1950–1960,32
increasing 186.9 percent, compared to a 16.3 percent population increase overall.33 The
city also renewed annexation during that period under the leadership of Frank Zeidler, a
Socialist and mayor from 1948 until 1960. Zeidler added the Town of Lake to
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Milwaukee in 195334 and the Town of Granville in 1956.35 He also annexed individual
neighborhoods and houses in the Town of Greenfield until the rest of Greenfield
incorporated as a city in 1957.36 Zeidler, like Hoan before him, thought Milwaukeeans
should spread out and believed that every man should be able to buy his own home. He
thought those who could not afford homes should be able to live in one provided through
a public housing program, including housing at the edge of the city.37 But he could not
win enough support of the common council or the state to construct public housing
beyond the inner city, and he faced bitter opposition from suburbanites who feared
African Americans might settle near their borders. Lack of good-paying and affordable
housing were two impediments to black home ownership in the newly annexed parts of
the city.38 In fact, more than 98 percent of African Americans lived in the inner core in
1953.39
Further expansion of the city was blocked by suburbanites who resented the
encroachment of the city and the urban problems they feared the city could bring. They
successfully lobbied the state of Wisconsin to change annexation laws to prevent
Milwaukee’s expansion in 1955.40 They also passed zoning laws that required lots that
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were so large that African Americans were priced out of the suburban housing market.41
As in the 1930s, the federal government continued to support racially biased
lending policies in the 1950s and 1960s. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
the Veteran’s Administration (VA) granted almost all loans to people who wanted to
build new single-family homes, instead of granting loans to multi-family units or to
remodeled older homes. With most empty lots in the suburbs, the FHA and VA gave
white middle-class people an incentive to leave the cities. The FHA tracked racial
information and used it to redline African American neighborhoods, making it difficult
for African Americans to get out of the inner city.42 In fact, according to the FHA’s own
records, there were only sixty-six African American families in the twenty-five suburban
communities surrounding Milwaukee in 1967, and eight suburbs had no African
American residents at all.43 As former Milwaukee mayor John Norquist commented
“[for] the FHA, creditworthiness was synonymous with whiteness.”44
James Groppi, a white Catholic priest, led Milwaukee’s campaign to end housing
discrimination. Groppi had traveled to Selma, Alabama, in 1965 to participate in the civil
rights marches there. Groppi, who was Italian American, felt that his fellow Italians had
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received unequal treatment from Irish church authorities in the Milwaukee Archdiocese.
He therefore identified with the mistreatment of African Americans and took up their
cause when he returned to Milwaukee.45 Groppi is most famously known for leading
African American and liberal whites in protest marches across the Sixteenth Street
Viaduct in 1967 as a means of demonstrating the need for an open housing ordinance in
Milwaukee. Although the marchers remained peaceful, they were greeted by a crowd of
five thousand angry whites when they reached Kosciuszko Park, some of whom held
signs that said, “Polish Power” and “A Good Groppi is a Dead Groppi.” Others yelled,
“Niggers go home!” “Go back to Africa,” and “Sieg Heil,” and some threw stones,
bottles, garbage, and chunks of wood.46 Obviously, a sizeable portion of white
Milwaukee was not ready to integrate.
The segregated residence pattern led to a segregated school system, because
students were assigned to schools closest to their homes. The school board and
superintendent took no steps to intervene and relieve segregation. The state legislature
revoked the Milwaukee Common Council’s power to appoint the school board in 1907
and made the board an elected body. Its fifteen members served six-year terms, with one-
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third elected every two years on an at-large basis. The intent of the “reform” was to make
the school board directly responsible to the people and take it out of ward politics, but
African Americans could not muster enough votes to elect any more than one African
American to the board.47
When debating racial issues, the school board was split between eight
conservatives and seven liberals throughout the 1960s and 1970s.48 These factions were
not immutable. The factions varied or could be nonexistent depending on the issue. The
school board dealt with frequently dealt with curriculum, appointment of administrators,
the budget, school construction/repair, and legal matters. In some years, race is barely
mentioned in the school board proceedings. Also, the terms “liberal” and “conservative”
are used here in the traditional sense of the words, not the connotation prevalent in the
early twenty-first century—liberals wanted change, while conservatives resisted change.
Some of the liberals and conservatives could be considered moderates and occasionally
voted with the other faction, and some switched sides as the context of the race and
integration debate changed.
The school board was led by conservative president Lorraine Radtke from 1963
until 1965.49 She prided herself on being “pure German [of] Prussian extraction” and
said that all ethnic groups struggled when they first came to Milwaukee but were always
able to overcome poverty. She claimed to see “paradoxes in the Negro thinking,” which
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she expressed by stating, “He says he hates the white man yet he wants to integrate with
him. He wants to copy the white people, he wants the same standard of living, yet he says
white people are all wrong.” She also demonstrated a paternalistic racism by saying
African Americans should develop their own course in life:
I would like to see him excel in areas which have not been thoroughly
developed by white people. I think that the Negro has a great deal to offer
our culture in the fields of the arts—music, drama, painting, and sports.
He should develop his skills to the utmost. He should be original in his
approach to living. He should realize that he need not imitate the white
man to fulfill his culture.50
Steven Baruch worked in the MPS human relations office in the 1970s and
described Radtke as “a conservative in the good sense of the word,” that she resisted
change and wanted to give programs a chance to work. Radtke and the other
conservatives believed the school board should not alter the neighborhood school system
or do anything else that would change the status quo in Milwaukee.51 The seven liberal
board members disagreed and said racial integration was a key to quality education. If
school board meeting agendas are any indication, then the liberals were largely ignored.52
The board dealt mostly with school construction, budgetary matters, and approval of
curriculum between 1963 and 1975. It also increased the amount of time it spent on
student discipline by the 1970s, as fights and other disruptive behaviors increased and the
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teachers union gained strength and demanded action.53
Radtke’s most vocal opponent was attorney Lloyd Barbee. A native of Memphis,
Tennessee, and graduate of the University of Wisconsin Law school, Barbee joined the
NAACP at age twelve and remained active in it his entire life. He moved to Milwaukee
in September 1962 and opened his own law firm, Barbee and Jacobson (known as Barbee
and Goldberg after 1976), and quickly became involved in the school desegregation issue,
partly because he experienced discrimination while in law school.54 He began researching
the extent of racial segregation in MPS upon his arrival to Milwaukee.55
Brown vs. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) overturned de jure
segregation—that is, segregation by law—in public schools, but Brown was silent on
segregation based on residential pattern.56 Barbee believed that the Milwaukee school
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board had violated Brown by deliberately promoting segregation. The board disagreed. It
established a “freedom of choice plan” in 1964, which was also in use in several school
districts throughout the United States. In theory, students were allowed to choose any
school in the school district and were allowed to attend if space was available and the
parents could take responsibility for transportation, which met the criteria for integration
set in Brown. In practice, often times, only a few token African American students were
admitted to a school.57 Barbee appealed to the state superintendent of public instruction,
who rejected his arguments.58
Barbee and the NACCP tried to work with the school board to integrate the
schools. The board responded by creating a seven-member Committee on Equality and
Educational Opportunity in 1963 to study racial problems in MPS. Radtke appointed
attorney Harold Story, another conservative, as chairman. Story had strong ties to the
business community and had been vice president and general counsel to the AllisChalmers corporation when the United Auto Workers, its chief employee union, sued the
company as part of a bitter labor dispute in which the union was accused of having ties to
the Communist party.59 Story said the school board should take a “color-blind” approach
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and that any kind of integration plan would be “in complete violation of the law.”60
Radtke appointed three other conservatives to the committee—John Foley, Margaret
Dinges, and Ed Krause—and three liberals—Cornelius Golightly (the only African
American on the school board), Elisabeth Holmes, and John Pederson.61
Golightly, a professor of philosophy at UWM, presented evidence of the harmful
effects of de facto segregation. He pointed to a 1961–62 study of the school system by
the state department of public instruction that, among other things, compared Fulton
Junior High and North Division Senior High (both of which were more than 90 percent
black) to Audubon Junior High and Pulaski Senior High (both of which were more than
90 percent white) and found that the white schools had a wider array of courses and better
programs for adult education. Golightly and other liberals believed this inequality was
one of the prime causes of African American students’ failure to achieve. The
conservative majority, however, disregarded most of what Golightly had to say and said
improvements had been made to black schools since the state report had been published,
but interestingly, they did not point out any specific examples of what those
improvements were.62
Most members of the school board did not get involved in the day-to-day
operations of the schools, deferring to the superintendent instead. The “School Board
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Member’s Creed” taken by board members in 1957 is indicative of this difference:
In working with the Superintendent of Schools and his Staff –
I will hold the Superintendent of Schools responsible for the
administration of the schools.
I will give the Superintendent of Schools authority commensurate
with his responsibility.
I will expect the schools to be administered by the best training
technical and professional people it is possible to procure.
I will elect employees only on the recommendation of the
Superintendent.
I will participate in Board legislation only after considering the
recommendation of the Superintendent and only after he has
furnished complete information supporting his recommendation.
I will expect the Superintendent of Schools to keep the Board of
Education adequately informed at all times through both oral and
written reports.
I will expect to spend more time in Board meetings on educational
programs and procedures than on business detail.
I will give the Superintendent of Schools friendly counsel and
advice.
I will refer all complaints to the proper administrative officer or
insist that they be presented in writing to the Board as a whole.
I will present any personal criticisms of employees to the
Superintendent.
I will provide adequate safeguards around the Superintendent and
other personnel as they may perform their proper functions on a
professional basis.63
Superintendent Harold Vincent had not been hired to deal with racial issues or
integration. Vincent has been described as a “brick and mortar superintendent”—he
constructed schools to accommodate the city’s rapidly growing school-age population,64
which had increased 50 percent between 1950 and 1960.65 Vincent ignored racial issues,
and concentrated on what might be deemed more traditional school-related issues in his
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seventeen years in office. Teachers were fairly well paid, and Vincent and the school
board kept taxes low. He introduced new curricula, and superintendents in other cities
considered him one of the most successful. School board members, fellow
administrators, and the Milwaukee Journal praised him for his professional and personal
conservatism. He did not drink alcohol or smoke tobacco and refrained from using
profanity.66
Milwaukee media lauded Vincent for his achievements;67 African Americans did
not. For example, when Vincent was given the Home and Family award from the allwhite Eagles Club in 1966,68 the Milwaukee Urban League69 and the Milwaukee Star, an
African American newspaper, demanded that he not accept the award.70 Lloyd Barbee
and Fr. Groppi led approximately sixty-five people, half of whom were white, in a protest
outside the Eagle’s Club the night of presentation for about two hours.71 Anticipating
trouble, Groppi formed the NACCP Commandos, a type of unarmed police force, to
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protect the other demonstrators.72 Four members of the Ku Klux Klan, three in white
cloaks and robes, showed up to distribute white supremacist literature and stage a counter
protest.73
Vincent and the school board’s conservative majority denied that there was
deliberate segregation in MPS. Barbee disagreed and filed suit against the school district
on June 17, 1965, on behalf of the parents of thirty-two black students and nine white
students in Amos et al. vs. the Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee.74 The
United States Supreme Court ruled three years later in Green vs. County School Board of
New Kent County (1968) that school districts had to take steps to eliminate segregation
when it was present,75 which Barbee argued the board had failed to do. But Barbee went
beyond Green and also argued that MPS deliberately promoted segregation in five ways:
(1) the school board established school boundary lines that produced segregation; (2) it
approved construction of predominantly black schools; (3) it allowed white students to
transfer but restricted black pupils to segregated schools; (4) instead of taking a “colorblind” approach to staff assignment, it preferred black teachers and other black staff work

72

“Ceci Asks Foe to Halt Commandos,” Milwaukee Journal, October 5, 1966, 3:15. See also
chapter 5 of Jones.
73

“2 Rights Groups, 4 Klansmen March as Eagles Fete Vincent,” Milwaukee Journal, October 14,
1966, 2:10, and “Rights Groups Join Protest at Eagles Club,” Milwaukee Sentinel, October 14, 1966, 1:5.
The uninformed man had been accused of bombing the Milwaukee NAACP headquarters.
74

Barbee Papers, register, ix, and Michael Stolee, “The Milwaukee Desegregation Case” in Seeds
of Crisis, ed. John L. Rury and Frank A. Cassell (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 245.
See Santocroce, 249–259, and the register of the Barbee Papers for information on Barbee’s career in the
state legislature prior to the Amos lawsuit. The case was Armstrong vs. O’Connell from 1976 until 1979.
75

Crockett, 40–44; Joe R. Feagin, “School Desegregation: A Political-Economic Perspective” in
Stephan and Feagin, 30–31; and Christine H. Rossell, The Carrot or the Stick for School Desegregation
Policy: Magnet Schools or Forced Busing (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 3–6.

61
in black schools and allowed white staff to transfer out of such schools; and (5) it failed
to integrate students who were bused “intact” with white students at receiving schools.76
As explained earlier in this chapter, MPS divided the city into several elementary
school districts based on neighborhood needs.77 Those schools fed into specific junior
high schools, which in turn fed into specific senior high schools.78 These boundaries
were adjusted if a new school was built or an existing school became overcrowded, which
was common in the 1950s and 1960s because of the tremendous growth in the central city
population.79 Arthur Kastner, head of the MPS Department of School Housing Research,
claimed in a newspaper interview that race was never a factor in determining which
boundaries would be moved or where facilities would be expanded. He said he did not
care if the students were “colored, white, Mexican, or polkadot” but called integration
“impossible.”80 Barbee argued that if Kastner could use maps, surveys, census data, and a
group of demographers to adjust boundaries and feeder patterns to minimize
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overcrowding for more than twenty years, then he could use the same tools to desegregate
schools.81
Although Kastner publicly stated he did not take race into account, Barbee argued
that memos from the Department of School Housing Research clearly show Kastner did.
Kastner knew African American families had higher birth rates than white families, and
he used that knowledge to predict where population growth would occur. One of his
general rules was that once a school district was 30 percent black it was within the
“tipping point” and was destined for a rapid growth in African American population and
white out-migration. Kastner’s office made recommendations to the school board to
adjust the district boundaries to reduce overcrowding or potential overcrowding in
schools located in these high growth areas,82 which Barbee argued was a “policy of
containment” that strived to keep African American students in the central city area when
they easily could have been bused to less crowded white schools.83
Although there were hundreds of boundary changes over the years, two examples
illustrate Kastner’s office’s commitment to segregation. In the late 1950s the school
board observed the percentage of black pupils in the Center Street School district had
grown dramatically and was predicted to continue to grow. Its district contained twenty-
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seven city blocks, so the board detached the twelve eastern-most blocks, which had
mostly white students, and added them to the neighboring Pierce district, which also was
mostly white. Thus, the Center Street School district went from being racially balanced
to being primarily black, while the Pierce district remained primarily white. By 1964,
Center was only 5 percent white, while Pierce was still 87 percent white. The same thing
happened to the LaFollette district when five of its thirty-five blocks were detached and
given to the Keefe Avenue School district. However, the boundaries of the Fratney
School district, a predominantly white district adjacent to the central city, were never
changed to make room for African American students.84
The second example centered on an explosive controversy surrounding
Washington and Marshall High Schools in 1970. The root of the problem lay in
overcrowding at Custer and Madison High Schools and at Peckham Junior High. The
school board proposed Peckham’s ninth grade be assigned to Washington Senior High,
making it a four-year high school instead of a three-year school. This action would
overcrowd Washington, so some of its students would have to be assigned to Marshall
Junior-Senior High (grades seven to twelve), which also would pick up students from
Custer and Madison. But this would overcrowd Marshall. Therefore, Marshall’s seventh
and eighth grades would have to be assigned to nearby junior highs, making Marshall a
four-year senior high. Several elementary schools also would have to have their feeder
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Figure 1

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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Figure 2.

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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Figure 3.

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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Figure 4.

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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Figure 5.

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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Figure 6.

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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plans changed to accommodate this, and in total, the boundaries of 40 school districts out
of 156 would change.85 The plan would create a racial imbalance. Washington was about
10 percent African American. Many white parents considered that ratio to be an ideal
racial balance, but by moving Peckham’s ninth grade to Washington and transferring a
portion of Washington’s school district (a section that was mostly white) to Marshall, the
percentage of African American students at Washington would increase significantly and
would probably inspire white flight, in the view of those parents. However, the school
board claimed this plan was a sound education strategy because it maintained
neighborhood schools and because many school systems across the country were
switching from junior and senior high schools to middle schools and four-year high
schools.86
But simply adjusting these boundaries was not enough to meet the growing
population of the city of Milwaukee. The school board predicted in 1947 that more
schools would be needed in order to meet the needs of the baby boom. Its solution was to
build new schools in newly populated areas of the city, which were populated by white
families, many of which were headed by World War II veterans.87 There were also a few
85
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Figure 7.

Source: Milwaukee Journal, April 28, 1970.

new schools in the central city. However, the term “new” is used loosely here. Walnut
Street School was remodeled and reopened as a “new” school in 1951 after being closed
for several years. Two years later the Milwaukee Girls’ Junior Trade School became the
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“new” Garfield Avenue Elementary School.88 Substandard classrooms (former
storerooms or gymnasiums) were put into use in several other schools.89 The selective
building of schools was the subject of the second part of Barbee’s case.
Parkman Junior High School, Holmes Elementary, and MacDowell Elementary
were three new schools that opened in the central city and were actually newly built, but
in the case of MacDowell, there were problems with how the school was constructed.90 It
was three stories high and had fortress-like towers with a dark-colored exterior.
Kindergarten classes were held in the basement on the opposite side of the building from
the nurse’s office, which upset some parents who wanted the youngest children to have
access to natural light and a nurse. Barbee compared McDowell to the new Louisa May
Alcott school, which was on the south side and was just one story surrounded by a large
lawn. The exterior was made of a soft red brick, and kindergarten classes were held in a
separate wing that adjoined a grassy play area and was near the school nurse. In simple
terms, the black students received the “bad” school, while the white students received the
“good” school.91 Furthermore, as each one of these schools opened, the boundaries of
adjacent districts in the central city shrank to make room for the new school, which
further isolated African American students from the rest of the city. Barbee said the
school board should send African American students to the southside schools on buses
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Figure 8

Source: Office of the Superintendent, “Report of School District Changes in Central Area of Milwaukee
1943–1953–1963” (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Public Schools, January 1964).
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instead of building more schools in black neighborhoods. Barbee did not suggest that the
school board find volunteers for the buses, nor did he say that students should be bused
involuntarily.92
The board’s third method of enforcing segregation was to selectively deny pupil
transfers. The school board adopted a “free transfer” or “open transfer” policy in 1964 to
try to avoid litigation from the NAACP and other civil rights groups.93 The policy
allowed students to transfer for any reason, provided parents paid the cost of
transportation. This policy was supposed to provide families with a degree of choice, but
Barbee presented evidence that it was not consistently enforced—African American
students had to go out of their way to transfer out of a black school, while all white
students had to do to get out of a black school was cite “fear” or “harassment” from
African American students.94 Also, because parents had to provide transportation, getting
to a southside school would have been difficult for poor African American children.
The school board also discriminated in teacher assignment. The school board had
resisted hiring African American teachers—it took until 1930 for it to get its first two,95
and by the 1950–51 school year, the first year in which MPS kept data on the racial
breakdown of its faculty, nine out of 1,749 MPS teachers were African American. Eight
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of those nine were assigned to Fourth Street and Ninth Street Schools, which were black
elementary schools. The remaining teacher taught at the only junior high school in
Milwaukee where African American students were a majority. The number of African
American teachers increased to 193 in the 1960–61 school year, but 64 percent of them
were assigned to schools with at least 90 percent black enrollment. Another 19 percent
were assigned to other black-majority schools, and the remaining 17 percent were in
white or mixed schools. School officials readily admitted this was intended and desirable
in their view for both teachers and students.96
Teacher transfers were related to assignment. Teachers, like students, could
request a change in schools for any reason.97 “Environmental” reasons became an
increasingly popular excuse among white teachers for getting out of black schools.98
Others came right out and cited an inability to teach African American students.99
Discipline problems and hostility from students were the most common reasons cited for
transferring out of inner-city schools. Many teachers said they were physically and
mentally exhausted and no longer saw themselves as teachers. Some teachers even
reported being physically assaulted or having personal property damaged, including
automobiles.100 Most of the transfers went to white teachers, as most of them had more
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seniority than African American teachers.101 Thus teachers could not actually change
schools at will.
Finally, “intact busing” was, in Barbee’s view, the most blatant tool used to
maintain segregation. Intact busing was the process by which a class of African
American students who were assigned to an overcrowded elementary school boarded a
bus at their school with their teacher and were bused “intact” to a different school.
Students were not allowed to integrate at the receiving school and were bused back to
their neighborhood school at the end of the day and often times for lunch. The first
instance of intact busing was in 1959.102 Because the most overcrowded schools were
almost always in black neighborhoods and the receiving schools were usually in white
neighborhoods, this practice preserved racial segregation. Superintendent Howard
Vincent claimed it would not be fair to integrate students at the receiving school because
intact busing was only temporary until space was available at the sending school, and it
would be wrong to break up friendships when space became available again at the
sending school. He also said the policy against integration made administration of the
program easier because it could be done any time during the semester without disrupting
the daily routine at the receiving school, as the students from the sending school still had
their own teachers and were under the jurisdiction of their original principal. He said it
was as if the bused students had never left their original school103 and that it was a notable
improvement over programs that reduced overcrowding in other districts, which relied on
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part-time or staggered scheduling and disrupted normal school operations.104
Barbee said Vincent was not telling the truth. He argued that students had been
bused and integrated at the receiving school until 1957 because both the students and the
receiving schools were white. Intact busing did not resume until the following school
year, when there was a surge in the city’s African American population.105 From the
1958–59 school year through the 1973–74 school year, there were 509 classes of intact
busing for all or part of a semester (counting semesters separately). Of these 509 cases,
214 (42 percent) involved movements between schools of about the same racial
compositions; the remaining majority of 289 cases (57 percent) involved movement
between schools whose racial compositions were substantially different. Most intact
busing was done from black schools to white schools or from white schools to white
schools. White students were rarely, if ever, bused to black schools. Additionally, the
number of African American students who were bused intact was larger than the number
of white students who were bused intact.106
Vincent denied racial discrimination. According to him, African American
students attended schools that were old and in the greatest need of modernization and so
they were bused intact, while the white students who had been bused intact had no
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schools in their areas.107 Therefore, the white students could never go to neighborhood
schools, and hence, had to be integrated into the schools they were attending,108 though
evidence submitted at trial showed this was not always true.109
Barbee surveyed teachers who participated in intact busing to see how it affected
equality of educational opportunity, and he introduced the results as evidence at the trial.
Teachers who had white classes reported either positive or mixed experiences with intact
busing. In some schools, the bused students were allowed to mix with the other students
and had full use of the facilities, including the cafeteria, playground, audio/visual
equipment, reading center, and library. They also got to participate in school activities,
and their parents were included in the receiving school’s Parent Teacher Association
(PTA). Teachers who had classes from black schools almost always reported negative
results. Many teachers reported their students felt isolated and not fully accepted, even
when they were allowed to participate in school activities. They also said students
needed a stable environment if they were to learn and that intact busing created instability
in their lives. Teachers of both races said students missed valuable class time because the
bus ride took too long and reported their students did not feel as if they were a part of
either their sending or receiving school. A few complained also their students were bused
for more than the one semester recommended in the intact busing plan.110
Based on this evidence, Barbee argued that intact busing was psychologically
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damaging. It branded African American students as inferior, as they were physically
separated from white students. Barbee also said intact busing was not temporary, as
Vincent claimed. For example, two classes at Seifert school were bused intact while the
building underwent expansion, but the African American population continued increasing
so fast that when the project was completed, six classes still had to be bused. Barbee
predicted this pattern would continue at Seifert and other schools for several more years.
This practice was in violation of the school board policy that said if a group of students
were to be bused for more than one year it was not temporary and that they should be
permanently assigned to the white school.111
Despite this evidence of segregation, there was not much of an organized
resistance movement to oppose school segregation until Barbee arrived in Milwaukee.
Unlike in other northern cities, Milwaukee’s African Americans were relatively satisfied
with their status, perhaps because they had only recently moved to Milwaukee. The
Bisbing Business Research group conducted a poll for the Milwaukee Journal in October
1965. The results of the survey were published in a series of articles in February 1966
entitled “As Milwaukee Negroes See It.” Four hundred African Americans and one
hundred whites were polled. More than 80 percent of the African Americans said they
liked living in Milwaukee, and two-thirds said they liked MPS.112 When asked to name
the most serious problems facing African Americans in Milwaukee, education ranked
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third (28.5 percent), behind jobs (42 percent) and housing (34 percent). A poll conducted
by UWM in 1960 showed similar results—education was again ranked third (9 percent),
with housing and jobs listed as the two biggest problems.113 This was followed five years
later by another UWM study that found two-thirds of Milwaukee’s African American
parents said the teachers of their children were as good as those elsewhere, 71.9 percent
judged their inner-city school buildings to be well maintained, and 70.0 percent said
schools were better now than when they were children.114
Thus, there was not widespread support for a legal challenge to segregation in the
mid-1960s. This ambivalence was partially caused by divisions within Milwaukee’s
African American leadership. There were actually three distinct groups of civil rights
advocates in Milwaukee in the 1960s: a middle-aged, middle-class African American
elite; a young group of integration activists; and an emerging group of Afro-centric
activists. The middle-class elite had been around the longest and had lobbied MPS to
hire African American teachers beginning in the 1930s. Primarily interested in financial
success, the elite was conservative, had a fair number of entrepreneurs, sometimes lived
in white neighborhoods, and did not want to harm their relations with the white
businesses. The integrationists, led by Barbee and Groppi, wanted swift change. Finally,
the Afro-centrists advocated for changes in curriculum and school governance, which in
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some circles involved state-supported vouchers to attend private schools.115
Understanding the distinctions among these groups is one of the keys to understanding
the reaction to Milwaukee’s magnet plan, which will be analyzed in chapter 6. All three
groups wanted Africans Americans to have quality educational opportunities, but they
disagreed on how that could best be done.
Alderwoman Vel Phillips and future alderwoman and state representative Annette
“Polly” Williams followed the older viewpoint. Like most other prominent African
Americans, they sent their own children to private or parochial schools for some or all of
their education.116 A UWM study showed that 53 percent of this black elite lived in
middle-class neighborhoods, so even those who sent their children to public schools were
sending them to white ones.117 Local notables such as Theodore Coggs, Grant Gordon,
Clarence Parrish, Hercules Porter, and Ken Coulter fit this description.118 Also, some
officials in the Milwaukee branch of the NAACP and some of Milwaukee’s black church
leaders were hesitant to challenge white leaders, who controlled business interests.119
But a younger group of African Americans who advocated integration instead of
cooperation had begun to emerge in the early 1960s. These African Americans sought to
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give children additional options of where to attend school. Calvin Sherard formed a local
chapter of the Negro American Labor Council (NALC) in 1961. Within a year, NALC
claimed to have one hundred members and began picketing Milwaukee businesses that
were lax in hiring black clerks.120 Ken Coulter, publisher of the Milwaukee Star, and
Walter Jones, general manager of the Star and later editor of the Milwaukee Courier, also
an African American newspaper, lent support by giving considerable coverage to school
segregation and other civil rights issues.121
Under pressure from these and other community groups, Harold Story was forced
to open hearings on segregation in the fall of 1963. Representatives of the NAACP, the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Near Northside Non-Partisan Conference
(NNNPC), requested at least fifteen minutes at a school board meeting to present a CORE
report on problems with segregated education in Milwaukee.122 CORE’s presentation was
especially critical of intact busing and showed that it went on too long to be considered a
temporary measure.123 CORE also criticized the school board’s failure to assign African
American teachers to white schools, the assignment of inexperienced teachers to black
schools, and discrimination in student transfers.124 Finally, representatives from the
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NAACP, under the leadership of Barbee, also spoke at the meeting and threatened a
school boycott unless plans were put in place by January 30, 1964, to integrate the
schools.125
That meeting was the beginning of the movement that swayed Milwaukee’s
African American community away from the older elite and toward the younger
integrationists. It was followed by a meeting on January 21, which broke down quickly
when Story refused to allow representatives from CORE and NNNPC to sit with Barbee.
Barbee stormed out of the meeting with about twenty-five other people and sang “We
Shall Overcome” in the lobby. He left the building after a few minutes of singing, and
Story went ahead and presented evidence that there was no intentional segregation in
MPS. He was arrogant enough to direct questions at Barbee’s empty chair and began
each question with “Mr. Barbee . . .” Barbee commented afterward that there was no
point in staying for the meeting as, “It was all a show anyway since Story wanted to be
the script writer, producer, and director.”126 He also again threatened to carry out the
school boycott.127 Story made feeble apologies to Barbee and CORE chairman Richard
McLeod a few days later, but both men refused to compromise.128
Barbee and his supporters launched a series of pickets at segregated schools that
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lasted about two weeks and drew support from some white Milwaukeeans.129 Then, on
March 1, Barbee and other members of the NAACP, CORE, and NNNPC joined with
some Milwaukee parents and ministers who were concerned about racial segregation and
formed the Milwaukee United School Integration Committee (MUSIC), of which Barbee
was elected chairperson. Its purpose was to organize a grassroots movement against
school segregation.130 A rally was held the night of March 1 at St. Mark AME church.
Barbee estimated that nine hundred people were in attendance, but the Milwaukee Journal
put the number at approximately 350.131 Whatever the case, nearly everyone who spoke
supported a boycott.132
MUSIC demanded Story’s committee be dissolved, and it organized two marches
and a rally to drum up support for the proposed boycott.133 The group researched the New
York boycott,134 chose a date of May 18, and laid plans to set up “freedom schools” for
students to attend at churches and other sites, modeled after New York. If the school
board would not give African American students a choice in where they attended school,
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then African American parents would make school available.135 The mainstream media
opposed the boycott, calling it a violation of truancy laws.136 Milwaukee labor unions,
traditionally liberal but almost entirely white, could give only mixed support.137
But Barbee did not yet have full support from the black community. Some
African American ministers were reluctant to embrace Catholic members of MUSIC138
and distrusted Barbee’s atheism.139 Historian William Dahlk has suggested black
ministers were jealous of the power that Barbee and Groppi, who was white, exerted over
the black community and were more concerned with preserving their power bases.140
Additionally, many members of the black elite were anxious about MUSIC’s
confrontational tactics. Many of the elite were closely entwined with white-dominated
businesses and public services and, as such, could not risk their privileged positions by
becoming militant. Instead, they exhibited a leadership style that was conservative and
quiet.141 One such individual was E’Allyne Perkins, an MPS teacher and president of the
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Milwaukee Council of Negro Women. According to newspaper accounts, rather than
boycott, she urged African Americans to concentrate on solving black problems, such as
blacks beating up whites at Wells Junior High, fights after high school football games,
vandalism, juvenile delinquency, parental apathy,142 and excessive drinking and pool
playing by black males. She also was very critical of emotional clergymen, whom she
believed were unqualified to lead Milwaukee’s civil rights movement.143 James Dorsey,
an attorney and active member of the NAACP, was also against the boycott, according to
both black and mainstream newspapers. Being part of Milwaukee’s older black elite,
Dorsey decried the lack of “dignity” in Barbee’s leadership style. He also criticized
encouraging students to be truant and disrespectful toward school authorities, and he
feared a white backlash.144
Board president Lorraine Radtke, Committee on Educational Opportunity
chairman Harold Story, and superintendent Harold Vincent refused to meet MUSIC’s
demands.145 They thought of Barbee as something of a joke and actually welcomed a
lawsuit, almost goading him into trying one.146 Golightly tried to keep peace between the
two sides, agreeing with most of MUSIC’s points but preferring diplomatic work through
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committees.147 The role of peacemaker became an impossible task, however, after Radtke
compiled and published a 247-page “bibliographical digest” of newspaper and magazine
articles detailing problems in the African American community with the intention that it
would show why integration would not be beneficial to Milwaukee,148 a tactic liberal
board member Elisabeth Holmes blasted as “racist,” “inflammatory,” “destructive and
vicious,” and “preposterously one-sided.” Golightly, an associate professor of philosophy
at UWM, said he was embarrassed as a scholar to have his name associated with the
document, which he called “sheer gibberish.” He also said he could not imagine “any
Negro seeing [the digest] and feeling good about it” and that it reinforced the negative
feeling in the community that “nothing should be done.”149 John E. Pederson, another
liberal member of the school board, agreed with Holmes and Golightly, and Milwaukee
Citizens for Equal Opportunity demanded Radtke’s resignation.150 Radtke claimed she
was doing a public service that would provide a “constructive” basis for committee
deliberations. “I don’t want any glory on this,” she said. “That isn’t its purpose.”151
Corneff Taylor, executive secretary of the City Commission on Community Relations,
said the digest “failed to include contributions from any of the widely known sociologists
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in the nation” and it showed “some people have to be dragged along by progress.”152
In a last ditch effort to save the situation, Mayor Henry Maier, known for his
conservative positions on social issues, proposed arbitration through an independent
panel. Barbee said he could work with such a panel but that the boycott would go on
anyway. The school board, for its part, rejected Maier’s suggestion by a vote of nine to
six,153 and MUSIC went ahead with its boycott on May 18, 1964. Thirty freedom schools
were opened in African American churches.154 They offered a curriculum centered on
black history and culture and functioned as normal schools for the most part. They had
many typical classroom activities that regular schools would normally have, including
reading, essay writing, attendance at lectures and films, small group discussion, and
singing. Volunteers from the black community and a few whites served as teachers and
principals and did everything one would normally expect of school officials. They even
posted fire drill routes.155 The volunteers included three ministers, two attorneys, a
county supervisor, a social worker, and Marilyn Morheuser, a white woman who had
been a teaching nun until 1963, whereupon she moved to Milwaukee, took up Barbee’s
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crusade, and became his chief lieutenant and editor of the Milwaukee Star, a move that
was considered very startling at the time. Because of her teaching background, she was
chosen to write the freedom school curriculum.156
According to MPS attendance figures, about 14,000 out of the district’s 20,000
African American students were absent that day, about 11,500 more than usual. In other
words, it would appear that 60 percent of all African American students participated in
the boycott. In comparison, the day before the boycott, Perkins, Dorsey, and Judge Christ
Seraphim sponsored an open meeting to foster opposition to the boycott, but it drew only
forty-six people.157
Whites Milwaukeeans still resisted change, and Harold Story and the other
conservatives on the school board refused to budge. A group calling themselves “The
Citizens” named Story “citizen of the month” in May 1964 and sent a petition with 732
signatures to the school board to “uphold and support the neighborhood school system as
it now exists under law.”158 The neighborhood school system itself was still something
that Story described as “sacred.” Any proposals to change it died in committee. Students
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would not be allowed to choose their own schools.159 Directors Golightly, Pederson, and
Holmes, now referring to themselves as “the minority,” complained that the four-person
majority on the Committee on Equality and Educational Opportunity deliberately blocked
any proposals to desegregate the schools, allegations the majority of course denied.160
This division reflected a similar fracture in the full school board, which frequently voted
eight to seven on racial issues.161
The local mainstream media encouraged the NAACP to cooperate with the Story
committee162 and advocated self-improvement as the only way for minorities to solve
their problems.163 Carl Zimmerman, director of news and public affairs for WITI–TV
Channel 6, called the NAACP’s complaints about segregation “unjustified” and urged it
“to put [its] energies to more productive use.” He also said:
The school board policy—and [Channel 6 believes] it’s a logical one—has
always been to send the youngsters to the school closest to their home. If
the area is predominantly Negro, of course there will be mostly Negro
pupils in attendance. By the same token, if it’s a Puerto Rican
neighborhood, the schools will have Puerto Rican children. If it’s an
Italian neighborhood, most of the youngsters attending schools there will
be of Italian descent. It’s a matter of geography! The youngsters go to the
school nearest their home.164
But criticism from the media was not very important to Barbee. The purpose of
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the boycott, in his view, was not to change whites’ minds, but to galvanize Milwaukee’s
black community, the way it had been throughout the South and in some other northern
cities. With a school board election a year away, MUSIC started to mobilize candidates.
Five seats, including Story’s, were at stake. When MUSIC-backed candidates claimed
integration would improve academic success for African Americans, Story countered
with a claim that lack of achievement was caused by ineffective parenting skills.165
Milan Potter, a Story ally and candidate for the school board, argued involuntary
desegregation would result in “white flight.” He proposed a program to encourage parent
involvement instead, hoping that would improve the quality of education in black
schools. He also advocated stricter discipline policies so teachers would have better
control over their classrooms.166
An informal poll conducted by the Milwaukee Sentinel shortly before the election
showed that most voters supported neighborhood schools.167 Potter came in first place in
the general election. John F. Foley and Story (second and third place, respectively) also
qualified, as did Frederick Mett and Walter Gerken, both of whom were endorsed by
MUSIC.168 Thus, the spring elections in 1965 were something of a mixed bag—only two
of the five MUSIC candidates were elected.
Following the election, the board approved $1 million for compensatory education
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programs for African American students, which included a low pupil-teacher ratio,
tutoring, reading centers, full-time prekindergarten teachers, welfare and psychological
counseling, and special orientation programs, on a nine to four vote.169 The board
majority cited the neighborhood school system, the mandate they believed they now had
from the voters, their lack of faith in Barbee and MUSIC, support from state
superintendent Rothwell, and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in a Gary,
Indiana, case that deliberate school segregation had not been adequately proved.170 That
July, when Radtke stepped down as president, the board elected attorney John F. Foley to
fill her position. Foley promised to continue all of Radtke’s policies, including the
neighborhood school system with the open transfer option, which allowed students to
attend schools outside of their neighborhood, if there was room available at the school
and if the parents could provide transportation. Foley also appointed Radtke to take his
place on the Story committee.171 The Milwaukee Star condemned the new president as a
continuation of dictatorship and paternalistic racism.172
MUSIC’s protests continued and intensified. Barbee led sit-ins at school board
meetings.173 CORE did the same at Superintendent Vincent’s office174 and picketed
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Story’s home.175 At about the same time, Barbee started a protest at the MacDowell
school site, charging the school would be almost entirely black if construction was
completed.176 On May 24, Barbee and ten other demonstrators were arrested for forming
a human chain around an “intact” bus that was supposed to take students from Brown
Street School to a white school.177 This action led to several more demonstrations and
dozens of arrests before the end of the school year.178
The Milwaukee Journal published a major study in September 1965 called
“Reading, Writing, and Race” that covered the battle over desegregation. The newspaper
gave some attention to problems in black schools, such as the high dropout rate and the
alleged psychological damage caused by intact busing, but it offered few solutions that
MUSIC would support. All in all, the Journal study stood by the neighborhood school
system. The school officials and board members the Journal interviewed cited several
factors other than segregation as causes of low achievement among African American
students, including economic problems, lack of strong family values, poor educational
history, and few parents with an education. Interviewees also cited the new compensatory
education programs and open transfer policy as evidence that the school board was doing
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everything it could to help African American students succeed.179 White parents filed
petitions in support of neighborhood schools after the survey results were published. One
petition had 1,573 signatures.180
Shortly after the Journal study was published, Barbee announced a week-long
school boycott to begin October 18. It unfolded almost exactly as the first one had.
MUSIC went door-to-door and held grassroots-level meetings and rallies to get support.
Churches volunteered space for freedom schools.181 The peaceful nature of the protests
attracted whites and Catholics, including black Catholics.182 Father Groppi, nineteen
other priests, thirty-five nuns, and four Catholic parishes volunteered to aid the boycott,
despite contrary orders from Auxiliary Bishop Roman Atkielski, the top Catholic official
in the absence of Archbishop William Cousins.183
The second boycott, however, was not as successful as the first. Only 7,300
students stayed out of class, as opposed to 11,500 before. Forty-nine guidance counselors
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were dubbed temporary truant officers and were sent to the freedom schools to seize
students.184 Some got into the schools, but others were physically barred from entering.
By the second day of the boycott, the number of participating students was down to
4,300. On the same day, Atkielski gave Groppi and the other priests and nuns a direct
order to desist, invoking their vow of obedience, which compelled them to comply.185 A
third boycott was attempted in March 1966, this time focused solely on North Division
High School. Participation in this boycott was even lower than before, and a wide
difference in North’s absentee rate and attendance at the freedom school suggested that
many absent students were simply using the boycott as an excuse to take the day off.186
The third group of African Americans activists emerged at this time. They were
part of the growing national trend of “black power,” and became active in April 1967, as
part of Groppi’s Youth Council, which distributed leaflets at North Division, King,
Riverside, and Lincoln High Schools that urged students to turn in their textbooks
because they did not adequately reflect African history and culture.187 Black power
advocates also formed the United Community Action Group (UCAG) in 1967 on a
platform of cooperation with MPS but ended up advocating for self determination, after
getting frustrated with MPS’s slowness to change.188 In their view, African Americans
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needed to take charge of their own course in life. Integration was fine, but if that was not
going to happen, then it was better to give African American families another choice,
which was community control over schools.
Robert Harris and Jake Beason, both teachers at North Division, were two such
advocates. Harris was head football coach, a physical education teacher, and a member of
Groppi’s parish, and Beason was a newly hired social studies teacher who advocated
black pride and Pan-Africanism, rejected white leadership, even if it was duly elected,
and took students on field trips to Islamic sites in Chicago. According to interviews, both
were able to make strong connections with the students at North.189 Then, in February
1968, students at Rufus King staged a walkout to demand black history be taught.190
About a week later, about eight hundred students walked out of North Divison.191 The
NACCP Commandos lent their support as well.192 These protests marked a significant
departure from the MUSIC boycotts, because they were organized by students, not adults,
which paralleled a national trend of youth involvement in civil rights. Similar walkouts
had occurred in Chicago, for example, in the same year as the Milwaukee walkouts.193
Black power advocates continued to stage demonstrations at various schools
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during the remainder of the decade. For example, students at Fulton Junior High staged a
boycott of the school lunch program in December 1967 to protest the absence of African
American cooks. According to Fulton’s principal, all but two or three of the school’s
1,400 students opted to bring lunches from home rather than buy food.194 A similar
boycott was successfully conducted at Wells Junior High in March 1968.195 The
following month, students at Wells protested when the school failed to hold a memorial
service for Martin Luther King, who had recently been assassinated.196 In May, parents
petitioned the school board to remove the principal at Ninth Street Elementary for lack of
sensitivity to African American students, parents, and culture.197 In October, some
African American students at West Division staged a walkout because their principal
refused to allow them to start an African American club. Ironically, his decision was
based on the fact that the club would not be integrated. At about the same time, some
African American students at West Division refused to take a standardized test because,
they claimed, it did not relate to them.198
These protests, like Groppi’s open housing protests that inspired them, achieved
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some success. Steps were taken to promote cultural awareness.199 For example, MPS
introduced a ninety-two-page booklet written by district officials called “The Negro in
American Life” in November 1967 to serve as a supplement to junior and senior high
school history courses.200 A year later, Jake Beason was allowed to teach African
American History at North,201 and a similar class began at Wells.202 Fulton’s
administration made an effort to recruit African American cooks,203 and several new
African American principals were appointed throughout MPS.204
One setback was when Beason was transferred from North Division to Lincoln
High School in August 1969 for what were deemed disruptive activities, including
advocating black power. He clashed with principal Walter Klaseser at Lincoln High
School and was removed from MPS altogether after only one year. Reasons cited for his
termination were failure to follow scope and sequence, excessive lecturing, and failure to
control a study hall.205
An organization of African American parents and community members formed
the Alliance for Better Education to get Beason reinstated and Klaeser fired. Following
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the black power model, they also called for community control of schools, a black school
board, and another communitywide boycott.206 The boycott never materialized, but
Beason was reinstated in 1971 and assigned to Parkman Junior High. Later, Beason
would be reassigned to North Division again, only to be removed in 1977 and assigned to
substitute teaching. His health deteriorating, he was eventually confined to a wheelchair
because of a wound incurred two decades earlier during the Korean War.207
Thus, lack of unity among African Americans, who were divided into those who
wanted to cooperate with the school board, those who were led by Lloyd Barbee and
wanted integration, and those who emphasized curriculum reform and the development of
African American identity. This lack of unity, combined with the tradition of
neighborhood schools and a school board that was resistant to change, allowed the board
to continue to operate segregated schools into the 1970s. Fear of a white backlash also
prevented integration, which is why, when integration did come, the school
administration developed voluntary plan that relied on magnets schools to end the era of
no choice.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ERA OF NO CHOICE:
PLANNING FOR MILWAUKEE’S MAGNET SCHOOLS, 1967–1976
As Milwaukee searched for a way to improve the quality of education for African
American students, a new curriculum fad—magnet schools—was sweeping the country.
Magnet schools specialize in particular fields of academics—some might specialize in
fine arts, while others might focus on math and science, technology, or business skills.
Students choose their schools, instead of simply attending the school closest to their
homes, and the schools are supposed to “attract” students from all parts of the school
district. Actually, the idea that specialized schools should be available for students who
wanted a vocational or college-preparatory curriculum not available in a comprehensive
school had been around for a long time (see chapter 2). But magnet schools began to
move beyond their original academic purpose in the early 1970s and into the venue of
racial integration by attracting white students to schools in the parts of the city in which
African Americans lived. Many African Americans looked forward to the possibility of
their children attending integrated schools, and whites liked the idea that magnet schools
were voluntary. Tacoma, Buffalo, Houston, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Boston
were some of the best documented urban districts to adopt magnet programs, and
Milwaukee learned from their experiences. Integration supporters spent a lot of time
planning and involved a wide variety of people in order to cultivate community support
for a voluntary plan that offered a wide variety of choices to students. However, they
were only marginally successful in cultivating that support from the school board and the
white community.
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The circumstances surrounding magnet schools differed from place to place. In a
few cases, such as Tacoma, school boards voluntarily developed magnet plans, but in
most cases they were the result of court order. Some districts, such as Buffalo and
Houston, sought broad community support for racial integration and magnet schools and
developed plans that were generally well received. Other districts, such as Cincinnati, did
not solicit much community input on integration, and white migration resulted.
Pittsburgh converted most of its schools to magnet status, while Chicago had only one
magnet high school. Boston represents an extreme example in which there was very little
community involvement and violent confrontations between African Americans and
whites.1
Tacoma, Washington, claims to be the origin point of magnet schools.2 The
population of Tacoma was 147,979 in 1960, approximately 95 percent of which was
white. In 1963, the first year in which the district compiled student enrollment by race,
just less than 9 percent of the students were not white, but by 1969 that figure was more
than 13 percent. Like most school districts in the North, Tacoma had a system of
neighborhood schools that resulted in de facto segregation. Consequently, Stanley
Elementary was 63 percent black in the early 1960s and McCarver Junior High was 84
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percent, even though the overall percentage of minorities was small in the district.3
The school board appointed a seven-person study committee at the urging of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1964. The
committee, which included two African Americans, recommended a program of
compensatory education, such as tutoring and special curricula that might better meet
students’ needs at the majority African American schools. It did not, however, endorse
desegregation until 1968. By that point, Tacoma’s African American community had
become much more vocal about change. According to then-superintendent Alex
Sergienko, an extensive recruitment effort for magnet schools began in the summer.
Counselors visited homes of white parents to explain what was going to
happen—McCarver Junior High was going to become the first magnet school and would
have the best teachers in the district and the most popular principal. Sergienko recruited
students from affluent parts of Tacoma and suburban districts, and that fall, McCarver
reopened with a minority enrollment of less than 64 percent. By 1970, African
Americans made up less than half the school, and there was a waiting list for white
children. According to Sergienko, “After 36 years, I’m still struck by what we were able
to get done. It is wonderful to think that good things can be accomplished in this world.”4
Desegregation went well in Tacoma, but Buffalo was more difficult. Like
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Milwaukee, Buffalo was segregated by residential pattern.5 Elementary school attendance
zones were set up on a neighborhood basis. They in turn fed into specific high schools.
New schools were constructed as overcrowding occurred at existing ones, and they were
almost always segregated. School attendance area lines were manipulated to further
isolate students.6 The NAACP mounted a legal challenge against the Buffalo school
board in 1962, and community groups, such as Build Unity, Integrity, Leadership, and
Dignity (BUILD), formed to take direct action such as protests and sit-ins. This was met
by a “law and order” platform from white elected officials in city government and on the
school board, which resisted racial integration.7
The court case began in 1972 and ended in 1976. The judge found de jure
segregation present. The school board was ordered to develop an integration plan. It
recruited influential citizens from a variety of ethnic groups and worked with concerned
parents to develop a plan that both the court and white parents could accept. The school
board implemented a three-phase desegregation plan. In the first phase, which began in
1976, some white schools and some black schools were closed and their students bused
elsewhere to create racial balance in some schools. Feeder patterns were also adjusted to
aid desegregation. In the second phase, which began in 1977, magnet schools were
created. Finally, in the third phase, which began in 1980, white students in prekindergarten through grade two would be bused to black schools to create integrated
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classes. After grade two, the racially integrated classes would be bused to white
neighborhoods until they finished eighth grade, after which each student would choose a
magnet high school.8 White elected officials reversed their opposition to busing when
they recognized that integration was inevitable.9 Local media aided the program by
promoting magnet schools on the radio and running positive or neutral articles in
newspapers. Thus, intensive community involvement helped win acceptance of magnet
schools.10
Desegregation in Houston was similar to desegregation in Buffalo. The city began
its school desegregation in 1970 when directed to by a court order. The school board’s
original plan paired twenty-two schools, generally one in a white neighborhood and one
in a black neighborhood. All students would attend one school in one of the pairs for a
few years and would then attend the other school for a few years more. For example, a
school in a white neighborhood might be designated kindergarten to grade three, and a
school in black neighborhood might be designated fourth to sixth grades. All the students
in the pair—African American and white—would go to the white school through third
grade and would then go to the black school afterward. Buses were used to transport
students when necessary. Parents of white students panicked and moved to the suburbs.
The total white enrollment in the twenty-two paired schools declined from 1,783 in
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August 1970 to 539 in November 1974.11
Houston Superintendent Billy Reagan asked the school board to appoint a task
force of school and community representatives to come up with a new plan. The task
force held meetings throughout the city, visited other cities, and analyzed survey data.
The task force recommended a twenty-six-part plan that called for curriculum changes,
optional bilingual and year-round programs, an average class size of fifteen in elementary
schools, and magnet schools. A sixteen-person committee was appointed to develop the
magnet plan. Its membership consisted of central office staff, assistant superintendents,
and building administrators. Teachers, parents, and community leaders were not
included. The city implemented thirty-four magnet programs at thirty-one campuses in
September 1975, the most prominent of which was the High School for the Visual and
Performing Arts. Eleven more programs were added the following year. Programs
emphasized foreign languages, ecology and outdoor education, music, science and
petrochemicals, aviation, engineering, literature, art, and remedial course work. More
than seven million dollars was budgeted to implement the program between 1975 and
1977, and the school district’s internal census data showed an improvement in diversity
of the magnet schools.12
Other districts, such as Cincinnati, experienced more resistence to integration.
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The NAACP sued the Cincinnati Board of Education in 1963 on behalf of Tina Deal, an
African American student who wanted to attend a white school. Litigation lasted until
1969. During that time, it became clear to many white parents that desegregation would
occur, whether they wanted it or not. As a result, white neighborhoods tried seceding
from the Cincinnati district and joining suburban districts, which the school board
steadfastly refused to allow.13
Cincinnati municipal officials wanted to keep white families in the city. They
represented a middle-class economic base and had children who were academically
successful. But with so much white opposition to integration, there would have to be a
powerful incentive for these parents to remain in the city rather than move to the suburbs.
Magnet schools were that incentive. Fourteen different programs were developed at thirty
locations in Cincinnati. Implementation occurred during the 1975–76 school year.14 The
Cincinnati district organized college preparatory schools, trade schools, and other schools
with innovative options such as ecology, zoology, and horticulture. It set up a math and
science high school and brought in scientists and mathematicians for special lectures and
demonstrations. It also implemented extensive bilingual and language immersion
programs at the elementary level. Some schools used the Montessori method, and others
experimented with multi-age classrooms.15 All these plans sounded very good, and they
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received favorable reviews from African American parents, but most white parents still
objected to integration, and an exodus to the suburbs began.16 Some experts
recommended metropolitan integration—Cincinnati was one of twenty-three school
districts in Hamilton County. But suburban districts did not agree to countywide busing,
and the United States Supreme Court ruled in Milliken vs. Bradley (1974) that suburban
districts could not be ordered by a court to integrate with urban districts unless they had
deliberately contributed to segregation.17
Pittsburgh did not want to be another Cincinnati, so it based its plan on the
successes of Houston and similar school districts. Superintendent Jerry Olson assembled
a four-man team of experts from all over the nation in 1977, including Dr. Billy Reagan,
the superintendent of the Houston school district, and Lee McMurrin, both passionate
advocates of magnet schools. The Pittsburgh school board held public meetings and
distributed surveys. Parents responded favorably to the magnet idea, and the school
board approved a plan 8–0, with one member absent. The school board brought in
consultants from nearby universities to help develop curriculum and formed a citizens’
advisory committee. These people made recommendations on program type and
locations, and the school board and court approved their recommendation in 1979.18
The Pittsburgh plan called for a three-year phase-in. In the first year, nineteen
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magnet schools would be established at the elementary level, including eleven schools
that would have the then-revolutionary full-day kindergarten, four that would receive
bilingual programs (French, German, Italian, and Spanish), two that would be set aside
for gifted and talented students, and three that would have “open” classrooms, an
educational phenomenon popular in the 1970s in which students could choose to study
whatever they wished with a teacher acting as facilitator to individuals or small groups of
students. The plan also designated three magnet middle schools, one of which was an
arts school for grades four to eight. The other two had gifted programs for grades six to
eight. Ten high schools would become magnet schools, with specializations in computer
science, ROTC, college-preparatory, math and science, health careers, law and
government service, journalism and publishing, engineering and architecture, business
and management, and creative and performing arts. Dozens of other programs would be
added in 1980 and 1981. Some would be full-fledged magnet schools, while others
would remain neighborhood schools with specialized programs.19 Outside experts and
internal reviewers evaluated the success of the magnet program in 1981 and made
recommendations for adjustments to program locations, staffing, and feeder patterns from
1982 to 1984.20
Tacoma, Buffalo, Houston, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh are examples of the typical
districtwide model used to implement a magnet school plan. Chicago’s plan, on the other
hand, was completely different. Originally, a plan to pair and cluster schools had been
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introduced in 1965, but it was quickly withdrawn in the face of voracious white protest.21
It took until the mid-1970s to formulate a new plan, which would have opened several
magnet high schools. The plan should have been more acceptable to the white
community than pairing and clustering, but lack of funding, among other reasons, meant
that only one of the planned schools—Whitney Young Magnet High School—actually
came into being. Whitney Young was part of a larger program of urban renewal in
Chicago. It was a brand new building, located in a neighborhood west of the downtown
area that was easily accessible by public transportation from all parts of the city. The
neighborhood had been a major center of light manufacturing and warehousing prior to
the 1960s but had been in a state of decline since. At a cost of $31 million, Whitney
Young was not only supposed to rejuvenate the Chicago Public Schools, it was supposed
to revitalize an entire neighborhood. Three specializations were available: medical arts,
science, and performing arts. There was also a special program for students with hearing
impairments. Each program used experts from the community and offered specialized
courses not available at other schools. Eighty percent of applicants were required to score
in the top half on standardized achievement tests to be admitted. Students who were
admitted represented a geographic cross section of the city. But each student had to
provide his or her own transportation, and no student was admitted midway through the
school year, which limited accessability for lower-income students whose families moved
frequently.22
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As Chicago’s lone magnet high school, Whitney Young was supposed to have the
best of everything. Staff development was crucial. The school opened in September
1976. But the principal began working there in January 1974, and twenty persons were
employed over the summer to develop curriculum, meeting daily for workshops on
individualization, learning theory, and other subjects taught by university consultants.
These twenty teachers worked with the rest of the faculty, which was recruited from all
over Chicago, during the 1974–75 school year for two hours per week to plan the school.
Whitney Young would open as a well-oiled machine, so to speak.23
The school received 5,400 applications for its five hundred ninth-grade seats.
About four-fifths of the applicants were African American. School administrators
blamed their low white recruitment on lack of publicity. Whitney Young also had to
compete with fifteen specialized neighborhood public high schools (including vocational
and technical schools) and several private and parochial schools for white students. On a
more positive note, administrators reported that the admissions process was very
competitive among African American students.24
All the cities described thus far in this chapter resulted in peaceful integration, but
the same cannot be said about Boston, a city with several parallels to Milwaukee.
Boston, like Milwaukee, was a city divided into very specific ethnic enclaves in the early
twentieth century. The major groups were the descendants of Puritan settlers, Yankees,

23

Campbell and Levine, 143–145.

24

Campbell and Levine, 145–146.

111
and the Irish.25 The Irish assumed control of local politics and moved into the more
affluent neighborhoods at the beginning of the twentieth century as the Puritans and
Yankees migrated to the suburbs. As more African Americans came north during the
Great Migration, they moved into the former Irish ghettoes.26 Again, as in Milwaukee,
Boston had a neighborhood school system at the elementary level and a feeder system for
the upper grades that created “black schools” and “white schools.”27 Similarly, Boston’s
school board manipulated district lines to maintain segregation, restricted transfers, and
discriminated in the hiring and promotion of staff.28
Boston’s white residents did not accept desegregation as well as the people of
Tacoma and other cities had. Nonetheless, seeing the inevitable court decision on the
horizon, local officials decided to act before they were required. Magnet schools seemed
like a palatable alternative to mandatory busing. To that end, the Boston School
Committee created a “model demonstration subsystem” in 1968 that consisted of three
new magnet schools: Trotter Elementary School, Wheatley School, and Copley High
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School.29
The three magnet schools were popular with elected officials and Boston’s white
citizenry, but integrationsists pressed for a stronger remedy. The Harvard Center for Law
and Education filed suit against the City of Boston’s School Committee in 1972 on behalf
of fifteen parents and their forty-three children. In the case, originally known as Morgan
vs. Hennigan (later Morgan vs. Kerrigan), Judge W. Arthur Garrity ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs in 1974. Garrity took over the school system himself and appointed a special
master to monitor implementation of a multi-part desegregation plan that included
changes to student, faculty, and administrative staff assignments; school capacities and
program locations; construction, renovation, and closing of school facilities; changes in
special education, bilingual education, and vocational and occupational education;
student transportation; school safety and security; and student discipline. Garrity ordered
a massive busing plan that paired schools in white parts of the city with schools in black
parts of the city.30 He also ordered that at least 35 percent of the students admitted to
Boston Latin (see chapter 2) be African American or Latino.31 The Boston School
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Committee proposed establishing an “intra-city voluntary transfer program” featuring
fifty-five magnet schools in lieu of mandatory busing in 1974. Garrity rejected the
voluntary component but accepted magnet schools in 1975 and predicted that magnet
schools would prove to be an “enormous safety valve” that could vent anti-busing anger.32
Garrity was wrong. Whites rioted in the streets of Boston and in the high schools
in 1975, the first year of desegregation. Some riots lasted several days. Molotov
cocktails flew through windows, and some African Americans were afraid to leave their
homes. Hundreds of students were suspended for rioting at South Boston High School.
When white students and residents tried to block the buses, the police were called, and
when the officers arrived, the white mob turned on them. African American students
were openly beaten up in the streets for months. White racists threatened to blow up
bridges to keep buses from crossing into white territory. Some African Americans
responded with violence of their own, throwing stones at white buses and beating up
white students. Leaders of both the black and white communities tried to calm people
down to no avail. Just being a person of a different race in the wrong place was enough
to bring on an assault. Innocent motorists were attacked, their cars overturned and
burned. Civil officials and law enforcement had lost control. Pandemonium reigned.33
The white student population declined 17 percent in Boston public schools from 1974 to
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1976 as whites families left the city.34 The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the city
of Boston a writ of certiorari in 1976, effectively declaring magnet schools a
constitutional means to desegregate schools.35
Milwaukee learned from the Boston example and would not make the same
mistakes. It was necessary to cultivate some level of community buy-in to stave off a
violent response. Milwaukee’s model for integration would look much more like
Buffalo, Houston, and Pittsburgh. It was peaceful, though not well received by all
people. In 1967, the Milwaukee school board paid the New York-based Academy for
Educational Development (AED), a nonprofit educational think tank, to conduct a study
on school problems. AED made several recommendations to improve the schools,
including changes in curriculum, more flexibility in curriculum, an increase in counseling
and psychological services, expansion of Advanced Placement (AP) classes, professional
development for teachers, decentralization of supervision and decision making, an
increase in school spending of more than double by 1972, and steps to end de facto
segregation.36
The last recommendation was the one that garnered the most attention. The report
said Milwaukee lagged behind other northern cities on racial integration in schools. In
fact, a slim majority of the school board did not even recognize segregation as a problem.
34
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AED described the board’s highly touted “compensatory education program” as “nice”
but lacking “the necessary air of emergency and urgency.”37 Some of the programs were
inadequately funded, understaffed, or aimed at groups of students instead of focusing on
individual needs. None of them provided college preparatory opportunities to students
with high potential nor did any provide interracial experiences. Lloyd Barbee said the
report was “being nice” when it came to describing racial problems and expressed doubt
toward school board action on the report.38 Eight school board members, including
Harold Story, Lorraine Radtke, John Foley, and the new school board president, Margaret
Dinges, refused to make any comments on the report, other than that it should be referred
to a study committee.39 But while this lack of action on the AED report may have been
another stalling tactic, the board was also beginning to shift toward reform.
The Milwaukee desegregation lawsuit was in full swing by 1967. Federal judge
John Reynolds had a long history of liberal activism and opposition to segregation as
state attorney general and governor of Wisconsin.40 It was, therefore, obvious to some
school board members that he was going to rule against the district. Reynolds appointed
Irvin Charne, a friend of his who was a moderate Democrat, as Lloyd Barbee’s cocounsel. According to people who were close to the case, Reynolds did this because
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Charne could help control Barbee’s temper and make desegregation more palatable to
Milwaukee’s white community.41 The school board, therefore, decided to take a twopronged approach to implement reform so it would not have desegregation forced on it by
Reynolds. Its first step was to hire a superintendent in 1967 who would work better with
the black community, and later, it allowed citizens and parent groups at each school to
formulate reform plans. These plans were met with opposition and were rejected by the
board, but they started discussions about integration in the Milwaukee community. Those
discussions laid the groundwork for a much larger citywide discussion about integration
in 1976 and helped cultivate community support for the integration plan that thr district
eventually adopted.
Superintendent Richard Gousha assumed office on July 1, 1967, after a thirteento-one school board vote in May. Superintendent Gousha was more progressive than his
predecessor Harold Vincent. He was willing to work with diverse groups of people to
accomplish goals and had experience with desegregation, as he had been state
superintendent of public instruction in Delaware, which had implemented a desegregation
plan.42 Historian Bill Dahlk has said that Gousha kept quiet on controversial issues like

41

Bruce Murphy and John Pawasarat, “Why it Failed: Desegregation 10 Years Later,” Milwaukee
Magazine, September 1986, 36–37. Reynolds did not comment on why he appointed Charne co-counsel
but said it was not a negative reflection on Barbee. See United States, District Court (Wisconsin Eastern
District), “Craig Amos [and Other] Plaintiffs vs. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee (and
Others) Defendants: Decision and Order / John W. Reynolds Presiding” (Milwaukee: The Court, 1976),
11–12 (hereafter cited as Amos).
42

Milwaukee Board of School Directors, Proceedings of the Board of School Directors
(Milwaukee: The Board of School Directors), May 17, 1967 (hereafter cited as Proceedings).

117
busing and did what he could to reform the system the school board had given him.43
Gousha assumed office in the midst of a civil disturbance that conservative whites
described as a race riot. Though their assessment of the situation may have been
overblown, Mayor Henry Maier put the city under curfew and called in the National
Guard for a few days in the summer of 1967 to keep the peace. The freeways were closed
and National Guard tanks rolled down Wisconsin Avenue.44 Given this context, Gousha
believed the city was not ready to desegregate the schools, so he compromised.45
Gousha did a number of things to try to improve the quality of education for
African Americans and prepare the city for integration. He spoke to community groups in
black churches, recruited more African American teachers and administrators, and
engaged in curriculum reform. Most significantly, Gousha was the architect of the North
Division subsystem, which gave an unprecedented degree of autonomy to the African
American community surrounding North Division High School and its feeder schools.
The subsystem included a community relations specialist; advisory councils made up of
parents, teachers, principals, and high school students; special federal funding; and an
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innovative curriculum with its own curriculum specialists.46
Eventually, Gousha planned to decentralize the district’s fourteen high schools
into seven subsystems, called “program service areas,” each of which would have
included one inner-city high school and related feeder schools and one outlying high
school and related feeder schools. The program service areas would have shared
curriculum specialists, supervisory personnel, and support service personnel, such as
psychologists and social workers. The purposes of the plan were to improve continuity in
teaching and learning from elementary school through high school, to foster greater
understanding between families and schools in the inner city and the outlying areas, and
to promote community and parent involvement in the schools.47 There was some
speculation that if the program service areas led to a greater degree of understanding
developed between the races, then students might voluntarily choose to integrate.48 As
chapter 3 indicated, however, the black integrationists blasted the plan as racially
“isolating.”
Many Milwaukeans were more concerned about radical shifts in demographics
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than they were about integration. Milwaukee’s black population increased 68.3 percent
between 1960 and 1970, while the white population declined 3.2 percent.49 Part of this
change can be attributed to continued black migration from Chicago and the South, and
part can be attributed to changes in demographics. Milwaukee had a young black
population and an aging white population, which caused a change in birth rates—young
families have more children; old families have few children.50 There was also movement
from the city to the suburbs—Milwaukee County’s white population actually increased
6.3 percent in the 1960s, even though the number of whites in the city decreased.51
More specifically, the number of African Americans living in previously white
neighborhoods had increased dramatically in the 1960s, and school demographics
reflected that change. For example, Rufus King High School had a small minority
population in the 1960s, but the neighborhood surrounding the school was changing and
minority enrollment reached 33 percent in 1964, which was King’s “tipping point” (see
chapter 3). Once at that level, a large number of white families left the school, and King
was 70 percent black by 1967. Thus, true integration, which is supposed to be voluntary,
as defined in this dissertation, never happened at King—it went straight from white to
black.52 West Division, Riverside, and Washington high schools experienced similar
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demographic shifts, though they were more gradual.53
Many schools embarked on plans to slow the swift demographic shift that
occurred at King. Riverside High School is particularly interesting. Because the school
is on Milwaukee’s east side, a significant number of Riverside parents were politically
liberal and wanted their children to attend integrated schools, but as more inner-city
students transferred to Riverside under the school board’s open transfer policy (see
chapter 3), more white students from less liberal families left. The remaining white
parents wanted to prevent the white migration that had happened at King, so on January
10, 1972, after a sometimes-heated two-and-a-half hour debate, the Riverside ParentTeacher-Student Association (PTSA) recommended a plan to the school board that would
have capped black enrollment at 25 percent. Any other African American students
desiring transfers to Riverside would have to go elsewhere. The idea behind the plan was
to stabilize black enrollment to create an integrated high school, rather than one that was
predominantly black. School board member Anthony Busalacchi said he would introduce
the plan to the school board, with the intention that it would apply to King and
Washington as well. African American parents were outraged. Some said it denied their
children due process, others cited the fact that it was in violation of the school board’s
open enrollment policy, and others simply blasted it as racist.54 The school board did not
approve the plan. But it is significant nonetheless, because it marked the closest attempt
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to creating an integration plan up to that point in time, and it did not use magnet schools
in any way.
The Washington High School case was much more volatile. As explained in
chapter 3, the area surrounding Washington was changing. Washington’s students came
from two junior high schools—Steuben, which was located in the Sherman Park
neighborhood, and Peckham, which was in the Midtown neighborhood and east of
Washington and Steuben. Once predominantly German and Jewish, the neighborhood
surrounding Washington, especially the Midtown neighborhood,55 was primarily African
American. In fact, the neighborhood’s African American population increased by 1,076.8
percent between 1960 and 1970 because of migration from the central city.56 Peckham
Junior High’s African American enrollment increased 14 percent in 1967 to 67 percent in
1970.57 Washington had once been considered one of the best high schools in Wisconsin,
but its new African American students did not perform as well as white students. They
also caused more disruptions, and their attendance was poor. The English department
added fifteen new courses in topics they hoped would arouse student interest in reading,
but they did not improve behavior or attendance.58 Racial fights, initiated by members of
both races, broke out at Washington. Some white students were reportedly afraid to go
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into school restrooms alone.59 Black students also complained about the lack of an Afrocentric curriculum and said white teachers were out of touch with African American
student needs.60
Harold Jackson, the only African American member of the school board since
Cornelius Golightly, decided to get involved before things got worse. Jackson had been
appointed to fill a vacancy on the school board in 1970 and was elected to a full term in
1971, as were reformers Anthony Busalacchi, Ronald San Fellipo, and Robert Wegmann,
all of whom were in their twenties and thirties. In voting, they were frequently joined by
Donald O’Connell and, after the 1973 election, new board members Doris Stacy and
Maurice McSweeny. This liberal coalition gave themselves the name “the young Turks”
because they challenged traditional school board positions on issues and criticized
Superintendent Gousha for his quiet leadership style. The young Turks were instrumental
in the election of Jackson as president of the school board.61
Unlike most school board members, who tried to stay above the fray of the daily
operation of schools, Jackson visited Washington several times to talk with students,
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staff, and parents, so they could help him identify the problems in the school.62 Jackson
decided the best way to put an immediate stop to the racial violence was to increase the
number of security aides. He also wanted adjustments to the curriculum and an open
discussion of racial issues to build long-term understanding and stability.63
Many people, including Lloyd Barbee, criticized Jackson’s plan as repressive,
because it centered on security aides.64 The interracial Sherman Park Community
Association (SPCA), which included representatives from the Midtown neighborhood,
tried to come up with its own plan. Like the Riverside PTSA, the members of the SPCA
wanted to stabilize racial integration and minimize white flight.65 They believed two
things were necessary to make this happen. First, the school board’s open transfer policy
(see chapter 3) had to end. Adopted in 1964 to ease black entry into white schools, the
open transfer policy also provided white students with an easy way of fleeing to other
schools. Second, in the view of the SPCA, the way to get African Americans and whites
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to peacefully coexist at Washington was to introduce them to each other in junior high
school66 and to hire a human relations coordinator.67
At the urging of the SPCA, the school board authorized creation of a volunteer
study committee composed of parents, school staff, and community members from
Washington’s two feeder junior high schools, Peckham Junior High School, which was
mostly African American, and Steuben Junior High School, which was 80 percent white.
The original committee had twenty-six whites and eleven African Americans.68 After
several months of discussions, the Peckham-Steuben committee came up with a plan. All
seventh graders in the Washington district would be assigned to Steuben, all eighth
graders would be assigned to Peckham, and the ninth grade would be moved to
Washington, which, it was hoped, would solve several problems. It would integrate the
junior high schools; foster better racial relations in the earlier grades, thereby reducing
antagonism at Washington; and, by moving all ninth graders to Washington, it would
reduce severe overcrowding at Peckham. Some committee members from Steuben, voted
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against the plan on the grounds that it called for what they called “forced busing,”69 but
the plan went to the school board anyway.70 In the face of Steuben’s opposition,
however, there was no way the school board could approve the plan, and it was voted
down, thirteen to one.71
With the failure of both the Riverside plan and the Peckham-Steuben plan, several
other individuals and organizations recommended their own plans in the early 1970s to
improve race relations, none of which involved magnet schools. Gousha continued to
push his 1968 plan of pairing schools together in clusters until 1972.72 It even received
endorsement from WITI-TV, reversing that television station’s long-standing position on
the issue of school redistricting.73 The plan was never approved, though something
similar would be adopted for elementary schools in the late 1970s. Four-year-old
kindergarten, not in use in Milwaukee since 1956, was floated as a means of leveling the
playing field, so to speak, but it was too expensive to make universal, even with federal
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Head Start funding.74 Additional compensatory education programs (see chapter 3) were
discussed for Lincoln High School, which was in a state of decline similar to that of
North Division.75 North’s students, for their part, continued to protest inadequate
facilities.76 The school board decided to commission a new North Division building,
though construction was delayed due to internal debate in the school board over site
selection77 and dissatisfaction within the black community (see chapter 6).78 Newly
elected school board president Ronald San Felippo came up with a gerrymandered school
redistricting plan in 1973, but it did not go anywhere in the approval process.79 Board
member and UWM professor Robert Wegmann resurrected the Riverside plan and
proposed that African American enrollment be capped at 50 percent in schools that were
transitioning from white to black.80 But his proposal lost by one vote and white families
continued to move out of the city.81 Noted conservative Lorraine Radtke predicted this
demographic shift would continue and proposed metropolitan integration in 1973 as a
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means of bringing white students back to the city,82 but no action was taken by the school
board.
Two years later, state representative Dennis Conta proposed a metropolitan
integration plan that would have merged the Whitefish Bay and Shorewood school
districts with Milwaukee’s Riverside and Lincoln districts.83 This plan was based on an
earlier plan devised by Wegmann, who had proposed cutting the Milwaukee metropolitan
area into eight pie-piece-shaped districts.84 Conta’s plan was met with fierce opposition
from suburbanites who did not want to give up local control of their schools85 and
probably did not want their children to attend school with low-achieving African
Americans. The Shorewood school board said the new district would be too large and
unmanageable, would decrease parent involvement, would erode the tax base by diverting
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funds to Milwaukee students, and would accelerate white flight.86 The Milwaukee
Teachers Education Association (MTEA, the local teachers union) did not support the
plan, because removing two districts from Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) would dilute
MTEA’s bargaining strength when engaged in contract negotiations.87 There were also
some people who suspected Conta’s plan was really just an excuse to stop Riverside High
School, which was in his assembly district, from going all black.88 The school board
eventually voted seven to three against the plan.89
The University of Wisconsin Extension, the Greater Milwaukee Conference on
Religion, and the League of Women Voters proposed that the city be broken into fourteen
districts, each containing a high school. Each district would direct its own operations,
with the Milwaukee school board overseeing all of them. Each of the city districts would
be paired with a suburban district for purposes of integration and would be supervised by
a new City-Suburban Council.90
State Senator F. James Sensenbrenner proposed a compromise in which districts
would not merge but would receive financial incentives to bus students across district
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lines. Larry Harwell, of the Organization of Organizations (Triple O), criticized the
Conta plan and all other plans that would have involved metropolitan integration as
“lessen[ing] the number of blacks that whites have to deal with.” Harwell represented the
growing sense of black consciousness in Milwaukee (see chapter 3).91 He had helped
organize the North Division cluster, organized parent groups at Rufus King High School
and several other black schools, and lobbied MPS to hire more African American aides.92
Harwell, however, did not speak for everyone in the black community. State
Representative Marcia Coggs proposed a radical plan in 1978 that would have merged all
the school districts in Milwaukee, Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee counties into a
giant district.93 Coggs was an integrationist and Barbee’s protégée (see chapter 7).
With two sides so opposed to each other, magnet schools might have been an
adequate compromise because they could have been a voluntary means to integrate in a
non-disruptive way. There were some precedents for them too. Milwaukee had several
neighborhood “specialty schools,” mostly for language immersion or special teaching
methods, that had existed at the elementary level for decades (see chapter 2).94 Under the
open transfer policy, students from other neighborhoods could enroll in those schools, if
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there was room for them and if parents provided transportation. And Milwaukee already
had one citywide high school—Boys Trade and Technical High School had had the
designation since 1941.95 Perhaps these early magnet schools, which had been created
strictly for academic reasons, could be replicated on a districtwide level to achieve racial
integration as had happened in other districts across the United States.
Conservative board members seemed to like the idea. In their view, it was better
than something imposed by Judge Reynolds. Cornelius Golightly, the only African
American school board member in the 1960s, had proposed magnet schools and voluntary
integration in 1963,96 and Margaret Dinges had been talking about magnet schools since
1970.97 The board also considered converting three neighborhood high schools to
citywide magnet schools in 1973: Lincoln Junior-Senior High School would have focused
on business and trade and technical education,98 another school would become a school
for the visual and performing arts,99 and long-troubled Washington would get a magnet
program of some sort.100 Gerald Farley, another conservative, floated a compromise idea
in 1973 that would have left each of the high schools as attendance-areas schools but also
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establish citywide magnet programs within five schools. Riverside would have a collegebound program; Custer would receive a trade and technical program; Washington would
acquire a program on science, mathematics, and graphics; West Division would become
the arts school mentioned earlier in this paragraph; and Milwaukee Trade and Technical
would retain its normal program. If a student lived outside of the high school attendance
area, he or she would have to enroll in the magnet program. All other students would
have been neighborhood students. Thus, busing would have been kept to a minimum.101
This plan died in committee like every other integration plan.102 A few other plans for
desegregation were brought to public attention throughout 1974 and 1975,103 most of
which recognized that busing would have to be used104 and the neighborhood school
system set aside.105 Nothing came of them. Moderate conservatives on the board tried to
reach out to liberals and form coalitions, but they could not come to a consensus on what
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plan to adopt.106
Gousha left Milwaukee after seven years as superintendent to assume the position
of Dean of the School of Education at the University of Indiana in July 1974. Long-time
MPS administrator Dwight Teel was acting superintendent until June 1975. Teel could
not do much to ameliorate the racial situation in MPS, because he was not permanently
appointed. Also, he had a much more pressing problem—the first of three teacher strikes
occurred in the 1974–75 school year.107
Demographics continued to shift. The city’s African American population
increased 17.7 percent between 1970 and 1975,108 while the nonblack population
decreased by 10.9 percent.109 The rate of decrease in the white population in 1970–75
was more than three times the rate of decrease in the entire decade of the 1960s.110
However, not all white neighborhoods experienced a population decline—Granville (on
the northwest side of the city) and Lake (on the far south side of the city) actually
experienced increases in population,111 indicating a trend of white migration to the edges
of the city and beyond. The neighborhoods that increased in population tended to have
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high numbers migrants and school-age children and higher birthrates, whereas the
neighborhoods that decreased in population had few or no migrants, high numbers of
senior citizens, and low birth rates.112 In some neighborhoods, the black birth rate was six
times that of the white birth rate, though the city as a whole had twice as many white
births as black births.113 Other census data show that the city’s population declined by
11.3 percent between 1970 and 1980. During that same period, an estimated 18.1 percent
of city residents migrated out of Milwaukee. By comparison, Milwaukee county suburbs
only lost 6 percent of their population due to migration, and Ozaukee, Washington, and
Waukesha counties experience a 15 percent increase in population due to in-migration.114
These census data indicate that white enrollment in MPS would decline due to outward
white migration and a lower white birthrate, while black enrollment would greatly
increase due to a higher black birth rate.
The school board recognized the outward white migration and discussed a racial
balancing plan in which black schools and white schools would trade students on a onefor-one basis, but board members were uncomfortable with such a quota system,
especially if it did not include suburban schools, given the fact that so many white
students were moving out of Milwaukee in the 1970s.115 Some African American parents
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criticized the plan for not including improvements in curriculum, funding, or academic
achievement.116 The racial transfer plan died in committee.
As school demographics changed, so did the composition of the electorate, and
the spring school board elections saw three African Americans elected—Marian
McEvilly, Leon Todd, and Clara New.117 All three supported integration but only if it
was voluntary.118 They brought with them a new spirit of cooperation, and it was in that
spirit that Lee McMurrin, deputy superintenent of Toledo, Ohio, was chosen as the new
superintendent, taking office in July 1975.119
McMurrin was chosen for his experience in racial integration, congenial
personality, and “smiling disposition.” The board majority believed that McMurrin was
the best person to create a voluntary plan and win over all major interest groups in the
city. McMurrin knew the desegregation suit would be decided during his tenure and was
aware of the volatile nature of race relations in Milwaukee (see chapters 2 and 3), so he
immediately began building links to the community. He went on a whirlwind speaking
tour to civic, political, and religious groups so that they would accept him as well
intentioned.120 He attended PTA meetings, chatted with parents in his office, listed his
home phone number in the phone book, and even wore a button that said “Everything is
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Beautiful.”121 McMurrin said he received a warm welcome from most Milwaukeeans, but
he also said uniformed representatives of the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis greeted him at
his first school board meeting to silently oppose the coming integration that McMurrin
would facilitate.122
A good desegregation plan would require a school board and superintendent that
could work well together, which has not always a given in MPS (see chapters 7 and 8).
But board members described McMurrin as a man who was very easy with whom to
work. Leon Todd, for example, said McMurrin borrowed ideas from him. Doris Stacy,
also on the board, said he was a lovely man.123 Anthony Busalacchi was another big
supporter and was something of a swing vote on the board, so his support was essential.124
McMurrin wrote and encouraged the school board to adopt a “Statement on
Education and Human Rights,” which declared, in part, that “Our multi-ethnic population
is potentially one of the richest resources available in our schools” and that “All school
districts have the responsibility to overcome within their capabilities any [racial] barriers
that may exist and to maximize the achievement potential of the children under their
care.” He also said that schools had a responsibility “to work to a more integrated
society” and that schools must “carefully consider . . . the potential benefits or adverse
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consequences that [their] decisions might have on the human relations aspects of all
segments of society.”125 The Statement on Human Rights was condemned by the Nazis
but brought accolades from the League of Women Voters and other civic organizations.126
McMurrin had five goals in mind for the desegregation plan that he would
develop. Those goals, in his own words, were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

a desegregation plan which was acceptable to the board, the court, and the
community
a way to effectively meet the needs of the “old” as well as the “new”
clientele of the system
an opportunity for all interested Milwaukeeans to “roll up their sleeves”
and “get into the act”
a set of alternatives rather than a singular approach to education
a rallying point for those who needed their spirits lifted127

McMurrin submitted a statement on “alternative schools” to the school board. (At
this time, magnet schools were still referred to as alternative schools in some circles.
This term should not be confused with the modern-day connotation of alternative schools
as schools for “at-risk” students.) McMurrin’s statement made it clear that he wanted to
end the chaotic series of desegregation and compensatory education proposals. As he
said: “the Administration concludes that there is a significant merit in almost all these
proposals, but that they lose their momentum toward implementation for lack of a
comprehensive model for establishing alternative schools.” McMurrin held several
meetings with community leaders, businessmen, and other various groups within the first
three months of assuming the superintendency. He said, “The community must be
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involved in the active planning along with School Board members and staff.” He also
indicated that citywide magnet schools would be made available at the elementary and
secondary levels and that busing would be a prime of part his plan.128 He made these
statements despite that fact that few Milwaukeeans supported magnet schools at that
point.129 McMurrin, aware of the fractured school board, decided to craft a plan without
the board’s active involvement.130
McMurrin proposed a plan similar to the one he had implemented in Toledo.
Deputy Superintendent David Bennett assisted him and was responsible for the day-today implementation of the plan.131 A concept called “High Schools Unlimited” was at its
heart. Yet, the program he proposed for Milwaukee would be unlike the magnet schools
in any other American city. The level of choice available to students would be
unprecedented. Instead of sponsoring just a few magnet schools, each of the fifteen high
schools would offer some kind of specialized program in addition to a basic curriculum of
art, business education, driver education, English, foreign languages, health, home
economics, industrial education, mathematics, music, physical education, science, and
social studies. Two or three schools would offer advanced math and science courses for
students who desired to go to college. Each of the remaining schools would specialize in
some sort of job training classes. These specialities would be unique to each school and
could include aerospace-astronomy, business-computer technology, communication arts,
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distributive education (which includes both classroom education and on-the-job training),
energy and power, fine arts, performing arts, and medical-health occupations. McMurrin
said such a plan would give students an unprecedented level of choice in their curriculum
and foster voluntary integration. For example, the medical specialty might be assigned to
North Division High School. This speciality would be a unique learning opportunity in
the city and might draw in white students from the south side. Thus, a curricular need
would be met, and North Division, a high school that was at or near 100 percent black
enrollment, would show an increase in integration.132
The plan McMurrin and Bennet crafted for Milwaukee also placed some magnet
schools at the elementary and junior high school levels. The elementary school program,
called “Options of Learning,” would include “basic” (also known as “fundamental”)
education, open education (a program in which individual students choose their own
topics of study), Montessori (similar to open education), bilingual, year-round, and
“multi-unit individually guided education.”133 McMurrin used concentric circles to show
the anticipated inward movement of white students to the magnet schools and the
outward movement of black students to the new buildings in the outer areas of the city
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vacated by the white students who would be attending the new magnet schools.134 The
junior high school program, called “Schools for the Transition,” would bridge the
elementary schools and high schools, as the name of the plan implies. The junior high
schools would continue to offer exploratory classes in different careers and fine arts but
would do so in innovative ways so that parents and students could choose the learning
style that best fit them. Nothing more was specified in McMurrin’s plan at that point.135
The plan won high praise from local media and many elected officials. The
Milwaukee Sentinel said it “deserve[d] the wholehearted support of the board and the
community at large” because it not only addressed racial integration but also improved
academics by offering specialized curricula not available in other school districts.136 The
Milwaukee Journal was a bit more cautious, pointing out that magnet schools had not
been effective at desegregating other school systems in other parts of the country, but
nonetheless predicted improvement in student achievement due to the wide variety of
choices offered to students.137 WTMJ and WITI television and radio reversed
longstanding policies, and while acknowledging that the plan was not perfect, they said it
was the best plan that could be devised and that people should support it.138 State
Representative Conta and State Senator Sensenbrenner introduced legislation to give
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MPS money to help fund busing expenses, thus demonstrating bipartisan support.139
Milwaukee school board members liked the voluntary aspects of the plan.140 Some
suburban superintendents indicated their students would also be attracted to such magnet
schools, and McMurrin said he was willing to enroll suburban students, making
countywide integration possible, even if only on a low level.141
Critics raised doubts about the effectiveness of magnet schools in fostering
integration. As chapters 3 indicates, Milwaukee was a divided city, both geographically
and racially. The magnet school experiment had not been conclusively successful in
Toledo, and McMurrin admitted that he had no evidence that his plan would lead to
integration in Milwaukee.142 Lloyd Barbee, serving as a state representative in the
Wisconsin legislature at the time, was particularly skeptical and warned African
Americans to beware of allegedly voluntary programs: “You expect your enemies to wear
the clothing of liberality. You expect them to say they’re your friends.”143
But by 1975, the direction of the trial made it appear that Judge John Reynolds
was going to rule against the school board, and McMurrin felt it was better to implement
139
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his own desegregation plan before the court imposed one. The board had been split eight
to seven every time desegregation plans had been proposed since 1963 (see chapter 4 and
appendix A, table 1), so all McMurrin really needed was to convince one school board
member to switch from the conservative majority to the liberal minority and to vote for
his plan. The board preferred the certainty of McMurrin’s voluntary plan over the
possibility of a court-mandated involuntary plan, so it approved McMurrin’s plan by a
vote of ten to five on April 15, 1976.144
McMurrin said community involvement was key to making an integration plan
work. The Milwaukee Journal conducted a major public opinion study in 1975. A total
of 1,220 Milwaukee County residents were surveyed via telephone, including 780 city
residents and 440 suburbanites. The gender split was almost 50 percent, and all age,
income, and occupational groups were represented, though “housewives” made up the
largest group of respondents (28.1 percent). More than 75 percent of all respondents had
completed high school, and some of those had gone on to college. The racial breakdown
was 88.0 percent white, 10.3 percent black, 1.1 percent “other,” and 0.5 percent “no
answer.” Thomas F. Pettigrew, a Harvard professor of social psychology, served as a
consultant, and Cardell Jacobson, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of
Wisconsin–Milwaukee (UWM), assisted.145
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The study concluded that slightly more than half of all county residents supported
the goal of racially integrated schools, but few could agree on how to achieve that.
Findings included:
!

Seventy-two percent of all black respondents said racial integration of
schools was a desirable goal, but only 53 percent of all whites agreed with
that idea.146

!

When examining residence patterns, people who lived in the northern
suburbs, reflecting higher levels of education, were most strongly in favor
of integration,147 though 77 percent were against the Conta plan of merging
Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, and the east side of Milwaukee.148

!

One-third of all respondents who supported integration would object if
students of a race other than their own rose above 50 percent in a given
school.149

!

People who lived in racially diverse neighborhoods were more likely to
support school desegregation than those who did not live in diverse
neighborhoods.150

!

People who identified themselves as Republicans tended to view
integration less favorably than those who identified themselves as
Democrats or independent. Likewise, a person who was older and lived in
the same house for a long period of time was less likely to support
integration.151

!

Of the respondents who were thinking about moving in the next two years,
only 2 percent cited schools as the prime factor in their decisions. More
than 60 percent cited housing or neighborhood concerns.152
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!

Fifty-three percent of all white respondents thought public schools in
Milwaukee County were “good” or “very good,” but only 32 percent of all
black respondents felt the same way. Seventy-nine percent of all
respondents thought suburban schools were as good as or better than city
schools. Only 4 percent thought city schools were better than suburban
ones.153

!

Nine percent of all respondents said white students would get better
educations in integrated schools, and 30 percent said they would get
worse. On the other hand, 41 percent said education would improve for
black students, while only 8 percent thought it would get worse.154

!

When asked about cases in which they would approve or disapprove of
busing children (either theirs or someone else’s) to a school outside their
neighborhoods, people gave the following responses:155
Approve/Disapprove
To attend classes for gifted children
67% 28%
To relieve overcrowding
65% 30%
To provide instruction in art, music, and multiculturalism 67% 29%
To achieve racial integration of schools
25% 70%
To provide special classes for handicapped children
98% 1%
For athletics, band, and other extracurricular activities
65% 32%

On a more qualitative side, the Milwaukee Journal report acknowledged that
segregation did exist in the Milwaukee Public Schools. It also summarized the views of
all the key players, including Lloyd Barbee, Lorraine Radtke, School Board President
O’Connell, State Representative Conta, and the NAACP. It acknowledged that the
school board had taken steps to maintain segregation and cited prejudice as the main
reason for its failure to remedy the situation.156 It also pointed out that about half of
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Wisconsin’s schoolchildren were already riding a bus to school in 1975, including 28,000
MPS students who were bused to relieve overcrowding.157 A reporter who rode a bus
with 47 pupils from Victor Berger Elementary on the north side to U.S. Grant Elementary
on the south side observed no deleterious effects. In other cases, parents and school
officials reported name calling on the part of both black and white students when they
were introduced, and in some cases, black students provoked fights. But this behavior
died down once the students got to know each other. The Grantosa PTA reportedly
welcomed parents from outside the neighborhood.158 The study also pointed out that
Jackie Robinson Junior High School was a multiracial citywide school with innovative
“open” classrooms, in which students could choose what they wanted to learn rather than
study teacher-chosen topics. Parents and students reported high satisfaction with the
school, though its standardized test scores were not available in 1975, so the level of
academic achievement in that “open” environment remains unknown.159
That was where Milwaukee stood on the issue of racial integration in schools in
1975. Opinion was mixed. Most people wanted to improve the quality of education, but
few agreed on how to do it. Some people had successfully tried integration on a small
scale, but there was much opposition to citywide change. Then, on Monday, January 19,
1976, Federal Judge John W. Reynolds issued a decision in favor of Barbee’s clients. He
said that segregation was present in MPS and was the cumulative result of the decisions
made by various school officials over a twenty-year period. Milwaukee was, therefore, in
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violation of the U.S. Constitution.160
In terms of case law, Reynolds cited the United State Supreme Court decision
Keyes vs. School District 1 of Denver, Colorado. Like the Milwaukee school board, the
Denver board had unsuccessfully argued that segregation was the result of residence
pattern and therefore not illegal.161 Reynolds also cited a decision of the Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit involving schools in Omaha, Nebraska. So similar were the two
cases that the Milwaukee school board’s attorney had cited the Omaha case in a portion
of his defense. Perhaps he was shortsighted, because the appellate court found Omaha’s
neighborhood school system unconstitutional.162
Judge Reynolds appointed his friend John Gronouski as the special master to
oversee desegregation. Gronouski had a strong background in diplomacy and legal
matters. While Gronouski was not from Milwaukee, Reynolds hoped Gronouski’s Polish
ancestry would appease south-siders, most of whom were Polish American.163 The
powers of the special master included “the authority to collect evidence, to conduct
hearings, to seek the advice of experts, to commission studies and reports, to consult with
community groups and civic organizations, and to subpoena witnesses and records.” The
special master was to solicit input from both the plaintiffs and the defense and present a
plan to the court by May 1, 1976. Once Reynolds approved the plan, the special master
160
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would be responsible for supervising the implementation of the plan and for evaluating its
effectiveness.164
McMurrin hoped to work cooperatively with Gronouski, and plans for magnet
schools accelerated as a result of Reynolds’s decision. Reynolds said Gronouski was
supposed to get input from both parties, so with the judge’s decision in hand, McMurrin
formed a “Committee of 100” (C/100), representing people from all schools and interest
groups from all over the city, to help him flesh out his plan. McMurrin had hoped that
getting community input would make integration palatable to white Milwaukeeans. Once
the plan was complete, McMurrin would forward it to the school board, which would
approve it and send it on to Gronouski, who could make whatever changes he saw fit.
Lastly, Gronouski would give the plan to Reynolds for final approval. Each of the fifteen
high schools formed a cluster committee with its feeder middle and elementary schools.
Two parents or citizens, one high school student, and one staff member were chosen from
each cluster committee, giving the schools sixty representatives. Thirty-six
representatives were drawn from business and industry, civic groups, community
organizations, educational agencies, government, labor, media, MPS employee groups,
religious groups, and veterans organizations. McMurrin appointed the remaining four
representatives himself.165
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A majority of C/100’s membership was moderately liberal. According to a survey
conducted by local desegregation scholar Ian Harris, 90 percent of C/100 members
supported desegregation, and 53 percent were willing to use involuntary busing to do it,
though Harris admitted that a survey by the Milwaukee Journal showed that only 29
percent of C/100 members supported involuntary busing.166 Harris also found that most
of C/100 was fairly well educated—the average committee member had a college degree,
while the majority of Milwaukeeans had only high school diplomas.167 Forty-one percent
of its membership consisted of white-collar workers, compared to 16.8 percent of
Milwaukee’s total population.168
The school board accepted C/100 coolly and made plans to appeal Reynolds’
decision. If students had to be integrated, the board supported magnet schools, but if the
board could get away with not integrating students, that is what it would do.169 As
chapter 3 indicated, a majority of the board was conservative and did not want to end the
segregated neighborhood school system. Lorraine Radtke, for example, maintained her
belief that compensatory education programs, such as the Superior Ability program, the
Upward Bound college preparatory program, and the school for unwed mothers, were
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better than integration as a remedy for underachievement.170 One must also keep in mind
that the school board was still elected on an at-large basis at this time, which meant board
members had to follow the wishes of the majority of Milwaukeans if they wanted to stay
in office. This system is unlike a district system in which board members might have to
appeal to particular groups. At-large systems make it hard for minorities—racial or
otherwise—to sway an election, and, as previously indicated, a majority of Milwaukeans
did not support busing, which would be necessary if students did not volunteer for
integration.
The first cluster committee meetings were held at each cluster’s local high school
on March 16, 1976. Nearly six thousand people attended and viewed a presentation about
magnet schools and desegregation on closed-circuit television. The tone of the meetings
varied from school to school. The two hundred parents at Washington were generally
supportive of integration but complained about Reynolds’ May 1 deadline for submitting
an integration plan. According to newspaper accounts, most of the 431 people at
Marshall were concerned about white flight. North Division’s parents and teachers,
reflecting Larry Harwell’s black power philosophy, were less concerned about integration
and more concerned about improving the quality of education and building a new school
to replace their current building, which had been damaged in a fire. Only slightly more
than one hundred parents attended that meeting, which was consistent with the chronic
problem of low parental involvement in Milwaukee’s African American community. The
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275 parents at the South Division meeting were strongly opposed to busing. One man
said, “The blacks are scared to go into our neighborhoods, and we are scared to go into
their neighborhoods.” Perhaps most alarming were the 1,300 parents at Hamilton, which
was the newest, whitest, and farthest south of the high schools. Some of the parents at the
Hamilton meeting said Reynolds violated the Constitution, and they complained about the
tax increase that would be necessitated by busing. One man likened involuntary busing to
Nazi war crimes and predicted a race war if “our kids [were bused] into that colored area,
that high crime area.”171 Clearly, many Milwaukeans did not support magnet schools, as
magnet schools require busing to transport students from residence to school.
So volatile was the Hamilton situation that Gronouski personally addressed
Hamilton-area parents at a separate meeting held across the street at Bell Junior High
School a few days after the initial cluster meeting. Parents questioned his ties to the
city—he was a University of Texas professor and a former U.S. ambassador to
Poland—as well as his $50-per-hour pay rate. Several parents feared a decline of
academic standards if African American students were bused to the south side of the city
and did not want their children taking long bus rides to the north side. Ten uniformed
members of Milwaukee’s Nazi party requested speaking time but were turned down.
They hurled insults at the people in charge of the meeting and did not leave until the
police arrived.172
Despite the opposition, the cluster committees elected representatives to the
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planning committees on March 18, which then elected representatives to C/100 on March
30.173 C/100 had its first meeting on April 2 and elected cochairpersons, one black and
one white. The African American was Cecil Brown, a state assemblyman and member of
the Milwaukee United School Integration Committee and the Congress of Racial
Equality, and the white man was Grant Waldo, an attorney and political liberal who had
unsuccessfully run for city, state, and national offices.174 Economically speaking,
according to Harris, C/100 started out with a mix of upper-middle-class and workingclass individuals, but the working class (both black and white) felt “alienated by the
formal proceedings, by Robert’s Rules of Order, and by the endless haggling over
parliamentary procedure.” As a result, the number of working-class people who
participated in C/100 meetings—which was already low—declined after the first few
months.175
Harris was very critical of C/100’s composition and agenda. The committee did
not adequately represent middle-class African Americans or whites, according to Harris.
Affluent, well-educated, liberal representatives controlled the agenda and pushed out
what few middle-class people there were. They also refused to listen to the concerns of
conservatives. In other words, C/100 only represented a fraction of Milwaukeeans, and
without broad community support, any desegregation plan would be difficult to
implement. Furthermore, by not directly connecting C/100 to Judge Reynolds or Special
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Master Gronouski, C/100 could be only advisory—neither the school board nor the
superintendent had to accept its recommendations.176
John Semancik was a parent on the Hamilton cluster committee. He said he and
the other parents on the committee had been promised input into the desegregation plan
but that Gronouski was unwilling to listen to their concerns. According to Semancik,
many of the parents were open-minded about African Americans attending Hamilton, but
they were concerned that money would be diverted from classroom teachers to busing and
would, therefore, increase class size. Some board members, such as Margaret Dinges,
were willing to listen to parent concerns, but ultimately, Gronouski was going to do what
he wanted to do. According to Semancik, “It was just a big smokescreen.”177
C/100 asked the school board to drop its appeal of Reynolds’s decision and
requested more time from Gronouski to formulate a desegregation plan. The student
representative from South Division voted along with the majority to halt the appeal, and
was then grabbed by a woman who called him a traitor and warned him to not go to
school if he valued his life. Finally, in an apparent power play, Claire Riley, the student
representative from Riverside, and daughter of Lois Riley, a member of the school board,
said that McMurrin’s magnet plan would not accomplish integration and that C/100
should draw up its own independent plan.178
Each of the clusters went to work on school-specific desegregation plans and
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submitted them to C/100. The diversity of plans indicates different priorities and levels
of acceptance of Reynolds’s decision. For example, the committee at South Division
barely mentioned integration, preferring to stick with traditional talk of compensatory
education programs, including extended-hour day care to help parents who could not pick
up their children after school due to work conflicts, an extra year of kindergarten for sixyear-olds who were not ready for first grade, tutoring programs for fifth- and sixthgraders who needed help in reading and writing, work-experience centers in the high
schools, and expansion of Spanish classes. It also explicitly said busing should be kept to
a minimum. One the other hand, the cluster committee at Pulaski, another southside high
school, was fairly progressive. Though its plan was most concerned with establishing
“human relations committees,” it supported a voluntary integration plan, including
magnet schools, consolidating or closing schools with low enrollment, redistricting,
changing feeder patterns, pairing of schools, and busing, where necessary.179 Marshall, a
racially diverse school on the north side, also endorsed magnet schools and asked that a
technical school be built in each quadrant of the city. Under such a plan, African
American students would likely have left Milwaukee Trade and Technical High School
on the south side to attend a trade school closer to their homes. The Marshall cluster also
requested that high school seniors not be bused, as it would be disruptive to their last year
of high school, and that kindergartners and first graders not be bused at all.180 Thus, the
South Division and Marshall plans did not call for magnet schools and stood in contrast

179

180

Pulaski Cluster Resolution, April 12, 1976, in Hart Papers, box 1, folder 1.

Kathleen Hart, interview with author, Greendale, WI, August 23, 2010, and Milwaukee Journal,
April 9, 1976.

153
to what McMurrin wanted.
Washington and Riverside had much more aggressive plans. The Washington
cluster supported the McMurrin plan for magnet high schools but argued that genuine
integration would be possible only if it began at the elementary level and believed it
should be done by midyear, even if that disrupted the educational process. Boundaries
would have to be adjusted; no school would be allowed to have less than 30 percent nor
more than 60 percent minority enrollment; human relations programs would have to be
put on for faculty, staff, parents, and community members; and MPS would implement an
affirmative action program and hire a black and/or female deputy superintendent.
Riverside’s cluster, with its active PTSA, suggested a high degree of parental and student
involvement in desegregation, including an inter-racial car pool and a student advisory
committee. It also wanted a racial quota system similar to what was in Washington’s
plan, but it would have included Latinos. All “tracking” (programming students into
classes based on ability level) would have ended, and the curriculum would have been
revised to include improved math instruction, bilingual education, and the cultural
histories of African Americans, Latin Americans, Native Americans, and women.
Finally, the Riverside plan called for more minority representation on the school board.181
With so many people in the community preferring compensatory education over
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McMurrin’s plan, the school board established an “Ad Hoc Human Relations
Committee” as an adjunct to C/100. The committee supported a transformation of
education, not just integration. It broadly declared that the school board’s goal was to
meet the needs of not just the students, but surrounding community in which he or she
resided. The way to do this was to ensure equal educational opportunities by working
with PTAs, promoting voluntary integration, and most of all, by establishing human
relations committees across MPS to promote understanding among racial groups. Each
school would have its own committee that would welcome new students, encourage
voluntary transfers, initiate programs on cultural awareness, and work for open housing
laws to integrate neighborhoods as well as schools. Each school would be represented on
a clusterwide human relations committee, and the cluster committees would be
represented on a citywide committee. The ad hoc committee also supported magnet
schools, redistricting, and pairing of schools to encourage integration. However, those
aspects of integration are given only slight attention in the committee’s proposal, another
indication that there was not much support for radical desegregation.182
Several other plans from outside C/100 were introduced to the public at this time.
In addition to proposing magnet schools, Superintendent McMurrin suggested closing
North Division and other dilapidated black schools and busing their students into white
areas. C/100 listened to North Division parents and staff, voted to keep the school open,
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and rejected what it thought of as “one-way” busing.183 According to a 1995 interview
with Cecil Brown, C/100 was caught in the middle between McMurrin and Howard
Fuller, who not only wanted to keep North Division a neighborhood school, but actually
wanted pull North Division and its feeder schools out of MPS to form their own school
district. Brown called Fuller and his followers “crass opportunists”184 and said African
Americans would have to bear a greater burden of busing if integration was going to be
achieved.185 Finally, the school board, in an attempt to hold on to its power, rejected
everything else in McMurrin’s plan and adopted its own plan, independent of C/100. The
plan would have created one magnet high school for computer data processing at
Washington and a feeder pattern that would have included Steuben, Wright, and fifteen
unidentified elementary schools. Other than that, the school board’s plan relied on an
expanded open enrollment to achieve nearly every other aspect of desegregation.186
Despite the grand vision behind C/100 and the plans of the superintendent and the
school board, it was Gronouski’s opinion that mattered most. He favored the
superintendent’s plan for the 1976–77 school year but made some modifications. The
following points were drawn directly from McMurrin’s plan into Gronouski’s plan:
!

a computer specialty program would be established at Washington High
School
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!

high school juniors and seniors would be allowed to spend a half day in
school and a half day at one of five racially balanced “satellite
specialization centers,” which specialized in the following: art, broadcast
communications, exploring the American economy in the Milwaukee area,
state and local government, and the American legal system

!

Peckham Junior High School would be closed, and the Jackie Robinson
Junior High School open education program would move into the old
Peckham building

!

Eighth Street School (an elementary school located downtown) would
become a “multi-unit” junior high school (in other words, a middle school
instead of a traditional junior high school)

!

a sixth grade would be added to the Steuben multi-unit school, thus fully
converting it to what is now viewed as a middle school

!

Wilbur Wright Junior High School would become a “fundamental” school
for grades seven and eight, in which students would be grouped according
to ability level in “fundamental” subjects, such as mathematics, reading,
and history

!

there would be five magnet schools at the elementary level: open
education at McKinley, fundamental education at Philipp, Montessori at
MacDowell, gifted and talented at Fourth Street, and a “teacher-pupil
learning center” at Jefferson187

Gronouski also modified a number of elements of McMurrin’s plan:
!

white students would not be allowed to transfer to schools that were less
than 35 percent black

!

black students would not be allowed to transfer to schools that were more
than 35 percent black

!

students enrolled in schools other than their neighborhood schools could
remain there if they were entering their last year of school (twelfth grade in
high school, for example) or if their presence at the non-neighborhood
school improved its racial diversity

!

old North Division High School would be phased out and its students
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allowed to choose magnet schools, a suggestion that would prove to be
very controversial (see chapter 6)
!

a medical, dental, and health program, originally intended for North
Division, would go to Rufus King High School

!

the planning of the new North Division would be suspended to allow time
to rethink the appropriate magnet program to be placed there, including the
possibility of a trade and technical school188

Gronouski also proposed in-service training for school personnel to prepare them
for integration.189 The school board passed a “human relations” plan shortly thereafter,
which included mandatory workshops for staff members, optional workshops for parents
and community groups, curriculum guides for teaching human relations and cultural
awareness, and a human relations coordinator and committee in each school. A human
relations office was also established at the MPS central office to provide support to
schools,190 including workshops, curriculum, and mediation of racially charged student
conflcits.191
Gronouski stated that further desegregation would require C/100 and other
community groups to be a part of future planning. He also included a plan for teacher
desegregation that the MTEA, the local teachers’ union, submitted to him—no school
would be allowed to have a racial balance of the teaching staff that differed more than
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five percent from the overall ratio of black to white teachers in MPS.192 The League of
Women Voters, the MTEA, and the NAACP also endorsed metropolitan integration, but
Gronouski did not take action on that matter.193 Judge Reynolds set June 9 for a hearing
on the matter.194
Dissatisfied with Gronouski’s plan, which included involuntary busing, some of
the school board members decided to submit their own plan, which would have been
purely voluntary, to Judge Reynolds.195 Frustrated by the roadblocks the board was
putting in front of him, Gronouski gave up and withdrew his plan.196 Reynolds ruled
against the school board’s plan and said it smacked of “the rankest form of deception.”197
He ordered the board to give him a new plan with specific goals for desegregation and
specific methods for achieving those goals and set September 30, 1978, as the target date
for full desegregation.198
The new plan, crafted primarily by McMurrin, would phase in desegregation
192

“Faculty Integration” in a Collection of Papers Relating to the Desegregation/Integration of the
Milwaukee Public Schools, Milwaukee Public Library Humanities Room, 1976, and Proceedings, May 11,
1976. As chapter 3 indicated, MPS had racially segregated its teachers in the 1960s.
193

Minutes from the League of Women Voters on February 5, 1976, an “MTEA Fact Sheet,” and a
NAACP position statement in Hart Papers, box 1, folder 1. Some duplicate records are found in folder 2.
194

David I. Bednarek, “Judge Gets School Plan,” Milwaukee Journal, May 24, 1976, 1:1,12.

195

David I. Bednarek, “Clashes Plague School Board,” Milwaukee Journal, May 30, 1976, 1:1,19,
and David I. Bednarek, “Reynolds Schedules Hearing on Proposal,” Milwaukee Journal, May 25, 1976,
1:1,4.
196

David I. Bednarek, “School Plan Withdrawn” or “Judge Rejects School Plan,” Milwaukee
Journal, June 9, 1976, 1:1,9. (The title changed between editions.)
197

David I. Bednarek, “53 City Schools to Be Integrated,” Milwaukee Journal, June 10, 1976,
1:1,20, and James Parks, “Board Lawyer Tastes Reynolds’ Wrath,” Milwaukee Journal, June 10, 1976,
1:20. See also Harris, 11.
198

Michael Stolee, “The Milwaukee Desegregation Case” in Seeds of Crisis, ed. John L. Rury and
Frank A. Cassell (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 252.

159
through magnet schools at the high school level, beginning with Washington and
Hamilton, the latter of which would acquire a business and marketing specialty, in 1976
and expanding to all high schools by September 1978.199 Milwaukee would be divided
into three zones in 1977, each of which would contain a portion of the central city. The
zones would be divided into four leagues, each of which have about twelve elementary
schools. The leagues would develop desegregation plans and would not be contiguous.
Thus, integration was possible. Each league also would get one of the new magnet
schools, which would serve the entire zone.200 In other words, some students would be
involuntarily bused, but they would be confined to the leagues and the zones—there
would not be involuntary citywide busing. McMurrin hoped the new plan would provide
enough integration to make each school 25 to 45 percent black without busing students all
the way across town. Reynolds accepted the 1976 component of the plan but wanted a
thorough investigation into the 1977–78 aspect of the plan, though he ultimately accepted
it after Gronouski made a few modifications.201 McMurrin said that he had one of the
best curriculum staffs in the United States and that they could develop curriculua that
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Figure 9

Source: Office of the Superintendent of Schools, “Preliminary Recommendations for Increasing
Educational Opportunities and Improving Racial Balance” (Milwaukee Public Schools, June 25, 1976,
printed with corrections on July 15, 1976).
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Figure 10

Source: Office of the Superintendent of Schools, “Preliminary Recommendations for Increasing
Educational Opportunities and Improving Racial Balance” (Milwaukee Public Schools, June 25, 1976,
printed with corrections on July 15, 1976).
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Figure 11

Source: Office of the Superintendent of Schools, “Preliminary Recommendations for Increasing
Educational Opportunities and Improving Racial Balance” (Milwaukee Public Schools, June 25, 1976,
printed with corrections on July 15, 1976).
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would make students want to choose magnet schools.202 The final plan was about three
hundred pages long and included a budget for personnel, training, travel, and equipment
for magnet schools, as well as enrollment figures and an evaluation tool, as the judge
wanted.203
Thus, the labyrinth-like planning had concluded. The magnet plan was approved
by the school board and Judge Reynolds, though it was designed mostly by the
superintendent with only marginal input from C/100. No one else had really devised a
comprehensive plan. The cluster committees within C/100 varied based on neighborhood
constituencies. Some clusters, like Pulaski and Marshall, were open-minded about
magnet school but not about busing. Other clusters, like Washington and Riverside, were
more concerned about transforming the nature of education and functions of schools.
Still others, like South Division and Hamilton, maintained that there should be no busing
and only minimal integration, while the black power movement gained ground in the area
around North Division, which was beginning to coalesce around the ideas of community
control of schools and self-determination for African Americans. A majority of the
school board still did not accept integration but was willing to accept McMurrin’s magnet
plan out of fear that Judge Reynolds’s might impose a plan that used involuntary busing
like John Gronouski wanted. However, they also appealed the ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed Reynolds’s decision on July 23,
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1976. They then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.204
McMurrin won—at least temporarily. Students would have a wide array of
choices in schools, as long as enough of them did not choose their neighborhood schools.
This one restriction on a fundamental choice, which was cherished by so many
Milwaukeeans, both black and white, would stick in the craws of many parents (see
chapter 6), but implementation began in 1976 anyway (see chapter 5).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE ERA OF FORCED CHOICE:
IMPLEMENTING MILWAUKEE’S MAGNET PLAN, 1976–1986
September 7, 1976, the first day of desegregation, was peaceful but confusing.
Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) officials desegregated fifty-four schools, one more than
what was required by Judge Reynolds’s order, which defined racial balance as 25 percent
to 45 percent black enrollment. However, over time, whites did not volunteer in the
expected numbers, which would make it hard to integrate schools in the second and third
year of the integration plan.
Administrators universally reported positive results,1 but careful examination of
the evidence indicates that the success of the magnet program was mixed. The
curriculum was mostly well received. There were several problems, however, that did not
become apparent until later in the school year. There were problems with teachers,
students, transportation, and expensive busing costs. Another complication was that
when students did not volunteer, the board had to remove students from neighborhood
schools and bus them against their wills, which a student at North Division High School
referred to as a “forced choice.”2 Various advocacy groups raised issues regarding the
scale of integration. For, example, on a microscale, even supposedly “integrated” schools
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still experienced racial stratification in that African American students were almost never
placed in Superior Ability classes. And from a macroscale, the school board struggled
with white migration to the suburbs and proposed metropolitan integration as a corrective
measure. What looked like choice in the mid-1970s looked appeared to look like no
choice to some people by the mid-1980s.
Surveys show that most Milwaukeeans professed nominal support for integration,
but they resented busing as a mechanism for achieving this goal. No one has published
more research on this issue than Christine Rossell, a political scientist at Boston
University. According to her 1988 study of Boston, Los Angeles, and Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, white enrollments declined by 21 to 55 percent in schools in these cities in the
first year of desegregation—the higher the percentage of African Americans at a
particular school, the greater the degree of white flight. Rossell’s study and others like it
found that many white families were willing to send their children to schools with
African Americans but only under a certain set of conditions. In the view of white
parents, African American students could come to “white schools,” but white students
should not be forced to ride a bus, especially if the bus had to travel a great distance. In
Los Angeles, for example, distance was almost as important as racial composition of a
school when parents decided where to send their children to school. In Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, it was the third most important criterion, right behind reading test scores.
Level of income (social class) was also an important factor in all three districts.3
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Rossell followed her 1988 study with a book in 1990. She analyzed survey data
from parents and school personnel in 119 districts across the United States and found that
voluntary integration programs were superior in equity, efficiency, and effectiveness to
mandatory programs. Rossell cited three sets of evidence to support her claim. First,
survey data showed that voluntary programs were seen as more equitable because both
African American and white parents were given choices in schools, and parents
responded favorably to such choice. Second, the voluntary plan was more effective over
time because white students who selected their own schools almost always enrolled,
whereas in mandatory plans, on the average, as many as half of the white students
assigned to predominantly minority schools failed to enroll. Third, voluntary plans were
more effective because they produced greater interracial exposure, which is defined by
the proportion of white students in an average minority child’s school. Mandatory
assignments, on the other hand, usually resulted in white flight from the city, which
ultimately increased segregation. Perhaps most strikingly, Rossell found the longer the
voluntary plan was in place, the stronger the level of black-white interaction. For
example, even though interracial exposure tended to decline over time due to lower birth
rates among whites, it remained higher than it would have been in the absence of the plan.
Rossell also found that white parents would send their children to magnet schools with
rigorous curricula. Using sampling data, Rossell found that magnet schools in heavily
minority neighborhoods had white enrollments of 37 percent on average if they had
college-preparatory programs. White enrollment declined to 32 percent if students were
forced to choose the school, and white enrollment declined even further to less than 10
percent in some schools if they offered career/vocational specialties instead of a college
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preparatory specialty.4
Other studies support Rossell’s findings. James Rosenbaum and Stefan Presser
published a study of an anonymous large urban school district in the northeastern United
States in 1978 and concluded that when the district chose to move gifted and talented
programs from the periphery of city to the inner city, the district actually encouraged
white migration. Families left the city for the suburbs to find schools that they thought
were better than what remained in their neighborhoods.5 Four years later, David Morgan
and Robert England published a broader study of fifty-two districts and found opening
magnet schools to be less effective than adjusting attendance boundaries and pairing
schools.6
Milwaukee’s experience is also consistent with Rossell’s findings. While Rossell
did not study Milwaukee, Belden Paulson, a professor of political science at UWM and
chair of the Center for Urban Community Development of the UW–Extension studied
Rossell’s early work, before she published any books, and concluded that Rossell’s
theories fit Milwaukee.7 Additionally, a detailed study of demographics prepared by Dr.
Maria Luce, also from the Center for Urban Community Development, showed that
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MPS’s enrollment was declining, and the decline was particularly sharp among whites
and in schools in impoverished neighborhoods. Luce therefore concluded that a magnet
school, even one of good quality, would not attract whites to a poor neighborhood.8
There was also a consensus on the school board that a school had to have a both a good
academic reputation and substantial number of white students if it was going to attract
other white students.9
There were only three magnet high schools (Hamilton, Washington, and
Milwaukee Trade and Tech) in 1976, the first year of integration. Washington was
racially integrated for the moment but the percentage of African American students was
rising rapidly. Juniors and seniors enrolled at any high school in MPS were eligible to
apply for full- or half-time status at Washington, where they would be able to use
computer equipment not available at any other school in the district, including eight
computer connections, several (then) high-speed computer terminals, a data entry video
terminal, key-to-disk units, and key-to-tape units. Four computer classes were
offered—computer applications in business and industry, keyboard data training,
introduction to computer science, and advanced programming.10 In his unpublished
8
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Figure 12

Source: Undated Milwaukee Journal article in Kathleen Mary Hart, Milwaukee Public Schools
Desegregation Collection, 1975–1987, UWM Manuscript Collection 90, Golda Meir Library, University of
Wisconsin–Milwaukee, box 1, folder 2.

Minorities in American Society; Philosophy; Political Philosophies; Simulated Social Problems; Water, Air,
and Man; Wisconsin History and Geography; and Women’s Studies.
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manuscript, McMurrin recounts that a student at Washington won a national computer
science competition that carried with it a four-year scholarship to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology worth $48,000. McMurrin lamented that this and other success
stories were not given adequate coverage by the media.11
Hamilton, located on the far southwest side, was entirely white but had space
available for African Americans. Two courses were offered in word processing and
marketing. The word processing classes emphasized (then) modern technologies like
electric typewriters, transcribing machines, dictation units, and text editing devices. The
other course, Opportunities and Techniques in Marketing, was a double-period class and
including training on personnel counseling, public relations, advertising and sales
promotion, and purchasing. The curriculum was designed in partnership with the Sales
and Marketing Executives Club, the Milwaukee Advertising Club, and the Kiwanis Club.
An intern program was scheduled to start in the summer of 1977.12
The opportunities at Washington and Hamilton sounded excellent, and Hamilton’s
program was well received, but few white parents were willing to put their children on a
bus to Washington or any other northside school. As Christine Rossell reports, white
parents will send their children to magnet schools if the curriculum is rigorous, the bus
ride is short, and there are a substantial number of other white students at the school. In
the case of Washington, the school was not perceived as good or safe (see chapter 4), and
it was an hour away from Hamilton by bus. Hamilton, on the other hand, was viewed as a
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good school, it was within walking distance for most of its students, and it was very
white. Simply put, Hamilton parents had no real incentive to send their children out of
their neighborhoods.
The same can be said of the other southside schools—the schools were perceived
as good and were close and white. Thus, there was no real reason for whites to change.
According to a report from the Milwaukee Urban Observatory at the University of
Wisconsin–Milwaukee only 3 percent of MPS’s white population opted to transfer to
specialty schools in 1976, and most inner-city magnet schools were more than 40 percent
empty. Black schools were closed to force African American students to choose
southside schools.13
The superintendent planned to increase the number of magnet high schools from
three to nine in the fall of 1977 despite these mixed results. Rufus King High School
would be closed as a neighborhood school and would reopen as a citywide school with a
college-preparatory program, as a complement to Milwaukee Trade and Technical High
School, which was already citywide. An entrance exam would be required for admission
to King, and students would take four years of English and two to three years of
mathematics, science, social studies, and foreign language. All King students would be
expected to participate in extracurricular activities and other supplementary learning
opportunities.14 The other specialties were as follows:
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Marshall—communications and media
Riverside—community, human services, and education
West Division—law, law enforcement, and protection services
Juneau—small business management
South Division—tourism, food service, and recreation15

South Division High School, the school with the highest percentage of white
students on this list above, was assigned the specialty that was least likely to require a
college education, while the most demanding specialty went to Rufus King, a majority
black school. The intent was obvious, although not spelled out in any of the board
documentation—King’s program would attract students from the south side and would
integrate the school. The low-skill program at South Division was supposed to attract
African Americans to the south side.
Five satellite centers were established to handle 250 juniors and seniors. Students
were transported from their schools to the satellite centers for half a day of instruction and
received credit for two classes. They attended their regular schools the other half of the
day. These satellite centers reflected both the classical and vocational curricula
philosophies that had been established at the beginning of the century (see chapter 2).
The Milwaukee Art Center hosted an art studio center where students met notable
Wisconsin artists. Junior Achievement hosted the other four satellite centers. Students
enrolled in the American Legal System Satellite Center met and learned from city,
county, state, and federal court officials, law enforcement officers, and law students.
Students enrolled in the Broadcast Communications Satellite Center studied broadcasting

until the present time. There have been periods in which no entrance examination was required. An exam
is required for most students entering King as of this writing.
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law, radio and television production and engineering, and sales and business aspects of
broadcasting. The satellite center on the American economy in the Milwaukee area had
students visit banks, stock exchange offices, factories, and distribution centers to gain an
understanding of Milwaukee business and industries. Also, business executives and labor
leaders were on hand to discuss their careers. Students in the fifth satellite center, which
was on state and local government, were split into small groups in which they would
discuss topics and job potentials with various public officials.16
There also were four magnet junior high schools. As many as 345 students could
attend Eighth Street School in downtown Milwaukee. Students were organized into units
by grade level in a format that is now referred to as a middle school.17 The small size was
supposed to help the students and faculty get to know one another, and the downtown
location was to provide students with learning experiences at Milwaukee’s central library,
YMCA, and Marquette University, which were all nearby. Open education continued to
be the sole mode of instruction at Jackie Robinson, which expanded and moved into the
old Peckham building near Washington High School. Because students choose their own
course of study in an open environment, it would be possible to find one student working
on mathematics, another one reading, and others listening to records or watching a movie.
Some of Jackie Robinson’s seats were reserved for neighborhood students, but the rest
were citywide. Steuben Junior High School, also near Washington High School, would
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continue to follow the middle school model it had used for years, but a new feature would
be that each unit would emphasize one of four different teaching techniques—open
classroom, traditional, individually guided instruction, or science. Finally, Wilbur Wright
Junior High, on the northwest side of Milwaukee, would become a “fundamental school,”
emphasizing the “basics” of reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies.
Students would be expected to adhere to a strict dress code and complete all homework
assignments, unlike some urban schools in which homework has been optional since the
1970s. Students would be grouped according to ability, and promotion to the next grade
level would be based on academic achievement rather than age.18 As with the other
magnet schools, the intent behind the junior high locations was never given, but it seems
obvious that all of them were placed in black or transitional neighborhoods in the hope of
attracting white students.
Finally, there were fifteen magnet schools at the elementary level. Three of the
schools were citywide—a gifted and talented program at Fourth Street Elementary, a
Teacher-Pupil Learning Center at Jefferson, and a Montessori program at MacDowell.
The other twelve magnet schools were each assigned to one of the twelve elementary
school leagues and had programs similar to the ones at the three citywide schools.
Although the citywide schools were popular with both black and white students, the
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twelve league schools lagged behind in white enrollment—only 219 whites filled the
1,630 seats set aside for them by mid-August. Likewise, fewer than half the necessary
number of white students enrolled in any of the four magnet junior high schools as
required by Judge Reynolds and Special Master Gronouski. African American
enrollment was stronger in the magnet schools—477 African American students occupied
1,198 seats at the elementary level, and the number of African American students in
junior high schools exceeded the requirements.19 In other words, the magnet schools
succeeded in attracting some black students but not white ones. It is also worthy to note
that African American parents were more likely to bus their older children to magnet
school than they were to bus their elementary-age children.
Experts were not surprised in the disparity between black and white enrollment.
Herman Goldberg, associate director of the U.S. Office of Education, spoke at a
symposium at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee in the summer of 1976 and said
voluntary desegregation plans, such as magnet schools, were usually ineffective because
too few students volunteered to make the plans work.20 Robert L. Green, dean of the
College of Urban Development at Michigan State University and a court expert on more
than a dozen desegregation cases, advised Milwaukee teachers that white students simply
would not attend black schools no matter how good they were: “Black magnet schools . . .
19
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could have Beethoven teaching music and Einstein teaching math, and they still aren’t
going to attract whites.”21
Also, despite what sounded like innovative curricula, some schools could not fully
implement their specialty programs. According to Gregory Strong, not all principals
provided adequate leadership. Successful principals created cultures that fostered
acceptance of all students and emphasized elimination of stereotypes, individualized
curriculum, heterogeneous classroom groups, consistent discipline, intra- and
extracurricular activities, appropriate training for staff, and parental input and
participation. Principals who were successful in those seven areas usually had excellent
human relations programs coupled with tutoring and other academic supports.
Unfortunately, not all principals were successful in these areas.22
Another problem, according to the Milwaukee Teachers’ Education Association
(MTEA, the teachers’ union) was that the court had ordered that 14.7 percent of the
district’s teachers be minorities, but the district had used a figure of 16 percent. When the
district could not find enough minority teachers, it left vacancies unfilled that could have
gone to white teachers. Seventy-one substitute teachers had to be used to temporarily fill
these positions, rather than the district employing available white teachers.23
Furthermore, the programs were set up so quickly there was not enough time to
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match teachers and students to the correct schools. Some teachers were waiting in March
for materials they had ordered the previous September. A Milwaukee Journal reporter
observed that most teachers were working hard but that some did not like their school’s
specialty, and so they made only minimal attempts to implement it. At the time, seniority
determined a teacher’s assignment, and if a senior teacher wanted to be in a particular
school because it was closest to his or her home or because he or she had been at the
school prior to the specialty program’s implementation, then the senior teacher usually
received his or her desired school. Some parents at southside schools reported that
African American students had behavior problems. This may have stemmed from what
school officials referred to as “misplaced” students. Such students signed up for schools
that did not fit their personalities or skills. For example, some students with severe
attention problems registered for open education programs, which allow students to pick
whatever they want to study and how they want to study it. Those students were poor fits
for open education because they needed a lot more supervision and regimented activity
than other students.24
There were also major problems with transportation. The costs were very high.
For example, four thousand junior and senior high school students would be transported
in the first year—a small number compared to the transportation that would come in
future years. The board paid $2.50 per student per week—that is $10,000 each week for
the entire program. Most of the junior and senior high students had to crowd on to
existing Milwaukee County Transit System bus routes during rush-hour traffic, while
24
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elementary children took regular yellow school buses. The county transit system also had
to create twenty special bus routes for hard-to-reach schools, such as Hamilton and
Vincent. This forced the county to press spare buses into service, which increased the
county expenditures on maintenance, fuel, and drivers.25 Seventy-three bus routes were
planned at the elementary school level, fifty-three of which were contracted to
Schoolways Transportation, which was nowhere close to prepared to meet its
requirements. Some drivers were responsible for more than one simultaneous route
because of a driver shortage. The extra routes made them an hour and a half late in the
mornings and two hours or more late in the afternoon. In some cases, students on the first
route were actually delivered to school very early, to allow drivers to make the second
run, and then picked up late, giving them a twelve-hour school day. School staff had to
supervise the children in the meantime.26 Taxis were used for emergency work. This cost
a minimum of $6 per ride. There were more than a hundred rides on some days in the
first three weeks.27 Although more drivers were eventually hired, Schoolways charged
the school district twice the $2,108 bid in the original contract.28 African Americans were
reluctant to join athletic teams at Hamilton because the buses did not run late enough
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after school, so some team practices were rearranged to accommodate the bus schedule.29
Also, an odd trend called “double busing” by MPS officials occurred in some
places—some students who volunteered for the new magnet schools were sometimes
already attending integrated schools. When these students transferred to the magnet
schools, they created vacancies at their original schools, and replacement students of the
same race had to be bused to fill the vacant seat. Thus, the school was not any more
integrated than it had been before, but one student was bused out, another was bused in,
and MPS covered the cost of two bus rides to keep the status quo.30 Conservative
taxpayers—both black and white—later criticized this practice for financial reasons.31
The superintendent ordered planning for the 1977–78 school year in the fall of
1976, despite the unexpected problems. Meetings were conducted in each league and
coordinated by the Committee of 100 (C/100). One issue that had to be addressed was
the needs of Latino students. Some people considered Latinos white in 1976, but other
people said they were a minority group. If they were white, then the school board would
have to send some of them to northside schools as part of the integration plan. But state
and federal law also required the board to provide Latino students with bilingual
education, which would be difficult to do if Latinos were dispersed to schools across the
city. Therefore, the board declared Latino students a minority group. Doing so allowed
the board to create bilingual programs at magnet schools and count them as part of the
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integration effort.32 This approach also allowed students to attend school close to home,
which, as explained in previous paragraphs, is something parents wanted.
Magnet programs would continue to develop at the high school level in 1977.
Because Marshall was going to become a broadcasting school, the satellite center in that
field could be eliminated. The other four satellite centers continued and were joined by
four additional programs for a total of eight centers. The four new programs were in
environmental science, “Exploring the Consumers’ 3Rs/Role, Rights, and
Responsibilities,” library media, and “Writing Laboratory in Advertising.”33
While the school board was holding all these meetings and community groups
were writing all these plans at the superintendent’s request, the school board was still
appealing its case to the United States Supreme Court. The appeal became the major
issue in the spring school board elections. Six of the fifteen seats were open. Anthony
Busalacchi, now considered part of the conservative board majority, was running for
reelection and was very vocal. He was a moderate conservative and said he supported
integration but also that involuntary busing would cause “middle and upper income
families [to] abandon the cities.”34 Reynolds wanted the schools fully integrated by 1979.
Busalacchi agreed that students should be integrated, and he supported magnet schools.
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But he also believed that three years was not enough time to change whites’ opinion
about sending their children to school with African Americans. Thus, any three-year plan
could be fulfilled only if it included involuntary busing. Busalacchi preferred a much
longer time line that would give residence patterns time to change. If neighborhoods
integrated on their own, then schools would integrate without involuntary busing.35 Most
of the other fifteen candidates, including two other incumbents36 and newcomer Lawrence
O’Neil, who lived in the all-white Hamilton High School neighborhood, agreed.37
O’Neil reflected the prominent opinion in the Hamilton neighborhood. Jeff Kartz,
the student representative to the Hamilton Cluster, recalled that many parents were
opposed to any kind of integration. He said it was as though they were fighting a battle
they had already lost. He also recalled that he was often the only representative from the
Hamilton cluster who voted in favor of integration policies and that an angry mother
actually hit him at a C/100 meeting because she did not agree with his votes. He said
Police Chief Harold Brier lived in the Hamilton neighborhood and had expressed concern
that integration would increase crime.38
MPS moved ahead anyway. The Hamilton Cluster relented and asked for a
medical speciality, rather than wait for a specialty to be imposed. But Superintendent
McMurrin turned Hamilton down, so that he could later assign the medical specialty to
35
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North Division in the hope that he could attract white students to the north side of the
city. Hamilton then asked for two specialties—business and performing arts.39 While
Hamilton did receive the business speciality, the superintendent gave Bay View High
School was given the performing arts program. The rigorous college preparation
programs were all assigned to northside schools, and were thus not available to hold
southside white students in place and reduce their migration to the suburbs (see “High
Schools Unlimited” later in this chapter). Frustrated with the whole process, the
Hamilton cluster committee declared it was abstaining from further C/100 activities until
new guidelines were issued by the school board and new elections were held for C/100.40
According to a survey by the Social Science Research Facility at UW–Milwaukee,
60 percent of all Milwaukeeans supported integrated schools, though support was
stronger in the black community (77 percent) than in the white community (57 percent).
This was an improvement over a survey from 1976 that showed only 46 percent of
Milwaukeeans supported integration.41 But, as the board majority had indicated, that was
not the important issue. Of greater concern was what to do if Gronouski’s quota for the
second year of integration could not be met. Gronouski had proposed the following for
the 1977–78 school year:
!
!
!

106 elementary and junior high schools would have black enrollments of
25 to 50 percent
26 schools would have black enrollments of 20 to 65 percent
26 schools would have black enrollments of 15 to 75 percent
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!

all high schools would have to fit one of the three categories above by the
fall of 197842

McMurrin, who, unlike the board majority, actually had a good working
relationship with Gronouski, did not believe it was possible to desegregate that many
schools by fall. North Division High School, for example, had an entirely African
American student population, which means the school would have required high degrees
of busing both in and out of the neighborhood. McMurrin instead proposed that one-third
of the schools be desegregated in addition to the first third that had already been
desegregated, which was a few schools less than Gronouski’s quotas.43 Without this
latitude, McMurrin might have had to involuntarily remove students from neighborhood
schools.44
Ian Harris, a local expert on desegregation, conducted a survey of Milwaukeeans
in 1977. According to his data, seventy-four percent of all respondents opposed
involuntary busing. The racial breakdown was 78 percent for whites and 65 percent for
African Americans. Thus, fewer that half of all Africans Americans in the poll supported
involuntary busing. Furthermore, 61 percent of the white respondents said the school
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board should continue the appeal (though only 38 percent of African American
respondents felt the same way).45 These data fit well with the work of Christine Rossell
and others who show that parents support integration when the program is voluntary,
schools are good, and the bus rides are short.
Not surprisingly, when voters went to the polls they reelected Busalacchi and two
other conservative incumbents. They also voted for O’Neil. Therefore, the conservative
majority widened from 8–7 to 9–6. Voters in several suburban districts also defeated
referenda that would have authorized the creation of voluntary transfer plans with the
city.46 Thus, integration suffered setbacks on two fronts. The new, larger board majority
vowed to continue the appeal, and McMurrin vowed to go ahead and desegregate the
schools no matter the outcome of the appeal.47 However, newspapers and interviews do
not indicate a strained relationship between the board and superintendent. Everyone still
seemed to think he was a nice, easy-going man.48
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling on June 29, 1977. It agreed with the
plaintiffs that MPS was deliberately segregated, but it ruled that the scope of the remedy
had to match the scope of the offense. In other words, the final plan Reynolds approved
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may have gone beyond the scope of the desegregation. The Supreme Court then sent the
case back to the Court of Appeals in Chicago for further study.49 Barbee and his
associates asked the appellate court to remand the case to Reynolds,50 which it did in early
September. The appellate court also eliminated the special master position,51 which
cleared the way for McMurrin to implement whatever program he wanted, as long as he
could get it approved by the school board and the judge.52 Reynolds was told to ask for
legal briefs and to begin listening to new testimony.53
The second year of integration proceeded while both sides prepared their legal
cases. The use of yellow school buses for elementary school students expanded, and
McMurrin wanted to minimize the number of busing-related problems. So he asked the
school board to add more routes, shift school start times and extracurricular times, and
hire a lot more personnel—instead of one transportation director and a secretary, there
was a director, an assistant director, three secretaries, a rider supervisor, a route specialist,
twenty staff who would ride the buses and monitor efficiency, and a $300,000-per-year
consulting firm to help monitor progress.54 A plan this expansive would be expensive,
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and that would make busing vulnerable to criticism from fiscal conservatives.
The final plan for the fall of 1977 called for busing for more than fourteen
thousand of the one hundred thousand students in MPS to 102 schools. Rather than allow
each school to set its own start time, the administration determined the schedule. Half the
elementary schools started at 8:35 a.m., while the other half started at 9:35. All high
schools began at 7:45, and all middle schools and junior highs began at 8:30. The
purpose of this staggered schedule was to allow school bus drivers to pick up students
and drop them off at schools that began early, then double back and pick up students who
attended schools that started later. The district was able to save money this way because
buses were used twice, but mass confusion resulted. Some students lived only a few
blocks from their school but were just on the other side of their school’s district
boundary. Hence, they were attending a school technically outside their neighborhood
and were therefore eligible for transportation,55 while at least a hundred other students
who lived farther away received no transportation. Many of the marooned students were
white and had volunteered for integration. “How can we integrate if we can’t get to the
school?” one parent wondered. Other white parents said they were going to put their
children back into neighborhood schools.56 A shortage of drivers meant that four-yearold kindergarteners could not be bused, even when their parents volunteered to be part of
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integration.57 Bus routes changed constantly to accommodate changes in enrollments or
mistakes—an average of twenty changes per day in September. As a result, students were
never quite sure of where or when their buses were going to pick them up.58 These
mishaps also disrupted the state’s school census, conducted every year by the third Friday
in September, which meant MPS received less state aid than that to which it was
entitled.59
With two-thirds of schools having to be integrated, the costs of busing soared by
58 percent by the end of the 1976–77 school year. That was an increase of 184 percent
since desegregation began in 1976. And while the average cost of busing was $115 per
pupil in Wisconsin, it was $347 per pupil in Milwaukee. The total cost increased from
$894,000 in the 1975–76 school year, one year prior to integration, to $3.6 million in
1976–77. It then increased to an estimated $6.8 million in 1977–78, which was more
than 5 percent of the MPS budget for that school year. If transportation costs not related
to integration, such as busing for special education students or taxis for students who
were marooned at school without a bus, were included, then transportation costs rose to
$12.1 million. Bus companies were paid $62,050 per day for 668 buses traveling 1,437
routes. At least one school, MacDowell School, was serviced by as many as thirty-two
buses. Flaws in the planning process, as described in the last paragraph, resulted in
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contracts with bus companies that had to be negotiated at the last minute, which led to
price gouging.60
The need to sign bus contracts quickly did not give MPS a chance to do adequate
research on the transportation companies, which also contributed to the high cost of
busing. ARA Transportation, for example, put in a bid that was unrealistically low and
sharply increased prices after the contract was signed. In fact, it was accused of
deliberately underestimating costs to win a contract from the school board.61 Bribery may
also have been involved, as school board director Anthony Busalacchi accused the MPS
purchasing agents of accepting free lunches from some of the transportation companies.62
Parents also raised concerns about safety problems on buses.63
With the growing minority population in the city, MPS sought to attract white
students from the suburbs to the magnet schools through the Chapter 220 program (see
chapter 6). Busing to and from the suburbs went much more smoothly than busing within
the city. Buses were still late, but students were integrated in the schools, at least at the
elementary level. The Milwaukee students and the suburban administrators reported that
students were friendly to one another and that teachers treated the Milwaukee students as
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they would any other students.64 Again, these were mostly unilateral (“one-way”)
transfers. Nicolet High School, for example, took in fifty-three Milwaukee students in
1977–78 but sent only five students to Milwaukee schools.65 However, those suburban
students who did transfer to the city reported mostly positive experiences after an initial
period of adjustment.66
Gronouski also established a monitoring board to watch for problems in 1977.
The board was composed of fifteen volunteers, many of whom were chosen by C/100,
and targeted twenty-five schools during the first week of school, including three high
schools, five junior highs, and seventeen elementary schools. They went to other schools
after the first week and were required to make at least one school visit per month. When
interviewed, monitors, most of whom were white, expressed concern about the treatment
of African American students in white schools. As long-time education activist Bob
Peterson explained, “Equal education and quality education aren’t limited to what’s going
on in the school statistic books. It goes into curriculum and attitudes.”67
Peterson was a member of People United for Integrated and Quality Education
and a paraprofessional in MPS at the time. He would later become a teacher at Fratney
Elementary School (now known as La Escuela Fratney) and a founding editor of
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Rethinking Schools, a liberal magazine, particularly on issues of race.68 He was elected
president of the MTEA in 2011.69 He said the monitors were trained to look for problems
with late buses, African American students who were improperly assigned, African
American students who were unfairly labeled for special education, language barriers
with Spanish-speaking students, schools that made it difficult for bused students to
participate in extracurricular activities, and curricula geared to “the white male majority
viewpoint.” He offered Riverside High School, where the Superior Ability classes were
nearly all white, while the rest of the school was of mixed ethnicity, as an example of
racial inequality.70
Peterson said the monitoring boards were a mixed success. Teachers viewed the
monitors as suspicious outsiders, and “principals would lock themselves in their offices”
rather than do human relations work.71 According to Ian Harris, the last thing the school
board wanted was “citizens snooping around the schools.”72 Plans made by the
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monitoring board were not always implemented well. At Pulaski High School, for
example, the student-run human relations committee was given some training, and it
wrote a multicultural handbook for the school and made plans for a newsletter, a “rumor
control center,” and interracial dances and clubs.73 Few of these activities happened, and
the racial composition of clubs remained overwhelmingly white, except the drill team,
which was predominantly African American. Student hall monitors were all white, which
contributed to racial tension. A group of African American students and a group of white
students exchanged money for drugs at a bus stop on Twenty-Seventh and Oklahoma near
the school. It almost turned violent when no drugs came forth, but the monitors
intervened and got the money back without the principal’s knowing.74
Planning also began for the 1978–79 school year. This would be the third year of
integration, at which point the court demanded that all schools be integrated, which
Reynolds’ defined as 15 to 75 percent black. This was a very difficult task, considering
that only about half the schools were counted as integrated by September 1977.75 Indeed,
only 73 of the required 102 schools met the required racial balance.76 Furthermore,
several schools were still nearly 100 percent black, including Auer Avenue Elementary,
Parkman and Fulton Junior Highs, and North Division and Rufus King High Schools.
More white students had to be transferred into those schools for MPS to comply with the
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court order,77 so magnet programs were introduced to the remaining high schools.
Madison received a program called “Earth, Energy, and Environment,” North Division
was assigned a “Medical, Dental, and Health” specialty to attract white students; a
program on truck transportation went to Pulaski; and Vincent, being in a part of the city
that still had farms, acquired a program on agribusiness and natural resources. The
magnet program was so extensive that Harold Hohenfeldt, who was a supervisor of social
studies teachers at the time, was appointed to the new position of “Magnet School
Coordinator.” The complete magnet program, as it would be for several years, is listed
below:78
Options for Learning program (one of each of these in elementary schools in every
area of the city):
!
multi-unit, individually guided education (IGE)
!
basic fundamental
!
open education
!
creative arts
!
gifted and talented
!
German language79
!
Montessori education
!
bilingual-bicultural (Spanish) centers
Schools for the Transition program (junior high schools):
!
middle schools
!
multi-unit, IGE
!
basic fundamental
!
open education
!
gifted and talented
!
career orientation
!
bilingual-bicultural (Spanish) centers
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High Schools Unlimited program:
!
Bay View—visual and performing arts
!
Custer—applied technology
!
Hamilton—marketing and business communication
!
Juneau—small business management
!
Rufus King—college preparatory academy (citywide)
!
Lincoln—finance and commerce
!
Madison—earth, energy, and environment
!
Marshall—communication and media
!
Milwaukee Trade and Technical High School (citywide)
!
North Division—medical, dental, and health
!
Pulaski—transportation
!
Riverside—community human services and education
!
South Division—tourism, food service, and recreation
!
Washington—computer data processing
!
West Division—law, law enforcement, and protective service
!
Vincent—agribusiness and natural resources80
King and Milwaukee Trade and Tech were the only high schools on the list above
that were designated as citywide. In other words, any student in any part of the city could
attend those schools, and all students were required to take classes in the specialty.81
King High School was (and still is) the flagship of the magnet schools. King had been a
neighborhood school of nine hundred students, only one of whom was white, in 1977.
But MPS cleared the school out in 1978 so that only sixteen former students returned
when King reopened as a citywide magnet school for college-bound students in
September. There were 345 students in the high school program, about 52 percent of
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whom were white, and 410 students in the middle school program, about 56 percent of
whom were white. Principal William Larkin reported students were eager to learn, and
students said they liked their new surroundings. It was (and still is) a fully integrated
magnet school succeeding in the mission for which it was designed—to prepare all its
students for college.82
The other schools had neighborhood status instead of citywide status, which
meant they were required to accept neighborhood students even if the students did not
enroll in their specialities. Each school was also required to accept any student who
enhanced racial diversity at the school, even if a student did not enroll in the specialty.
Likewise, some elementary schools and junior high schools on the list above were
citywide, while others were neighborhood specialty schools. This arrangement was set up
to please parents who wanted their children to attend neighborhood schools but who did
not have a neighborhood school other than the one with the magnet program (see chapter
6).
There were also the now-familiar problems when the buses rolled out in
September 1978, including a shortage of bus drivers. One company, Handicabs, had only
four of the thirty-two drivers it needed. Of the 1,177 scheduled bus routes, thirty-six did
not run or had major problems that affected hundreds of students.83 Special education
students were particularly affected, as a number of route changes were made without
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notifying parents.84 Rufus King reported that some students were picked up late, while
others were not picked up at all.85
New measures were introduced to ensure that the buses would be on time,
including new contracts with transportation companies that required a $20 fine be paid
each time a bus was more than thirty minutes late. Students who changed residences
were required to attend a neighborhood school or a school on an existing bus route. The
previous policy allowed students to move without changing schools, which meant MPS
had to alter bus routes to match the new homes, a process that caused more than one
thousand route changes in 1977–78 and slowed down drivers so they were late for some
deliveries. The new policy was designed to eliminate these problems.86
As the year got underway, so did the collection of new evidence for the remand
trial. Though Barbee had not fully won his case yet, most of the integrationists’ goals,
such as ending intact busing, ending a racially biased transfer system, and giving parents
the power to choose where their children went to school, had been achieved by the late
1970s, making the continued legal challenge seem less relevant to many people. Intact
busing stopped in 1971, and most students were attending integrated schools by 1977,
though not all the court-imposed goals had been met.87 Finally, as schools were
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converted to magnet status, they could be partially restaffed under a plan approved by the
teachers’ union.88
Nonetheless, the trial reopened in Reynolds’ courtroom in January 1978. The new
trial focused on the intent of the school board in the 1960s. All of the old evidence from
the first trial was reexamined. More attention was focused on the racially biased teacher
transfer system from the 1960s.89 The past practice of intact busing also came under close
scrutiny. Almost a thousand new pieces of evidence were introduced.90 Assistant
Superintendent Robert Long testified that African American students who were bused
intact were not allowed to mix with white students, although white students when he had
taught in the 1950s and 1960s had mingled freely with the population of the host school.91
African American teachers and a white union representative testified about the
administration’s intent to segregate, and administrators testified about private
conversations held with school board members in which the administration was told to
keep the schools segregated.92
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Reynolds ruled against the school board again on June 1, 1978, and again ordered
districtwide desegregation, finding the actions of the school board had been so pervasive
that a districtwide remedy was the only possible option to correct violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871. It was his
opinion that the burden of proof set by the Supreme Court in Keyes vs. School District 1
of Denver, Colorado had been met93 (see chapter 4). Further hearings were held from
July until October to determine what the final desegregation plan would look like,94 and a
new monitor, U.S. Magistrate John C. McBride, was named to replace Gronouski.
McBride was not expected to advocate for the plaintiffs as Gronouski had. In fact,
McBride publically said, “I don’t plan to be telling [MPS] what to do,” and told reporters
that he would prefer to let the attorneys do the actual enforcement of the integration plan,
which would be monitored by the plaintiff’s attorneys.95 Thus, while Reynolds appointed
a monitor who would be less controversial in the white community, the magnet plan
would continue.
Reynolds received a major boost from the state legislature in February 1978, when
it approved the restructuring of the Milwaukee school board, reducing it from a fifteenmember board elected on an at-large basis to a nine-member board with eight elected by
local districts and one chosen at-large between 1979 and 1983. The intent was that this
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change would make the board more accountable to the voters.96 The phase-in had a
noticeable effect on the 1979 election—minority-dominated neighborhoods that had not
been able to meet the threshold to elect a representative under the old system were able
concentrate their votes and win an election. Thus, the liberals gained a majority of seats
and advocated more integration, even if it would have involuntarily placed white students
onto buses to the north side.97
Judge Reynolds issued his final ruling on February 8, 1979, setting up a
framework for desegregation,98 and the final details were hammered out in an out-of-court
settlement between the plaintiffs and the school board by May—almost fourteen years
after Lloyd Barbee filed the initial lawsuit.99 Seventy-five percent of all students—
kindergartners exempted—had to attend schools that were racially balanced, which was
defined as 25 to 60 percent black at the elementary level and 20 to 60 percent black at the
high school level. Students would be allowed to attend neighborhood schools and could
not transfer unless it enhanced the racial balance at the receiving school. Because there
were not enough schools on the north side of Milwaukee for the African American
students at the elementary level, this meant they would be bused to white schools on the
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south side, where there was more room. Schools in African American neighborhoods
were to be closed to induce transfers, voluntary or not. Two-thirds of schools would have
to have staffs that were 11 to 21 percent black, and the remaining third had to have staffs
that were 6 to 26 percent black.100 The settlement was set to expire on July 1, 1984, at
which point MPS should have been completely desegregated, assuming a static
demographic.101
According to historian Bill Dahlk, Barbee realized he had used up all his political
and social capital, he was losing control of the black school reform movement to black
power advocates, such as Howard Fuller (see chapter 6), and a settlement that achieved
most of his integration goals was the best he was going to get.102 McMurrin and most
school board members accepted the settlement because it would not require involuntary
busing of white students and would allow for some desegregated white-majority
schools.103
This time, with a settlement in place, there would be no chance of appeal. The
board’s new liberal majority would not have appealed anyway, though the NAACP tried.
The NAACP felt the settlement did not meet its organization’s standards, and it wanted
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white students to ride the buses too.104 Legally, the NACCP could make this appeal
because Barbee had been working for them,105 but this time they did not have the locally
famed lawyer’s support.106 The appeal was rejected by the Seventh Circuit’s Court of
Appeals on February 19, 1980,107 and the approved desegregation plan was put into place.
The plan above remained mostly unchanged during the 1980s, with a few
exceptions: Lincoln, which was a small-sized high school in downtown Milwaukee, was
closed in 1979 due to declining enrollment,108 and Juneau became a citywide school for
the same reason.109 Bay View and West Division switched specialties in 1984, with West
Division becoming Milwaukee High School of the Arts, a citywide school, due to its law
and law enforcement specialty not drawing enough white students.110 Riverside received
an open education program111 (which was discontinued in the 1990s) and a college-bound
program in partnership with the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee;112 Madison
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switched from earth, energy, and the environment to an electronics specialty;113 and a few
minor tweaks were made in other schools through at least the late 1980s.114
At the middle school level, Samuel Morse received a citywide “gifted and
talented” program and became a feeder school for Rufus King High School.115 Robinson
and Eighth Street middle schools also received special programs and became citywide
magnets, as did Fourth Street, Elm, Garfield, MacDowell, and several other elementary
schools. Some black schools, including Wells Junior High and Brown Street Elementary,
were closed to force black students to choose white schools. McMurrin said he wanted
all magnet schools to be at least 50 percent African American. New magnets in reading,
environmental studies, Spanish, and French were added at the elementary level. All the
new magnets were approved except the reading program, because it raised concerns about
the stigma that might be attached to a school for students with reading problems. The
plan was to be phased in during the 1979–80 school year and had to be complete by the
1983–84 school year,116 and several adjustments were also made in time for the 1985–86
school year, including an international studies specialty at Webster Middle School.117
Additional citywide magnet schools or magnet programs within neighborhood schools
were added through at least the late 1980s.118
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There was talk for a while of reopening Lincoln as a “Center for the Arts.”119
Both Lincoln120 and Roosevelt121 eventually became citywide fine arts middle schools.
Elm and Tippecanoe elementary schools were also assigned arts specialties. So if a
student attended one of those two elementary schools, he or she could have chosen to
attend Milwaukee High School of the Arts. Thus, a kindergarten to twelfth grade fine arts
education became possible in MPS.122
Initial reports showed that magnet schools were achieving their goal of integrating
African Americans and whites. A news article from 1981 reported that more than twentyfive thousand MPS students, or close to 30 percent, were enrolled in magnet schools, and
fifty-three of the district’s 143 schools were magnet schools or offered magnet
programs.123 Washington had managed to slow white migration and held the African
American population to only 52 percent by 1982.124 Its computer specialty grew from
seventy-five students in 1976 to six hundred in 1984.125 The business specialty was very
popular at Hamilton, where there was a waiting list to get into it.126 Juneau High School’s
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business program was also successful in teaching students how to write business plans
and market products and services.127 South Division, meanwhile, had simulated hotel and
restaurant facilities. Hamilton, Juneau, and South all released students from school for
part of their day so they could work in actual job settings for both pay and academic
credit.128
Rufus King, the flagship of the MPS magnet schools, was perhaps the biggest
success story, with an attendance rate of 94.2 percent in March 1983, compared to 85.5
percent for all high schools in MPS. King garnered national praise for its college-bound
program. The White House recognized it as one of the best 144 high schools in the
United States, and its Academic Decathlon team won third place in a national
competition in 1983, after a string of first-place championships at the state level.129
French Immersion, located on the northwest side of the city, was also very
popular. It exceeded its capacity to enroll students in 1985, partially because of
participation from families in the northern suburbs. The school board chose to move the
school to the old 88th Street School on the far south side, prompting cries from northside
and north-suburban parents who did not want their children to ride a bus far from
home.130
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These and some other schools proved to be so popular that there was a waiting list
to get into it them by 1985. The district had to implement a lottery to admit students,
which prompted criticism from parents whose children were not admitted,131 though MPS
claimed that 93 percent of students got into one of their top three choices when applying
for a school.132
Students enrolled in the magnet programs reported positive experiences. Jeff
Hauser, who lived in Hales Corners, was one of about eight hundred suburban students
who attended Milwaukee schools to take advantage of the magnet programs in 1985.
Hauser was drawn to the truck transportation program at Pulaski. He said he really
wanted to be a veterinarian or zoologist but thought it was important to have a skill as a
backup plan. Jeanne Laurenz of Oak Creek said she wanted to study theater and that
Milwaukee High School of the Arts had a much better program than Oak Creek. Her
friends were not supportive: “Many of the people I knew said: ‘You’re crazy. There are a
lot of crime and drug problems [in Milwaukee]. Besides, you’re a white girl. You’ll get
raped.’ I think they’ve been living in Oak Creek too long. There are no cliques here.
There is very little drug use, because everyone wants to take care of themselves.” She
admitted she did not like waking up between five thirty or six o’clock to catch a seven
o’clock bus but that she was willing to make that sacrifice.133
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One of the more curious magnet programs was at Vincent High School. While
one might question the practicality of establishing a magnet school for agribusiness and
natural resource management in an urban context, Vincent’s program thrived. The school
opened in 1979 on eighty acres of land and had 210 students enrolled in its specialty after
only one year. Classes involved genetic research, horticulture, and veterinary science.
One student, Steve Fischer, wanted to be a state fish and game warden: “Not many people
can become one—usually only six are hired a year. But this might give me a head start.”
Students planted trees on the property—eight hundred spruce and pine trees, one
hundred-fifty oaks, one hundred tamaracks (ninety-nine of which were eaten by small
animals in the school’s vicinity), fifty poplars, and twelve hundred ornamental shrubs in
the 1979–80 school year. Students also planted seventy garden plots, the proceeds from
which were used to defray the costs of field trips.134 As the program grew, students were
allowed to take increasingly advanced classes and also studied business management.
The U.S. Forest Service even started a program at Vincent in 1984, and it hired some
students for summer jobs.135 A handful of graduating seniors went on to study at the
Milwaukee Area Technical College or the University of Wisconsin system, which the
school administration saw as a victory, even though most of its students did not pursue
postsecondary education.136
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The federal government rewarded MPS in 1985 with a $4 million grant to support
magnet schools, which was more money than any other city received except New York.
Superintendent McMurrin said, “The money will make Milwaukee schools more
attractive, not only to our children, but to suburban parents.”137
On the other hand, while the magnet programs may have been popular, many
students were not prepared for their desired careers. One study found that many MPS
graduates could not read, write, do mathematics, or follow directions, and only about 30
percent of Wisconsin students trained for a vocation found employment in that field after
graduating from high school.138 The Medical College of Wisconsin criticized North
Division’s program for “set[ting] its sights too low” because it only trained students for
careers as medical technicians and nurses’ aides instead of preparing them to be doctors
or nurses.139 The magnet schools also did little or nothing to reduce the dropout rate.140
The scale of integration was another problem. For example, many students at the
middle school and high school levels were in segregated classes in 1980, even though
they were in schools that met the court’s standard for integration. Specifically, while
fifteen of the nineteen middle schools met the desegregation criteria from the settlement,
only 65 percent of their classes were integrated, and while thirteen of the fifteen high
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schools were desegregated, only 61 percent of their classes were.141 African Americans
were more likely to be placed into special education classes, and students who rode buses
could not participate in after-school activities because they had no way to get home if
they did not board the bus immediately after school.142 Only 7 percent of students in
Hamilton’s Program for the Academically Talented were African American. Students
chose racially homogeneous groups in cafeterias and physical education classes. African
American students were also frequently late to school because of long bus rides and could
be suspended for repeated tardiness. When interviewed by a reporter, a couple of African
American high school students downplayed the importance of race but acknowledged that
African Americans could not participate in some after-school activities and parties
because they did not have private transportation. A few other students reported racial
slurs or being ignored by white students when they tried to participate in extracurricular
activities.143
Despite these criticisms, a majority of Milwaukee voters evidently supported the
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magnet schools, because they returned pro-integration school board members, including
board president Doris Stacy, to office in the 1983 elections. Voters took this action even
though a difficult economic situation in 1983 made busing an extremely expensive
program.144 As a result of the elections, the school board voted to continue its integration
plan the following January,145 despite the fact that the desegregation settlement was
scheduled to expire on July 1.
Metropolitan segregation involved another problem of scale. MPS covered only
the city of Milwaukee, and while the city was multicultural, the surrounding suburbs were
not. According to the United States Supreme Court case Milliken v. Bradley (1974), a
court cannot mandate interdistrict busing unless the school district lines were established
to promote segregation. As a compromise, the state of Wisconsin designed the Chapter
220 program to promote metropolitan integration by providing financial incentives to
what would eventually be twenty-three suburban school districts that volunteered to
enroll minority students from the city. Also, white suburban students were allowed to
attend MPS schools. The program began in 1976 and was hailed by suburban
superintendents as a way to bring about voluntary integration and supplement school
funds,146 but it was never very popular with suburban parents, some of whom worried that
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MPS students lagged behind and might slow the academic achievement of their own
children. Other suburbanites were concerned about long bus rides or had financial
concerns and stated that they did not believe the state money would cover all costs.147
Enrollment statistics for Chapter 220 showed mixed degrees of success. The
West Allis-West Milwaukee school district, for example, debated the merits of the
program for years,148 and when it finally approved the program, it accepted only fifteen
Milwaukee students. Likewise, only eleven West Allis-West Milwaukee students
volunteered to attend Milwaukee magnet schools in the fall of 1983.149 Whitnall school
district, which encompasses the village of Hales Corners and parts of Greenfield and
Franklin, had some success—it exchanged seventeen of its students for thirty-five
Milwaukee students in the 1983–84 school year.150 That is about a two-to-one ratio,
which is more even than that of other districts who accepted Milwaukee students and the
related state funds but had proportionally fewer students attending Milwaukee magnet
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schools. Greendale, for example, admitted seventy-eight students for only sixteen
students it sent to Milwaukee. Brown Deer took 101 students from Milwaukee but sent
only twenty into the city. The disparity was worse in the Maple Dale-Indian Hill district,
where fifty-four Milwaukee students attended school compared to the four it sent to MPS,
and Nicolet, the most affluent district in southeastern Wisconsin and possibly the entire
state, accepted 123 Milwaukee students but traded only five of its students to the city.151
When incoming suburban freshmen were asked why they chose Nicolet over Milwaukee
high schools, students responded that the Milwaukee specialties looked good but that they
wanted to attend school with their friends.152
Suburbs in Waukesha county, to the west of Milwaukee, were eligible for Chapter
220 but sent few or no students to Milwaukee. Parents and district officials cited
underachieving Milwaukee students, school violence, and long bus rides as concerns.153
In the words of one Brookfield parent: “No way on God’s green Earth am I going to send
my children to Milwaukee.” Or, as another parent said, “You’re living in a fantasy land if
you think we’ll send our children to Milwaukee.” One parent predicted that “If we go
with the plan it will be the beginning of the end as we know it today.” Another parent
believed Chapter 220 was nothing but a way to siphon off Brookfield tax money for
Milwaukee’s purposes: “The City of Milwaukee would like nothing better than to dip into
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our checkbooks. I pay my property taxes to my school district. Let’s keep them [the
taxes] here.” And as an MPS teacher who lived in Brookfield said, “I deal every day with
children who can’t read. Fight this [the plan] right down the line. We don’t have to have
it forced upon us.”154
Thus, despite early interest in magnet schools from suburban superintendents,
countywide integration did not occur. For example, only seven north-suburban students
had volunteered to attend Milwaukee magnet schools full-time, and only thirteen students
volunteered to participate in the Milwaukee satellite centers by August 26.155 The
numbers were not much better by the end of the school year: 345 students were bused
from Milwaukee to the suburbs under Chapter 220, while only thirty-five suburban
students chose to attend schools in the city by March 1977.156 Seven years later, another
study showed that only 82.5 percent of the Chapter 220 participants were African
American.157
Thus, a purely voluntary program was not enough to bring about integration in the
metropolitan Milwaukee area. The Milwaukee school board considered a lawsuit in early
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1980 that would have forced interdistrict desegregation.158 Several community groups,
including the Milwaukee Integration Research Center (MIRC), the American Civil
Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters, and the NAACP, suggested a merger of
the Milwaukee, Shorewood, and Whitefish Bay school districts. As in 1975, when state
representative Dennis Conta first proposed such a plan (see chapter 4), the idea of a
merger was met with strong opposition from Shorewood and Whitefish Bay.159 It did not
gain much traction in 1982 either, and the Milwaukee School Board voted to join the
lawsuit led by MIRC in 1983 that would have reorganized Milwaukee and twenty-nine
suburban districts into several districts, each of which would include a portion of the city
and some suburban territory.160
According to a Milwaukee Journal survey, 68 percent of black Milwaukeeans and
54 percent of all Milwaukeeans supported creation of a metropolitan school district, but
only 40 percent of all suburbanites agreed with the idea.161 Most African Americans who
objected to the lawsuit said they would prefer that the school board concentrate on
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improving education in the inner city. Increasingly in the 1980s, black leadership turned
away from the assumption that integration was the key to solving school problems,
rejecting the Brown premise and embracing one of black self-determination. Milwaukee
alderwoman Marlene Johnson said integration should not be forced on anyone. Bernard
Benn, of the Milwaukee Urban League, said there should not be a lawsuit until the results
of Chapter 220 had been studied. Christine Belnavis of the Milwaukee chapter of the
NAACP believed there should be more negotiation between the city and suburbs. State
representative Polly Williams, an outspoken critic of busing, said she would fight any
lawsuit and that the proposed city-suburban merger had nothing to do with improving the
quality of education. Most poignantly, she added that she did not accept “the notion that
a black student must be sitting next to a white student in order to learn.”162
Opposition continued to come in from the suburbs. Waukesha parents, for
example, said they opposed long bus rides and a tax increase that would probably be
necessary to fund the buses. They also resented what they perceived as Milwaukee’s
interference in their schools. McMurrin told Waukesha residents that he wanted to place
magnet schools in their county but said he could not guarantee it would happen.163
Wauwatosa’s superintendent said that if magnet schools were all Milwaukee had to offer,
he would prefer to create his own, rather than lose self-governance.164
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Even Dennis Conta, who had urged a merger between Shorewood, Whitefish Bay,
and the east side of Milwaukee just a few years earlier, could not accept a plan as radical
as the proposed merger, saying in a Milwaukee Journal op-ed piece, “It is insulting,
demeaning, and patronizing to tell blacks that the best way for them to at least receive a
basic education is for them to attend school with whites.” He also said that expecting
schools to fix racism, a societal ill, was folly, and that the magnet schools were improving
education only for children who “attend specialty schools such as Golda Meir, Rufus
King, and a small number of others.” He further said, “These select schools are an
abberration [sic] and do not represent the common experience. The effort of these
parents smacks of being from an elitist, ‘knee-jerk liberal’ dictate.”165
Some people speculated at the time that the school board knew it would lose but
was hoping that it could provoke the suburban districts into negotiating a voluntary plan
that would increase participation in Chapter 220.166 Indeed, Brown Deer superintendent
Kenneth Moe tried to broker a compromise and introduced his own proposal that would
have created teams of advisers to visit Milwaukee schools and suburban schools, assess
the strengths of each, and recommend integration plans.167 Twenty-four superintendents
endorsed the plan unanimously at a conference in January 1984.168 The Milwaukee
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school board voted to postpone the lawsuit one month in an attempt to cooperate with the
suburbs. It also gave a nonbinding endorsement of Moe’s plan.169
But the hope for voluntary metropolitan integration lasted less than three months.
Lois Riley, a hardcore integration activist, was unanimously elected president of the
Milwaukee school board in April.170 She immediately proposed a new plan that would
have merged the city with twenty-four suburban districts into six districts. It was never
approved by the state but won the support of the Milwaukee school board on a six-tothree vote. The majority consisted of Riley, Kristine Leopold, Edward Michalski, Alex
Weinberger, and former board presidents Donald O’Connell and Doris Stacy. David
Cullen, Kathleen Hart, and Joyce Mallory voted against the plan. Mallory, who was
involved in the local chapter of the NAACP, was the only African American on the
school board in 1984 and was already advocating African American empowerment rather
than integration (see chapter 6). Riley’s goal was to have an approximate mix of 45
percent white, 45 percent African American, and 10 percent “other” in Milwaukee
schools by fall 1985.171 McMurrin labeled the plan voluntary, but Moe and other
suburban superintendents said that any plan with anything resembling quotas could not be
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voluntary. They also refused to give up their local self-governance.172 Greenfield, West
Allis-West Milwaukee, and most other districts rejected the plan outright. The Nicolet
school board offered to compromise, rejecting quotas but embracing most other aspects of
the plan.173
For her part, Riley said Milwaukee’s specialty schools had a lot to offer to the
suburbs and said the city needed suburban money: “The Milwaukee schools have to
broaden their financial base. That’s part of what this is all about. You can’t just have
your inner city schools with kids who come from poor families.” She said if the suburbs
did not agree, “the only alternative is to go to court.”174 And that is exactly what
happened. The board voted six to three to pursue a lawsuit, independent of MIRC,
against twenty-four suburban districts on June 27.175
The school board stood on tenuous legal ground. A federal judge in Kansas City
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had recently dismissed a case in which the Kansas City school board had sued the
surrounding suburban districts, but on the other hand, judges had mandated interdistrict
integration in Wilmington, DE, and Indianapolis.176 Lawyers for the State of Wisconsin
and the twenty-four districts filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the
Milwaukee School Board lacked standing because it was suing on behalf of a third
party—the school children. The lawyers also argued that education was primarily a local
responsibility and that neither the state nor the surrounding schools districts had intended
to do anything harmful to Milwaukee children.177 Intent was a key issue. Courts had not
been able to mandate interdistrict integration since the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Milliken vs. Bradley (1974) unless the state or school districts had intended to
discriminate.
Another problem was that the lawsuit had only mixed support in the city. Lloyd
Barbee, who had led the movement toward integration, had assumed that educational
opportunities would improve for African American children if they went to the same
schools as white children, but standardized test scores, graduation rates, and suspension
rates indicated this was not true by 1984 (see chapter 7). Thus, Mallory, Fuller, and other
black community leaders, such as Milwaukee assemblywoman Polly Williams, turned
their attention to community control (see chapter 6). Williams, in particular, was critical
of metropolitan desegregation, believing that the city’s white power structure was aiming
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to disperse African American children so whites would not have to deal with them.178 A
staunch advocate of community control, Williams claimed, “We must make our own
rules. Only Black folk know what’s best for Black folk.”179
Milwaukee’s white leadership could give only a moderate level of support. The
Milwaukee Journal advocated voluntary integration.180 Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier
supported metropolitan school integration if it was coupled with metropolitan residential
integration, which would help disperse the city’s concentration of poor minorities.181
Voters also had mixed feelings, as evidenced by the divided election of 1985, in which
some supporters of the lawsuit were elected to the school board but other were not. Chief
among the losers was long-time civil rights activist Kathleen Hart, who was defeated by
former board member Lawrence O’Neil in the seventh district, which was located in the
Hamilton High School area on the very white south side.182 O’Neil was aided by an
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endorsement from the MTEA.183
The drive toward the lawsuit cooled after the election. But nonetheless, the
lawsuit encouraged suburban districts to come to the bargaining table rather than take the
risk of having a desegregation plan imposed on them. A marathon of talks was held in
spring of 1985,184 and a plan eventually emerged that would have encouraged more
voluntary integration. The sticking point came, however, when the Milwaukee school
board agreed only to postpone the lawsuit by five years, rather than drop it altogether. As
a result, most suburban districts rejected the plan.185 Larry Harwell, at the time an aide to
Polly Williams, continued to criticize the lawsuit because busing African American
students outside of Milwaukee would weaken the black community’s control over its
children’s education. It also might have weakened the black community’s political
strength because African Americans would not have constituted a significant voting bloc
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in any of the new districts.186
A variety of other plans surfaced in the face of the suburban district’s opposition:
MTEA suggested college tuition subsidies for suburban students who volunteered to
attend city schools; suburban teachers asked that additional specialty schools be
established in the city to attract suburban students;187 and the NAACP, which had joined
the lawsuit in February 1985,188 vowed to continue the legal challenge.189 Superintendent
McMurrin proposed that the city’s ten traditional high schools (the ones that were not
citywide) and their surrounding elementary schools and middle schools be evenly split
into five districts and then combined with one of the big five specialty high schools and
nearby suburban schools. These districts would not be self-governing but would aid in
planning for metropolitan integration.190 None of these plans amounted to anything, and
eventually, the city and suburbs agreed to set integration goals that were to be filled over
a period of years, and the legislature agreed to increase aid to MPS to reduce class size.191
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The final settlement was reached in 1986–87. The districts of Shorewood,
Whitefish Bay, Brown Deer, Menomonee Falls, Mequon-Theinsville, Greenfield,
Greendale, and St. Francis agreed to open 2,700 hundred spots for Milwaukee minority
students, and Milwaukee would take in about nine thousand suburban students. This
agreement represented a small increase in the number of students participating in Chapter
220.192 Joyce Mallory voted against the settlement because she believed it did not go far
enough to integrate students and lost sight of the lawsuit’s goal of improving educational
opportunities for African American students.193
Thus, implementing desegregation had mixed results in Milwaukee. The
programs appeared to be academically sound on the surface, but they may have lacked
substance. Busing was extremely complicated and expensive, and students were often
not integrated within schools. Metropolitan integration was proposed. But suburban
school districts resisted it, and Chapter 220 emerged as a compromise. The most
vigorous challenge to desegregation, however, would not be curricular issues, busing
problems, or opposition from the suburbs. Parent opposition, from both the black and
white communities, would be the main obstacle to reform. Some parents objected to
busing, while others wanted community control, and none of the parents supported choice
in schools if they had to make a “forced choice,” as will be shown in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ERA OF FORCED CHOICE:
THE REACTION TO MILWAUKEE’S MAGNET PLAN, 1976–1986
As could be expected, reaction to Judge Reynolds’s decision varied widely, even
among the plaintiffs. Craig Amos, who had been thirteen years old in 1965 when the case
was filed on behalf of him and forty other children, was twenty-three years old and
attending the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee (UWM) when Reynolds made his
decision. For him, so much time had passed that the court decision did not seem relevant
anymore. In an interview the day after Reynolds’s ruling, Amos explained that he was
supposed to attend Lincoln Junior-Senior High School, but his parents sent him to Morse
Junior High, a white school, so he could receive a “quality” education. He said, “It
wasn’t worth it. I got nothing out of it. Nothing but fights and name calling.” He
remembered some white students yelling, “Nigger, go home. Go back to Africa.”1
Threats of physical violence were common, and eventually he was worn down,
transferred to Lincoln, as he originally wanted, and graduated from its senior high
program in 1970. His mother did not want to discuss the suit with reporters at the time of
the verdict.2
Amos’s response encapsulates the varied reactions to integration. Many whites
made it clear to African Americans that they were not wanted. Some, as Amos indicated,
were racists, while others were open-minded about integration and liked magnet schools
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but did not want low-achieving students bused into their neighborhoods. Virtually no
white parents were enthusiastic about their children being bused into what they perceived
as unsafe, low-achieving schools. Therefore, most of the busing was shouldered by
African Americans in order to minimize disruption the white community, and the choice
some African Americans really wanted—to attend their neighborhood schools—was
denied to them. As a result, some African Americans and liberal whites lobbied for twoway busing, while the black power movement continued to gain strength under Howard
Fuller and the Coalition to Save North Division.
As explained in the last chapter, the school board was split were eight to seven on
the issue of racial integration in the 1960s and 1970s. Lorraine Radtke led the
conservative majority in its legal appeal of Judge Reynolds’ decision. Anthony
Busalacchi, who was in the majority faction, wanted to put a restraining order on John
Gronouski, the court-appointed special master, until the appeal was completed. “In
reality, this plan will only segregate the city of Milwaukee,” Busalacchi said. “I envision
a white migration to private and parochial schools and, where financially possible, a flight
completely out of the county.”3 Busalacchi was roundly criticized for his position against
busing, but he pointed out that his children attended integrated schools, whereas some
other board members sent their children to private schools. To this day, Busalacchi holds
firm to his conviction that it is wrong to break up neighborhood schools and require
students to ride buses and that doing so causes white flight.4
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Though Busalacchi may have been correct about a white flight to the suburbs and
parochial schools, white parents looking to evade integration received no help from the
Milwaukee Archdiocese, which declared that Catholic schools would not be havens for
racists. Father John Hanely, superintendent of the archdiocese’s schools said, “Mixing
black and white children in both public and parochial schools can only bring advantages,
both educationally and as a Christian witness (supporting desegregation), to the
community.” The archdiocese hired a consultant to work on integration, in-services, and
curriculum. It also proposed that the archdiocese accept African American students at
public expense, articulating an idea that would become part of the “school choice”
voucher plan of the 1990s (see chapter 8). In return, white students at parochial schools
would be allowed to participate in public school specialty programs. Relations between
the archdiocese and Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) soured in spring 1976, however,
when a thousand eighth-graders graduated from Catholic elementary schools and enrolled
in MPS high schools. MPS considered them new students, since they had previously
been in Catholic schools, and assigned about two hundred of them to schools that were
far from their homes or were once predominantly black. These assignments were made
because MPS’s desegregation policies required the district to give MPS eighth-graders
top priority for seats in neighborhood high schools. Because the Catholic eighth-graders
were technically new to MPS, they were given low priority in preference for school
assignment.5 The MPS-archdiocesan exchange plan never materialized.
State Representative Dennis Conta supported desegregation and busing, but few
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other local politicians did. Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier said he would obey the
judge’s decision but resented it.6 State Senator Monroe Swan, an African American who
was a professed black nationalist, was cool to it. He was more interested in quality
education than integrated education and said he hoped some black schools would be left
intact in black neighborhoods.7 Republican State Senator James F. Sensenbrenner
lamented the likely end of Milwaukee’s neighborhood school system. Another state
senator, Wayne Whittow, said he was “disappointed in the opinion,” and U.S.
Representative Clement J. Zablocki said he was so upset by Reynolds’ ruling that “it
makes my blood boil every time his name is mentioned.” He defended the neighborhood
school system, said it was a waste of time for children to spend three or four hours a day
on a bus, and questioned Reynolds’ objectivity, saying, “Federal judges are supposed to
be removed from politics, but I have yet to see one who doesn’t have politics on his
sleeve.”8 Circuit Court Judge Christ Seraphim sharply criticized his colleague Reynolds.
Although he claimed he did not support segregation, speaking at the racially exclusive
Eagles Club, Seraphim chastised Reynolds for taking far too long to reach a decision and
for exceeding his Constitutional authority. Decisions of that type “would tear down the
fabric of our society.”9 Governor Pat Lucey was more moderate and simply said he
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would comply with the ruling and hoped there would be a peaceful transition, free from
the violence that had accompanied desegregation in Boston.10
White parents expressed fear that their children would be removed from their
neighborhood schools and sent to areas of the city they perceived as unsafe. As one white
woman said, “I guess I’m the type of person who doesn’t care who gets bused in, but I
don’t want my kids bused out.” An African American woman agreed that personal
freedom should not be sacrificed in the name of desegregation: “If my son wanted to go
to Fox Point, no one should tell him he can’t. But if he doesn’t want to go, he shouldn’t
have to.” Several parents also said busing was unfair to people who had purchased
homes in the middle-class parts of the city. As one parent said, “You’re paying taxes to
live in a better area. If your children have to be sent to a school outside their district . . .
it’s Communist.” Other parents, both black and white, said the money used for busing
would be better spent on improving the schools.11
The Milwaukee Sentinel polled nearly four hundred Milwaukee households, 115
of which had school-aged children, in 1976, at the time of Judge Reynolds’s initial
decision. Of the 115, 72 percent said they would prefer their children attend integrated
schools, but 61 percent opposed busing. A racial divide was evident—65 percent of
African American respondents supported busing. Some of the other 35 percent cited fear
for their children’s safety at white schools in the city. In a preview of the white migration
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that was to come, half the white parents who were against busing said they would put
their children in private or parochial schools to avoid involuntary busing. Another 10
percent said they would leave the city for the suburbs, and 34 percent said they would
take other steps, including protests and keeping their children at home. Most concerned
parents cited safety issues in northside schools, and some referenced the violence in
Boston (see chapter 2). But 17 percent of white parents admitted they would prefer to
have their children attend all-white schools.12 Some busing critics cited a tax increase
that would be necessary to pay for the buses.13 Other survey data showed Latinos
generally supported desegregation,14 but Native Americans worried they might lose their
racial identity if busing was forced on them.15 Residents of the Sherman Park
community, a racially diverse part of Milwaukee, were divided—31 percent thought
integration would have a positive effect on the quality of education, 26 percent thought it
would have no effect, 27 percent thought it would have a bad effect, and 16 percent did
not know.16 According to another Milwaukee Sentinel poll, conducted in 1976, 56
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percent of city residents believed the suburbs should be part of integration,17 and 64
percent of suburbanites said they supported busing African American students to their
schools.18
John Rakus, president of the National Justice Foundation, a group opposed to
court-ordered integration plans, came to Milwaukee in spring 1976. He claimed his
organization represented people in thirty-two states and likened “forced integration” to
British rule over the American colonies in the eighteenth century.19 Many Milwaukeeans
agreed with Rakus’s position, if not his rhetoric. They revealed in interviews that they
liked the voluntary nature of McMurrin’s magnet plan but also doubted it would actually
achieve racial integration. They expected involuntary busing would follow soon.20 And
despite the poll data that said white parents would welcome African American students in
their schools, one white man, whose wife was a substitute teacher at Lincoln High
School, speaking on the condition of anonymity, called Lincoln a black prison and said,
“Now what’s going to happen when they bus a whole lot of black students over the
viaduct to the South Side? The people aren’t going to accept that. You know what I
mean by that.”21
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That last sentence is key to understanding the white mindset. It was spoken in a
kind of code—no one wanted to admit it, but while many white Milwaukeeans publicly
said they favored integration as long as their children were not bused, they privately did
not want any integration at all. White Milwaukeeans simply could not accept their
children going to school with African American children, whether for racial reasons or
out of a fear of a decline in educational standards, as Christine Rossell’s research has
argued was true in other cities (see chapter 5).
Reaction in Milwaukee’s black leadership was mixed. Organization of
Organization (Triple O) director Lawrence Harwell feared for the safety of black children
in white schools. He also questioned the benefits of integration and said it “somehow
covers up the key issue, which is how to make every school in this city a quality
school.”22 He held a series of community meetings in 1976–1977, and according to the
Milwaukee Courier, a black newspaper, many African Americans agreed with him.23
Milwaukee Urban League President Wesley Scott, on the other hand, took the more
traditional black viewpoint and believed integration was necessary to achieve equality.
He also supported busing and countywide integration. Frederick Carr, chair of the Black
Administrators and Supervisors Council in the Milwaukee Public Schools, was pleased
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with Reynolds’s decision. He also said he liked McMurrin’s magnet plan but felt it
would not go far enough and involuntary busing would be necessary. O.C. White, a
popular Milwaukee radio personality and head of an inner-city youth group, encouraged
parents to get involved in formulating the desegregation plan. Like Carr, he believed
countywide integration was necessary, otherwise white flight would result in the city’s
becoming entirely African American.24
Student reaction to integration varied. According to newspaper accounts, African
Americans were the targets of harassment at Hamilton, the first southside magnet school
since Milwaukee Trade and Tech received citywide status in 1961 (see chapter 4).
Hamilton’s enrollment went from ninety-two African American students (3.6 percent of
all students) in 1975 to 538 (20 percent of all students) in 1976. A carload of white
students hurled objects at a county transit system bus carrying African American students
home after school on September 21, which resulted in at least one minor injury.25
Rumors about African American students carrying guns spread. There were violent
clashes between African Americans and “greasers.” Several African American pupils
said they felt unwanted. As Lisa Mann lamented, “Why can’t you respect us the way we
respect you?” Principal Robert Temple, several assistant principals, and security guards
patrolled the hall and grounds looking for trouble.26
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White students at Hamilton complained about the lack of self-discipline among
African Americans. For example, a story circulated about that African American students
urinated on the wildcat mascot mosaic on the floor of the main entrance. Some white
students claimed that some Africans Americans behaved badly at school dances.27
Whites also said African Americans were not punished for their actions, and about fifty
white students staged a walkout in protest at the beginning of the 1983–84 school year.
They claimed that black gang fights broke out without consequences and that white
students were afraid to go to school. Some of the students actually called the Milwaukee
Journal to explain their reasons. They accused the school administration of covering up
racial problems. “They say we are prejudiced, but we are plain scared,” said one junior
girl. A freshman boy added, “If people can’t walk by black people without putting their
heads down, that is not a school, that is a hangout.” A third student said the purpose of
the walkout was to alert the public to what was “really going on [at Hamilton],” claiming
that white students “don’t want to be pushed around anymore.”28
But former Hamilton teachers report that stories in the Milwaukee Journal and
Milwaukee Sentinel were overblown. Arlo Coplin, who was the Physical Education
Department chairperson in the 1970s and would be a guidance counselor in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, recalled very few problems among students. He said the white students
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were apprehensive at first because they had had little or no contact with African
Americans prior to integration. He acknowledged that there were some fights between
black groups and white groups. But he also said there had been fights among whites prior
to integration, so nothing had really changed other than skin color.29
A guidance counselor who requested anonymity agreed with Coplin and said very
little changed in the tenor of the school. One problem she did recall, however, was that
African American students were added to Hamilton in the middle of summer, and that
overloaded some classes. She said the whole school had to be reprogrammed three weeks
into the school year and that some white students were removed from classes in which
they were earning A’s, which angered several students, but the counselor said the anger
was over the loss of a good grade and was not race based.30 Scott Hirsch, who attended
Hamilton from 1975 until 1978 and who worked as a safety aide at Hamilton in the
1990s, remembered a lot of anger and confusion over the reprogramming.31 Some classes
remained overcrowded despite the reprogramming and some students wanted to transfer
to less crowded suburban or parochial schools.32
James Jones was an art teacher who came to Hamilton in 1976. Jones, an African
American, grew up in Rockford, Illinois, and attended Buena Vista University in Iowa.
He said he always had a lot of white friends and was used to multicultural groups. His
first job in Milwaukee was at Robert Fulton Junior High in 1969. He said he actually
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went to see the principal after the first day of school and asked where all the white
children were, because he did not know that Milwaukee was a segregated city. Jones said
Fulton was at least 90 percent African American. He said he liked his time there but
realized he had to leave after seven years when his car was vandalized. He ended up at
Hamilton in the first year of integration and was surprised to find out that, while African
American students were bused to Hamilton, few, if any, neighborhood students were
bused out. He said he liked all the students and teachers—both black and white. Robert
Temple, Hamilton’s principal in much of the 1970s, recognized Jones’s unique people
skills and asked him take over the school’s newly created human relations position.
Jones accepted it and worked to improve relations between students and faculty through
multicultural activities and a student-faculty advisory committee. He returned to the
classroom after a few years and became Art Department chair and head basketball coach.
He said he always loved the people with whom he worked.33
Former Hamilton students agreed with their teachers. Jeff Kartz said most white
students accepted African American classmates.34 Dena Platow agreed and said there
were no concerns about racial violence, although she acknowledged a noticeable change
in student behavior once integration happened. “We never had to worry about vandalism
in the bathrooms until then.”35 Hirsch, who served on the human relations committee,
remembered the school being overcrowded. He said there were some fights and territorial
conflicts—for example, one of the doors to the school was the “greaser door”—but those
33
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territorial conflicts had always been there, and race was not an issue: “It was just that
nobody really knew anybody.” He also said the white students and teachers were
unprepared for poor African American students. The teachers were used to higherachieving students and did not have much training on working with students who were
below grade level and had learning styles that were different from those of middle-class
students. He said he thinks teachers might have had an easier time adjusting their
pedagogy for the new students if the students had been phased into the school, perhaps
starting at the elementary level.36
Eventually, some white parents took their children out of Hamilton and put them
in parochial schools or suburban schools, but they said it had nothing to do with race.
John Semancik, for example, sent his two sons to Martin Luther High School, which was
both parochial and suburban, to take classes with fewer numbers of students who were
less likely to be disruptive. One of his daughters also left Hamilton for the same reason,
but he said she got a fine education and went on to become a successful artist.37
Kenneth Knoll, who was also on the Hamilton cluster committee, agreed. Knoll
had been a teacher and a principal in Greenfield and in the rural Milwaukee County
school district that had preceded the modern suburban districts. He lamented the lack of
discipline in modern schools. In his day, it was perfectly acceptable to physically
discipline students. He said he remembered some fights and assaults at Bell Junior High
School and Hamilton but said they were not race-based. In his view, lax discipline and
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tolerance of fighting was simply a sign of the times. Knoll never tolerated fighting,
profanity, or other behaviors in his own school, and he eventually took his children out of
MPS when he saw increases in these problem areas.38
As MPS went into its second year of desegregation in 1977, white students would
have to volunteer for integration to clear out space in southside schools for African
Americans. Many white parents did not want to remove their children from
neighborhood schools and became angry when their children were bused to northside
schools. There were more than a thousand such cases. Keith Malkowski is one example.
Keith and his parents lived a few blocks from Lake Michigan and, along with fifty-five
thousand other families, received information packets on desegregation in May 1977.
These families were informed that they would face possible mandatory reassignment if
they did not fill out transfer forms. The form allowed parents to list their top three
choices, and the Malkowskis wrote “Fernwood” for all three and added the following
message: “The above choice is our one and only, positively without a doubt.” The
Malkowskis had sent Keith to Fernwood, which was only four blocks from their home,
since he was in first grade, with the exception of one year at a Catholic school, during
which he received sacramental preparation for Holy Eucharist. Keith was in sixth grade
in 1976–77, and his parents were intent on his completing seventh and eighth grades at
Fernwood. By listing Fernwood three times on the application, Keith risked being
involuntarily assigned to a school if he was not admitted to Fernwood, but Christine
Malkowski did not care. “If I have to carry a folding chair and take my child into the
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seventh grade class at Fernwood next year and sit him down in it, I’ll do that,” she said.
She also admitted that she and her neighbors did not believe the desegregation order
applied to them: “We kept hearing how voluntary it would be and we thought that meant
we’d never really have to become involved.” She also liked that Keith could walk to and
from school and could come home for lunch.39
Parochial students had even less choice. As previously stated, students in
Catholic schools who entered the public school system were given the lowest priority
when it came to school assignment. Diane Duncan was one of those students. Diane
graduated from eighth grade at St. Florian’s school in spring 1977. Faced with the choice
of paying high tuition at a Catholic high school or attending an MPS school, Diane and
her parents chose the latter and filled out an application to enroll at Walker Junior High,
the junior high school closest to their home, after which she would attend a senior high
school for grades ten to twelve. Audubon Junior High School and Bell Junior High
School, also close to their home, were their second and third choices. But Diane was not
allowed to attend any of those schools. MPS assigned her and at least three other St.
Florian graduates to Edison Junior High School on the north side of the city in order to
integrate it. Thus, Diane went from an all-white school to one that was half black and
half white. When interviewed, Diane’s father said he did not mind his daughter’s
attending school with African Americans but objected to the half-hour bus ride his
daughter would face: “I think it’s fine to integrate the school system if they could do it
without busing the kids. I’ve been paying property taxes here for 21 years, even though
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my daughter was attending parochial school. Now when I want her to go to public school
down the block, they say she has to take a bus all the way across town, just because she’s
white.”40 Duncan’s opinion is consistent with Rossell’s findings that indicate many white
parents objected to busing for reasons in addition to race.
About a hundred white parents went to the school board shortly before the
1977–78 school year began to try to have the mandatory assignments rescinded. Some
parents demanded that McMurrin be fired: “The things that were once important in our
schools—reading, writing, and arithmetic—are now forgotten. That’s what this school
system was set up for, not integration,” said Frank Augustine. He received loud applause
when he said “the biggest mistake ever made was in hiring McMurrin.” Another parent
claimed that his twelve-year-old son still could not read and that desegregation was doing
nothing to help him. Other parents described mandatory school assignments as “a
communist plot,” “a Soviet scheme,” and “akin to a three-ring circus.” In response, the
board’s Committee on Community and Group Advisory ordered the superintendent and
the board’s desegregation attorney, Lawrence Hammond Jr., to prepare options to erase
the mandatory assignments.41
But not all whites objected to mandatory busing. Special Master Gronouski and
some members of the Committee of 100 (C/100) made public statements against “oneway busing,” in which African Americans were bused in disproportionately larger
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numbers than were whites.42 People United for Integrated and Quality Education (People
United for short) organized around the issue. People United was a multicultural
organization dedicated to the transformation of learning in MPS. A total of 12,700
African Americans were scheduled for busing—either voluntary or involuntary—in the
1977–78 school year, compared to a mere 1,800 whites. That was one out of every three
black students, compared to one in every thirty-eight white students.43 People United
wanted pairing and clustering of schools. For example, a black elementary school and
white elementary school might be paired so that all students would attend grades one to
three at the white school and grades four to six at the black school. Their ambitious
platform also called for more multicultural education, more bilingual education, an end to
“tracking,” changes in how discipline referrals and suspensions were handled, counseling
for students with substance abuse problems, a reversal of the Bakke case, and a boycott of
corporations that did business in apartheid South Africa.44
People United criticized what it saw as overuse of suspensions as a means of
disciplining students. It cited a study by the Social Development Commission that found
African American students who were in white-majority schools in Milwaukee were
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suspended five to ten more times often than white students, compared to a rate triple that
of whites nationwide.45 One of the fliers from People United addressed the issue of
suspensions this way:
Do you care about suspensions? . . . For every one white suspension there are
three black suspensions. Part of the reason there are so many suspensions is
because they’re not teaching in a more modern way than just old-fashioned
teaching methods. The MPS does not have uniform rules defining what students
can be suspended for. Suspensions are not used as a last resort but as the typical
method of discipline—students can be suspended for breathing out of turn! Racist
administrators and administrators who tolerate racism make it even more difficult
for minority students.46
People United attempted to organize the black, white, and Latino communities
through meetings, picketing, and “speak-outs,” which were gatherings where individuals
could approach a microphone and “speak out” their concerns about a specific topic.47 It
also emphasized student involvement and issued a high school students’ bill of rights,
which called for, among other things, a discipline appeal board with equal numbers of
teachers, administrators, and students; a truancy council run by students; freedom of
speech and press; expanded tutoring and counseling opportunities; an increase in minority
and social history; the right to grade teachers; the right to leave campus during the day;
and the right to smoke cigarettes.48
When Bob Peterson, cofounder of People United, was asked thirty years later
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about why the organization was largely unsuccessful, he said MPS refused to adopt twoway busing and reforms due to the “white power structure” in the community and
“spineless” white leadership. He was particularly not fond of Superintendent McMurrin,
whom he referred to as “Mr. Smiling Face.” From Peterson’s viewpoint, McMurrin was
a nice person but was unwilling to take the necessary steps to bring about bilateral busing
and curricular reform because such steps would disrupt the white community. C/100 had
incorporated many of People United’s points into its integration plan, but McMurrin
refused to accept those points. He accused the school board of “dragging its feet” by
accepting integration on the surface but delaying implementation while it appealed
Reynolds’s decision and noted that specialty schools received extra funding to improve
education but other schools did not. According to Peterson, adequate funding and a lot of
human relations work would have been necessary to improve education at schools that
were already integrated and to encourage whites to stay in them. Peterson also was
disappointed in the lack of leadership at the city, county, and state levels and said that he
considered John Gronouski to be “obnoxious” because he did not allow public hearings
as he formulated his integration plan.49
African Americans also organized outside of People United. They were not
unified in their opinion of the implementation of integration. As explained in previous
chapters, there were three distinct groups of African Americans in Milwaukee.50 Black
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business interests tended to oppose integration out of fear that it would upset the white
business community. Others wanted voluntary integration without mandatory
assignments, and the third group favored black community control over black schools and
was adamantly opposed to magnet schools. The Black Administrators and Supervisors
Council, Larry Harwell, and the Milwaukee Courier, a black community newspaper,
opposed one-way busing.51 Joyce Mallory of the local NAACP chapter had several
complaints about one-way busing, including long bus rides, the inability of whites to
teach American American students, new discpline policies in white schools that were
aimed at African Americans, and lack of opportunities to provide African American
parents with input into how the white schools were run.52 Former Urban League director
Wesley Scott put it this way: “Blacks didn’t have much input into the schools in the first
place. This plan made it even worse.”53 Comments like those of Mallory and Scott
indicate a shift in the black school reform movement to community control of schools by
the 1980s.
No one involved wanted to admit it publically at the time, but the basic premise of
busing was to bus only African American students and to leave white students where they
were. School administrators thought that would integrate the schools as the court order
required but would keep white flight to a minimum. Deputy Superintendent David
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Bennett was the chief architect of Milwaukee’s busing plan, and Bennett admited this
strategy in 1999 when he mentioned it twice at a forum on race issues. Anthony
Busalacchi, school board president from 1978 until 1979, agreed, saying, “It was an issue
of how do we least disrupt the white community.”54
An organization named Blacks for Two-Way Integration formed in the spring of
1977 under the leadership of Larry Harwell to try to decrease the amount of involuntary
busing to the south side and increase white enrollment in black schools. They encouraged
rallies, communities meetings, and boycotts of the buses.55 According to their figures,
7,328 African American pupils were bused in 1976–1977, the first year of integration,
while only 985 whites were bused. African American students were removed from forty
black schools to attend ninety-five white schools. It also said that 1,939 African
Americans were “forced to volunteer.” in 1977–78.56
Blacks for Two-Way Integration found those statistics appalling. It made nine
recommendations to the school board:
1.

That black schools remain majority black—55 percent black and 45
percent non-black

2.

That busing be two-way (bilateral, instead of unilateral black-only busing)

3.

That black schools should not be closed or torn down until funds were
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allocated to replace the school, that black schools in need of renovation or
remodeling should be given priority, and that black schools should not be
closed to force integration
4.

That specialty schools should be equally distributed throughout the
community, not concentrated in the black community; that specialty
schools should not be used to “trick white folks” to attending black
schools and to force black students to volunteer; and that five of the seven
city-wide and zone specialty schools located in the black community
should be placed in schools that have been closed in the white community

5.

That all high school specialties should be placed in one or two main
schools and that the remaining high schools should retain their regular
curriculum, along with needed improvements

6.

That all teachers should incorporate various teaching methods into their
classrooms

7.

That there should be less emphasis on discipline and more concentration
on instruction in each school, that black students should be expected to
learn, and that personnel used for police work and detention programs
should be used as instructors

8.

That new teachers and experienced teachers should be distributed
throughout the school system

9.

That annual progress reports concerning black students should be released
to the public, including reading, math scores, suspension and truancy rates,
special students, and disciplinary transfers57

The school board’s Committee on Community and Advisory Group Relations
responded to each recommendation. The committee stated that there could not be any
black-majority schools under the terms of the court order. In fact, there could not be any
schools with an African American population of more than 30 percent. As for the
recommendation for two-way busing, the committee stated that some white students did
ride buses to the north side, though the committee did not acknowledge that there were
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only a few whites bused compared to African Americans. The committee further said
that it would be impossible to mandate equal amounts of black and white busing without
a completely mandatory system of school assignments. It saw no reason to change the
procedures already in place, as the court and the special master had both approved the
board’s plan for voluntary integration. When it came to the issue of school closure, the
committee reported that funds had been allocated to replace one black elementary school
and that the board was looking for money to replace three others. It sidestepped the
recommendation that black schools not be closed to force integration and responded
much the same way to the request for equal distribution of magnet specialty schools—the
committee listed several specialty schools in white neighborhoods, while ignoring the fact
that most specialty schools had been placed in black neighborhoods. It also ignored the
fact that black students were often denied admission to these schools even though the
schools were in black neighborhoods. As for the recommendation that all magnet
programs be placed in one or two schools, the committee said that was logistically
impossible—no school was large enough to house all those programs without eliminating
all basic classes that were required for graduation.58
One of Blacks for Two-Way Integration’s slogans was “two-way or no way.”
People United disagreed, maintaining that some integration was better than none.59 The
Committee on Community and Advisory Group Relations did not give a precise response
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on that issue. However, based on available documentation, it appears that MPS planned
as if black enrollment had to be limited in north-side schools in order to make seats
available for whites. If more magnet schools were on the south side and if more whites
chose them, that would leave more seats for African Americans at northside schools,
which was inconsistent with the goal of school integration.60
The last four recommendations from Blacks for Two-Way Integration were
centered on curriculum or teaching reform, and all were essentially rejected by the
committee. The committee stated that most teachers were already incorporating various
teaching methods into their classrooms and that in-service activities and classes were
being scheduled for teachers who desired additional training. It also said that it would
like to devote more personnel to teaching but that having enough staff for discipline and
security also were priorities. In fact, the committee replied that discipline was a top
priority among parents in Milwaukee schools and elsewhere in the United States. As for
teacher distribution, the committee pointed out that teacher assignments were based on
voluntary transfers, with placement governed by seniority according to the contract with
the teachers’ union and that only a few new teachers were going to be hired in time for
the 1977–78 school year. Finally, the committee promised that the administration would
continue to collect data and regularly disseminate the progress of all of its students in the
schools.61
In other words, Blacks for Two-Way Integration did not get much beyond lip
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service from the school board, which could not implement policies that were inconsistent
with the court order. Nonetheless, Blacks for Two-Way Integration made ballots and
took a vote in the black community. African Americans were given three options in the
vote: follow the board’s planned busing assignments, send their children to neighborhood
schools, or boycott MPS altogether. Ballots also asked voters to decide whether they
favored unilateral integration, as the school board did, or bilateral integration. A public
forum was held prior to the vote, at which speaker after speaker talked about the
“victims” of busing amid cries of “two-way or no way.” “If we don’t say ‘two way or no
way,’ then we’re saying Caucasians care more about their children than we do,” said
Marzuq Madyun, a Black Muslim. Marvin Echols, a former teacher, added, “This day
hopefully marks the end of an era, an era when white folks tell us what happens to our
kids.” Future state legislator Annette “Polly” Williams said that black communities were
built around schools. In her view, losing control of the school meant losing control of the
neighborhood.62
More than four thousand African Americans voted. When the results were tallied,
it was revealed that more than 60 percent of voters wanted to send their children to
neighborhood schools, more than 30 percent supported a boycott, and fewer than 10
percent supported the school board’s integration plan. More than 90 percent of all voters
also said they favored bilateral busing over unilateral busing.63
On a related note, those who favored community control were enraged by the
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closure of some formerly all-black schools. Lincoln High School, for example, which
had had declining enrollment for years, still had strong alumni support that did not look
favorably on the school board’s decision to close the school and bus the students
elsewhere. Joyce Mallory of the local NAACP and Dwaine Washington of the Coalition
of Peaceful Schools both spoke out against closing Lincoln,64 while Marian McEvilly,
now representing the minority viewpoint, lamented the poor facilities at Lincoln and
longed for the closure of the school. The closure of Wells Street Junior High School,
which had a gifted and talented program, was also controversial. But the board deemed it
necessary, because it wanted to send gifted students to Rufus King, which had the
college-bound program for students in grades six to twelve.65
MPS also received some positive press on its magnet schools. The Milwaukee
Journal, for example, said integration was proceeding much more smoothly than in other
cities, such as Boston or Louisville,66 and parents hailed the Montessori schools for their
innovative programs.67 Washington High School, once the site of race riots (see chapter
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3), was singled out as a model for integration by the Sherman Park Community
Association, which recognized the school at a fine arts celebration attended by more than
four hundred people.68 A 1979 Milwaukee Sentinel survey found that about 60 percent of
all parents agreed with the statement “Children of different races get along at my school.”
Only about a third of the parents disagreed. Teachers had more positive opinions. More
than 70 percent agreed with the statement, compared to about 20 percent who disagreed.
Students, on the other hand, had lower opinions—slightly less than 40 percent of students
agreed with the statement, and slightly more than 50 percent disagreed with the statement.
The gap between black students and white students was alarming—close to half of
African American students in the survey agreed with the statement, compared to a third of
white students, while the black-white gap for the students who disagreed with the
statement was more than 25 percent. Clearly, African American students were more
supportive of integration than white students.69
The students had mixed reactions to integration at Marshall High School. While
there may have been little violence, African Americans reported feelings of isolation in
what was still a mostly white school. Student Jill Gilmer, a member of Marshall’s human
relations council, observed that students were still segregated within the school and that
whites were still in control of the school’s culture. She cited problems in electing black
class officers or having black music played at events in the white-majority school. She
said social aspects of school, such as those, were “as important as a good academic
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environment,” and that “Blacks might not feel that they are really wanted or belong [at
Marshall].” She added, “We’ve got a mixture of kids from all sorts of schools. Some are
coming from mainly black [schools,] and this is an entirely different setting. Many
people feel uprooted.” She said her human relations council tried to promote integrated
events, but they sometimes turn into all-white or all-black occasions.70 Larry Totsky, a
white student, said change was coming slowly and that he could see that his younger
brothers had a much more open attitude toward African Americans when compared to the
attitudes of his friends, who were used to the old segregated system. Cathy Pattillo
echoed similar sentiments about slow change:
The black students who have been here for three years are just getting used
to it and relationships are better but for the 200 new black students, most
are still acting like they did in their former schools. Many of them are still
wearing T-shirts with the names of their old school, they don’t identify
with Marshall. It isn’t so much a matter of black or white, it depends on
the normal behavior of their group and what is expected of them. The
teachers don’t have time to change a whole lifestyle. We have to give the
new black students a while—we can’t expect them to catch up all at
once.71
Reactions at King were a bit more positive. As indicated earlier, the
neighborhood population was removed completely from King so it could become the
flagship magnet school with a college-bound program. In other words, all the students
who attended King were there voluntarily, and it could be expected that they would react
positively to integration. Vanessa James, an African American student who had attended
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King both before and after integration, said slow progress had been made, and Tarome
Alford, another African American student, gave reviews: “Now that I’m here I’m proud
of the school and my classmates. I have white friends too, and we all want the best
education possible. I did find that the courses were harder . . . but we have more on the
honor roll at King this year—it’s become more than just a display of names and we want
to keep it that way.”72
Marshall had been in transition from white to black for several years, and King
was voluntarily integrated, which means students at both schools were fairly well
prepared for integration. The situation at Bay View High School was much different. The
Bay View neighborhood has a long tradition of independence, and in fact, it was an
independent village from 1879 until 1887. It is technically the portion of the city that is
bounded by Beecher Street to the north, Morgan Avenue to the south, Sixth Street to the
west, and Lake Michigan to the east. It is characterized by very close-knit citizens and
locally owned businesses—even in the twenty-first century, they are few chain stores in
Bay View.73 Opinions of integration varied from mixed to hostile at Bay View High
School. Elizabeth Dziennik, a white student, said the human relations program worked
well when students were working on a school activity that was of interest to all, such as
sports or music, but when students were not interested in an activity, perhaps something
forced on them by school administrators, students were not likely to participate. La
Donna Goskowicz was less optimistic, saying “The ideas behind the human relations
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activities were good and attempts were made, but time limitations, insufficient
preparation and the [teachers’] strike limited the success of any meaningful activities.”
She also went on to complain that more students and parents had to get involved in
human relations activities if they were going to be successful, and that the same group of
people was doing all the work.74
The examples above, while not entirely flattering, were not entirely negative
either. They were, however, from an MPS-produced document, so they may not
accurately reflect the opinions of the general student population. Some documentary film
makers solicited other opinions at Bay View High School in 1980 and concluded that
African American students were not really given a choice in where they would attend
school. The filmmakers referred to it as a “forced choice,” a term coined by an African
American student who said he wanted to attend his neighborhood high school but was
forced to make a different choice that would help integrate the schools. This student was
not alone. An African American student at Bay View angrily said this about
desegregation: “Hell, I got to go all the way out on South Kinnickinnic Avenue to get an
education. I mean that was offered to me. I was told I couldn’t go to Lincoln JuniorSenior High School [a black school]. I had to go somewhere else, and the only three
choices I had was South, Pulaski, and Bay View,” all of which were white schools.75 In
other words, this student’s viewpoint was very much the same as that of Keith
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Malkowski’s mother, whose only desire was to send her son to Fernwood Elementary
School.
Some of the other African American students at Bay View were more openminded, but the white students were universally opposed to desegregation. Several of the
students casually used the word “nigger” in the interviews. Some girls who were passing
by the camera crew yelled it out and laughed about it. Many said the African American
students did not care about academic success: “They send the niggers here. Nine-tenths
of them don’t want to learn. All they want to do is just sit around in class and fuck
around and stuff and screw up.” Another student suggested taking all the “niggers” out in
the ocean and drowning them or sending them back to Africa. Several students of both
races recommended a return to segregated neighborhood schools. One white student said
he would rather drop out than attend a school on the north side.76
Many African Americans felt the same way. Space had to be made available for
white students at northside schools. Therefore, minority enrollment was restricted. For
example, only one hundred neighborhood students were allowed to attend Garfield
Elementary, which was a school of three hundred students with an “open education”
specialty. The school had asked for the open education program two years prior to the
court order, but the school board refused to grant the school’s request. Vice Principal Lee
Davis expressed her disappointment at the time: “We wanted [open education] for our
neighborhood. We were not given it. But then when we got it, many of our
neighborhood people had left, because they had to leave because of integration. It was
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hard to do anything positive without hurting someone, and it is unfortunate—it
appears—that most of the uprooted population has been blacks.”77
UWM professor Michael Barndt, a special consultant to the federal court during
the desegregation proceedings, explained it this way:
The specialty schools set up in white areas in most—all—cases were such
that there was room in those schools for black students to come in without
displacing those students. [In] specialty schools in black areas, the reverse
was the case: There was no room in the school—it was usually
overcrowded to begin with. Black students had to move to reduce
overcrowding. Black students had to move to accommodate whites.78
Some African American parents complained about waiting lists to get into what had been
their neighborhood schools. To enroll their children in the city schools of their choice,
families would have had to move to the suburbs. Now that their schools had more
desirable programs, they could no longer attend them.79
Most northside schools, however, failed to attract substantial numbers of white
students from the south side or the suburbs. Logically, as African American families
began enrolling in southside schools, northside schools began to lose enrollment, which
increased the per-pupil cost of operating them. Therefore, the superintendent and school
board decided to close some northside schools and move students into other schools that
were closer to capacity.80 Sixteen black schools were closed between 1976 and 1980, the

77

Quoted in Forced Choice.

78

Quoted in Forced Choice.

79

David I. Bednarek, “City Showing the Way on Magnet Schools,” Milwaukee Journal, February
8, 1981, 2:1,9; David I. Bednarek, “Pupil Swaps Don’t Please All,” Milwaukee Journal, September 13,
1981; and Forced Choice.
80

Jim Bednarek, “Panel’s View Questioned by McMurrin,” Milwaukee Sentinel, May 25, 1983,
1:5,10, and “Public School Closings Regrettable, Necessary,” Milwaukee Sentinel, January 8, 1983, 1:8.

255
first four years of desegregation, displacing about forty-six thousand African American
students and sixteen thousand white students. Officially, these schools were too old for
effective learning to take place, even though there were many white schools in use that
were at least as old as those sixteen black schools.81 Meanwhile, white high school
students were supposed to voluntarily choose to go to magnet schools in the inner city,
even if they did not want to leave their neighborhoods.82 These closures also had the
effect of forcing African American students to “choose” southside schools.
This “choice” caused an explosive controversy at North Division High School.
The events at North Division represent a shift in black leadership in Milwaukee. No
longer were Lloyd Barbee and the middle class in control of the civil rights movement.
Rather, a grassroots movement, led by Howard Fuller and sustained by the lower class,
grew to advocate for community control, not integration, of schools.83
North Division had several problems. The original building opened in 190684 and
was in a sad state of disrepair by 1973, described by one teacher as “an archaic,
depressing, dungeon-like building coming apart at the seams.”85 But school board
president Donald J. O’Connell opposed construction of a new school on the grounds that
it would contribute to segregation. Instead, O’Connell encouraged the school board to
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bus students out of the community and integrate them with white students at other
schools. The community surrounding North Division was dead set against O’Connell.
North Division was an important part of Milwaukee’s black community, and residents
said they would rather see a new building opened with an improved educational plan.86
Eventually, the board voted to construct a new building, but debate went on for months
over the location—the county refused to sell parkland to the school board for the favored
site of the new school, and the community opposed another proposal that would have
moved the school several blocks from its original site.87 Once a site was selected, the
funds had to be appropriated for the new North Division, as well as the recently approved
new South Division and Vincent High Schools. This was no small task, with a price tag
of more than $15 million each. Thus, construction of the schools was delayed as the
school administration figured out a financing plan.88 Then a fire burned a portion of
North Division, closing it for a few days.89 With repairs estimated to cost $200,000, it
was beginning to appear that it might be easier to permanently close the school and bus
the students to white schools, as O’Connell had proposed. This would essentially take
care of two problems—the school board would be able to integrate students and could
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divert money to the construction of the new South Division and Vincent.90
Nonetheless, the community surrounding North Division vowed to fight for a new
school, even if it was not integrated. Quality of education and community control over
the school were more important than integration to this segment of the black
community.91 Some even said they would rather keep the old school open and under
neighborhood control if that was the only way to keep North from becoming a citywide
specialty school with white students being bused in and African American students being
bused out.92
Superintendent McMurrin proposed a medical specialty for both the old and new
buildings. The plan was approved by the school board even though the old building was
in no condition to host such a program.93 But when the new $20 million building94
opened on September 5, 1978, at Eleventh and Center Streets, it was a sight to behold. It
had state-of-the-art medical and dental laboratories and a field house that contained an
Olympic-sized pool, four basketball courts, and an indoor track. Each academic subject
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had its own resource center with reference books and special materials,95 and a computer
that “looks like a television set” was installed with twenty student terminals.96
But the new magnet school only attracted about one hundred white students,97 out
of a student body of seventeen hundred.98 This racial disparity was probably the result of
North Divison’s proximity to Rufus King, which was more attractive to white students.99
King was a citywide school, whereas most of North Division’s students came from the
surrounding neighborhood. Thus, southside parents concluded that King had a superior
program and student body and that if they were going to send their children to a northside
high school, it would be the one with the best program and students. As one student who
chose not to attend North Division said, “I didn’t go because there were only going to be
about 100 white students and 1,500 black students. I didn’t feel like busing all the way
out there, and I don’t think I really missed anything.”100
According to interviews at the time, the white students were treated with a mixed
level of respect. Some got along well with the African American students, whereas
others were the subject of physical and verbal harassment, including racial slurs. As for
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the quality of learning, one student referred to his teachers as “dynamite,” while others
said the quality of learning suffered from the high truancy rate among African
Americans.101
MPS was not able to recruit any additional white students to North Division, so
Superintendent McMurrin floated the idea of increasing the African American enrollment
by seven hundred in the spring of 1979. But this proposal was not popular with the
liberal majority on the school board,102 and it was quickly abandoned. McMurrin instead
decided to convert North Division to a citywide specialty, similar to Rufus King High
School and Milwaukee Trade and Technical High School. Under the plan, the thencurrent eleventh- and twelfth-grade students would be allowed to continue at North
Division for one more school year and graduate in June 1979 and 1980, while the current
ninth- and tenth-grade students would be transferred out of the school. Thus, in the fall of
1980, a new student body would replace the old one. As could be expected, McMurrin’s
plan set off a firestorm in the North Division neighborhood,103 despite the support of two
African American school board members, Leon Todd and Marion McEvilly.104 Five
hundred students marched four miles from North Division to a school board meeting to
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protest. The students remained peaceful, but they also made it clear that integration
should not have to come at the price of losing community control over schools.105 One
junior said, in reference to white students, “We were here first.”106
This reaction should not have been a surprise to the superintendent, who had
proposed in 1976 that the old North Division become a citywide school. Several students
said at the time that they liked North Division and did not want to be bused to a white
school.107 Community activist Larry Harwell had urged a walkout.108
The reaction was much the same in 1979. Steven Baruch, who worked in the
human relations office in MPS, spent one semester at North Division and recalled that
North Division was a good neighborhood school for those who attended. He said it had
wonderful students who appreciated the educational opportunity North Division afforded.
The classroom environments were friendly and cooperative, not dangerous. The trouble
was outside the building or in the halls. He said a core group of teachers knew the
neighborhood very well and were extremely devoted to the school and that people from
the black community did not always think they had to have desegregation to have
achievement.109
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Howard Fuller, an African American community activist and North alumnus who
would eventually become the superintendent of MPS, chastised the school board for
approving McMurrin’s plan: “We exist. We have rights. We want North Division to be a
special school, not a specialty school. You took Lincoln [which had closed] and Rufus
King and now you want North. We say no!” Other speakers at the school board meeting
pointed out that the board was willing to keep North Division a neighborhood school
when it was in the old building. They felt cheated, as if white students were taking over
their school. As one person said, “When the school was full of rats and rodents, nothing
was said.” Of course, if the school was converted to citywide status, neighborhood
students would have to be bused to other schools, which prompted one North alumnus to
say, “When I look at integration so far, I see a bunch of black students depressed because
they don’t have anywhere to go except where the School Board sends them. They are
being forced to accept the blunt end of integration.”110
Other African Americans suggested the school board bring in white students to fill
seven hundred vacant seats without displacing neighborhood students.111 Some of North
Division’s teachers—both African American and white—agreed and helped students
stage a protest outside of the building at the end of the school year. As one teacher said,
“Why can’t the kids stay here? There’s an undercurrent of racism here. The School
Board really feels they can’t bring any white kids here until they move the black ones
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out.”112
McMurrin held firm: “Can North be racially balanced and still allow the present
North Division students to remain in the school and be graduated? We believe the
answer is no.”113 The following exchange between a North Division student and
McMurrin is instructive:
Student:

I don’t never hear you talk about going to the south side
and making them integrate. See but you make us go out,
but you don’t make them come in.

McMurrin:

Because we tried. We are trying to do this, if we can, on
the basis of choice.

Student:

But it’s almost a forced choice. Everybody knows . . . back
in ‘75–‘76, they pushed us. We didn’t have no choice.
You told us we couldn’t come to North. Can I ask you a
question again? Custer is perfect[ly integrated] ain’t it?

McMurrin:

Do you know how we did it?

Student:

Oh, how did you do it? By forcing ‘75–‘76 North out. It
wasn’t no “open the door.” You all opened it, but you
pushed us through it too. We didn’t have a choice now.
What I feel it was, was in ‘75–‘76, you all just cut up the
black junior high schools and sent them all where you
wanted to.

McMurrin:

I think they [the white students] will come in.

Student:

No you won’t.

McMurrin:

You don’t think white will come in? To integrate, you
gotta have both black and white.

Student:

That’s right. That’s what I’m saying . . . If you send all

112

Quoted in Milford Prewitt, “Teachers Join Students in North Protest,” Milwaukee Journal, June
5, 1979, Accent on the City:1,4.
113

Quoted in David I. Bednarek, “North High an Example of Pitfalls,” Milwaukee Journal, May
30, 1979, 2:1,5.

263
them white kids that’s gonna go to Vincent next year to
these black schools down here, you could even integrate
Lincoln all the way. Integration, as a whole, we ain’t
integrating. It’s a one-way thing.
McMurrin:

It’s gotta be two ways.

Student:

It’s not two ways.

McMurrin:

If it’s not two ways it won’t work.

Student:

But see they’re not going to do this voluntarily. You gotta
make them like you did us in ‘75–‘76. Everybody knows
this.114

Fuller organized the Coalition to Save North Division. He was the perfect person
for the job—tall, athletic, educated, a North Division alumnus, and well connected in the
black community, having been mentored by former Urban League director Wesley Scott
and having friendships with several black clergymen, community activists, and
politicians, including Polly Williams. According to historian Bill Dahlk, Fuller’s unique
background enabled him to win support with some white school board members and the
editorial boards of the Milwaukee Journal and Milwaukee Sentinel.115
Fuller also was a passionate advocate for black nationalism and a natural leader.
He had been a star athlete and expert speaker at North Division High School. He went on
to Carroll College in Waukesha, Wisconsin, after graduating from North Division in
1958. He was one of the first African American students to attend Carroll, where he was
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elected president of the student senate. He went from there to Western Reserve
University in Cleveland, Ohio, where he obtained a master’s degree in social
administration and became involved in Cleveland’s school integration movement in 1964.
He traveled to North Carolina in 1965 and founded and directed the Malcolm X
Liberation University until 1973, when it closed due to financial problems. Afterward, he
went to Mozambique with the African liberation forces, who fought to overthrow
Portuguese colonial rule. He eventually returned to Milwaukee to earn a doctorate in
education from Marquette University and then held the position of associate director of
Marquette’s Educational Opportunity Program.116 He began to organize the black
community in 1979 under the principle that self-determination was more important than
integration.117 He was deeply concerned about the message that was sent to young
African Americans when MPS converted black neighborhood schools to citywide
specialty schools: “You’re saying it makes it easier to get whites to come if you get rid of
all those incorrigibles. Then you can say [to whites], ‘You can come to school with
blacks more like yourselves.’”118
Fuller was right. That was exactly what the school board was saying. The board
felt it had to do something to make North Division a more attractive choice for whites.
Leon Todd believed citywide specialty status was the best thing for all students, both
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black and white. In his own words: “North Division is an academic cesspool. It is a
cancer that manifests itself in severe below average test scores . . . Five hundred per day
are truant . . . The students are trapped there in concentration camps of
underachievement.119” He also said, “If it takes making North Division a citywide
specialty to get it integrated, let’s get on with the job.”120 Lois Riley, who was white and
had a daughter at North Division, stated that such a busing plan was also in the best
interest of underachieving African Americans: “The fact is North Division has the highest
failure rate of any school in this system. Maybe it’s true that they [underachievers] have
to sit next to a higher achiever to succeed. Maybe they have to sit next to a white. I don’t
know. Just maybe, just maybe, if they see that kid taking books home and learning,
they’ll do the same.”121
Fuller disagreed, believing it was possible to teach underachievers, even if they
were all in one school. Fuller blamed the failures of the students on the school itself. He
said the secretarial and engineering staffs were too small and that many of the teachers
were inexperienced and white.122 Fuller and Barndt both argued that the Milwaukee
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integration plan was psychologically damaging to African American students. It was as
though the school board and superintendent were saying that black schools were bad and
white schools were good, and that if any student attended a black school, he or she was a
bad student.123 Wesley Scott, president of the Urban League, predicted increased truancy
if North Division’s students were forced into long bus rides to southside schools.124
North students said they felt as though they were mere pawns in desegregation. As Lisa
Smith said: “We are tired of being shuffled about with virtually no say in what goes on in
our lives while the whites are still being given a vast number of alternatives.”125
The school board ignored the pleas of the community to keep North Division a
neighborhood school and went ahead with the citywide medical specialty.126 Fuller filed a
complaint with the U.S. Office of Civil Rights, claiming the school board had violated
civil rights laws, and when school opened in the fall of 1979 without ninth-grade students
to make room for the white students who would arrive the following year, Fuller urged
the students who would have been freshmen at North Division to skip school on the first
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day of classes to attend a rally instead.127 About 250 students did so. Several parents also
showed up, forced their way into the building, and tried to register their children.128 Some
students threatened to drop out of school if they could not attend North. A national group
called the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations lent support,129 as did
the NAACP.130 The school board created an advisory committee on North Division,
which asked the school board to slow down its conversion of North to citywide status,131
as did the federally appointed monitoring board.132 Fuller was encouraged by the
monitoring board, but the school board vowed to forge ahead with the conversion
anyway.133
Fuller responded by using confrontational tactics. According to Dahlk, because
magnet schools had been sold to the white community as a peaceful alternative to what
happened in Boston, Fuller had to show that magnet schools actually provoked anger if he
wanted the white community to reconsider the school board’s approach to desegregation.
To that end, Fuller encouraged a boycott, and hundreds of African American students
responded by walking out of North Division in the middle of the day. They walked to a
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nearby church, where they listened to a minister who criticized MPS for “a lackadaisical
approach” to educating African American students.134 U.S. Magistrate Ruth Lafave sided
with Fuller and moved to open a hearing on the school board’s plan for North Division.135
The Milwaukee Teacher Education Association,136 the Milwaukee Journal137 and
Milwaukee Sentinel138, and Milwaukee’s two chief American American newspapers, the
Courier139 and Community Journal140 also came out against the plan.
Several national experts weighed in on the plan. Alan Freeman, the well-known
law professor from the University of Minnesota, argued that desegregation had come at
the expense of the black community and that it was time for a reversal of policy to one
that made integration voluntary and provided African American students with choices. In
his own words:
There’s a time for new strategy. I call it the victim perspective on racial
discrimination. The law is constantly trying to look at [school
desegregation] from the perpetrator perspective. Something is very, very
wrong. Somehow things have been twisted when kids other than those [at
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North Division] have more of a claim to the benefits of desegregation.141
Derrick Bell, the famous law professor from Harvard University, agreed and said
that busing African American students away from their neighborhoods did nothing to
address the inherent racism in the educational system. He further said that he preferred
all-black schools to busing, but more importantly, African American parents should have
choice in where they send their children to school. Lloyd Barbee, still the spokesperson
for Milwaukee’s older black leadership, disagreed with Freeman and Bell and said racial
integration was the only solution to racism.142
Barbee kept quiet on the issue of forced choice. He did, however, give a couple
interviews in which he indicated support for integration at all costs. In 1978, he told the
Milwaukee Courier, “We should enjoy the same things as the white community. I don’t
care how we accomplish that. If students must crowd into a Volkswagen or take a
helicopter . . . [these are] extremes that we must live through as long as we receive the
same type of education the whites receive.”143 Later, in an interview with Jack
Dougherty, he mused:
The process of desegregation is undoing what has been done by the
segregators. Sometimes that is hard on the people who have been
segregated, like the Little Rock Nine or James Meredith. The burden
many times is uneven. But when you get integration, that burden
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disappears.144
But Barbee was no longer the voice of the black community, and with all the
school board under pressure from Fuller and his allies, and with only forty whites signed
up to attend North Division in fall,145 the board finally gave up in April 1980 and voted
ten to two to pursue an out-of-court settlement with the Coalition to Save North Division
High School and implement a new education program. The North Division community
rejoiced, but some school board members questioned the effectiveness of the district’s
magnet plan if individual school communities could take legal action to withdraw from
the plan.146 The final plan for North Division allowed it to remain almost all black with a
medical specialty designed to draw in a small number of white students.147
But the fallout from the North Division fiasco continued for months. Leon Todd
criticized the MPS administration’s attempts to recruit whites to North Division as
“pathetic.”148 He and the other two African American board members, Marian McEvilly
and Peggy Kenner, continued to advocate for integration.149 The administration briefly
considered capping white enrollment in other schools to force whites into “choosing”
144
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North Division, but heavy criticism from white parents put a quick end to the proposal.150
Fuller continued to raise concerns about inequities in busing. He claimed the
percentage of whites bused to black schools remained low (only 3 percent in 1983)
compared to African American students bused to white schools (34 percent at the
elementary level and 48 percent at the middle school level) and broke up black
neighborhoods by sending students to as many as a hundred different schools.151 Once in
those schools, African Americans were much more likely to be suspended for what Fuller
and his supporters considered white teachers’ inability to understand black social
customs.152
Fuller, Williams, and some other African Americans in the state Assembly asked
the state legislature in 1984 to give African Americans access to schools in their
neighborhoods. They said that as things stood, white students could choose magnet
schools or stay in their neighborhoods. African Americans students were frequently
denied that choice and were forced onto buses. McMurrin dismissed their criticisms as
“ridiculous” and said that African Americans had more choices than anyone in MPS,153
ignoring the point that neighborhood schools were the one choice that some African
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Americans wanted more than anything else but were denied.
Howard Fuller also criticized what he perceived to be elitism in the specialty
schools. He said it created a dual system in which a small group of the best and brightest
middle-class students and teachers go to a small group of schools, while other students,
who are poor, got what was left over. He especially did not like Rufus King High School.
In his own words:
I can’t believe they are getting away with claiming they have turned a “ghetto
school” around. Sure, it’s an excellent school, but what they don’t say is that they
took a school, stripped it of its attendance-area enrollment and put in a different,
an elite population. If the central administration had the same kind of
commitment to educational excellence at North that they have in their little
powerhouse [King], I’m sure North could be turned around and become a Top 10
school. Then, they would have something to brag about.154
Fuller continued to actively criticize involuntary busing into 1986. He and about
forty other people testified at a public hearing in May. One parent said his students were
“shuffl[ed] . . . around like dominoes,” and a minister exclaimed, “No longer will we
tolerate you dictating to us.”155 Such criticisms did not seem to faze McMurrin, who
insists to this day that many parents liked the fact that their children got to ride a “warm
bus” that left them free from worry about Milwaukee’s cold unsafe winter roads.156
McMurrin also came under fire for simply assuming busing would improve education,
while quality of education actually declined, according to some people, during his time as
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superintendent.157 Once again, a proposal was floated to bus white students, but it was
met with strong opposition from southside parents.158 Karen Murphy, an African
American mother of three, helped organize the southside parents because she believed
children should have access to neighborhood schools.159 Joyce Mallory urged resources
devoted to busing be redirected to training teachers in new instructional techniques that
would enable them to do a better job of teaching African American students.160
Fuller reflected popular opinion, according to a series of Milwaukee Journal polls.
One survey of 607 residents of Milwaukee, Washington, Ozaukee, and Waukesha
counties found that 80 percent of the respondents supported voluntary integration, while
only 25 percent supported buses. Furthermore, 84 percent of the respondents opposed
involuntary transfers. More generally, when asked whether they supported any kind of
integration at all, only 51 percent of suburban residents responded favorably,161 and only
69 percent of black Milwaukeeans thought racial integration of any sort was a good
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idea.162 When the question was narrowed further, and respondents were asked whether
students should be bused into their neighborhoods, only 36 percent approved, while 58
percent disapproved.163 Thus, it is clear that most people support integration as long as it
is applied to someone else. Their attitude shifted once integration was applied to them.
Milwaukeeans’ shift in attitudes was reflected in a pattern of white migration.
While it is true that the number of whites in Milwaukee was already in decline in the
1970s,164 it would be hard to believe that the desegregation of MPS did not play some role
in the change in demographics. The district’s white population declined by eight
thousand students between the first and second years of desegregation, while white
enrollment in southside parochial schools increased.165 The number of African American
students finally exceeded the number of white students by the end of the decade,166 and by
1985, one-third of the white students had left the city. Of the ones who stayed behind,
half attended private schools.167 Since not all families could afford tuition, some families
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(both African American and white) petitioned Superintendent McMurrin for vouchers to
attend private schools, which he denied.168
This demographic change was part of a national trend. Opinions vary, but most
demographers agree that white migration was caused by a decline in the white birthrate,
changes in immigration patterns, discrimination in housing, and busing.169 Ronald Edari,
a professor of sociology at UWM, published a paper in 1977 that analyzed the
sociological reasons for white migration. It drew together secondary literature that went
as far back as 1947. According to Edari, who borrowed from sociologists Paul Glick and
Robert Winch, people moved through five stages in their life cycles—marriage,
establishment of a household, birth and rearing of children, marriage of children, and
death of spouses.170 Edari correlated these five stages with varying degrees of racial
preference. For example, people almost always marry within their race, and according to
Edari, when white couples looked for homes, they almost always wanted them to be in
white neighborhoods. Such neighborhoods convey a sense of values and shared heritage
and were believed to hold the promise of a good return on the purchase and sale of a
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house. As property values improved, Africans Americans were denied access to the
credit they needed to enter the white housing market, thus increasing racial segregation.171
According to Edari, whites associated life in their neighborhoods with free choice, local
autonomy, social status, social mobility, and aspirations for their children, all of which
were the result of hard work. Edari said white suburbanites saw African American
communities as the opposite of those values. Hence, any attempt to integrate schools
challenged ideas of free choice and local autonomy and was viewed as rewarding people
who failed to maintain their own homes, schools, and neighborhoods.172 Hence, racism is
inextricably tied to white opposition to busing.173
A 1986 study by Milwaukee Magazine provided more evidence of white
migration. It found that between 1975 and 1985, the city had lost 115,070 of its nonblack
residents and had an increase of about two thousand African American residents. About
one-third of all non-African American children who were four years old or younger had
left the city by 1985. Furthermore, the number of white elementary school students
attending private schools had doubled between 1975 and 1985. By 1985, only 51 percent
of white elementary-age children in the city attended MPS schools, compared to 94
percent of minority children.174
But as Christine Rossell has pointed out numerous times, white flight and
opposition to busing are caused by a combination of the quality of education in schools,
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the distance students must ride on a bus, and the number of white students in schools. J.
S. Fuerst of Loyola University and Daniel Pupo of Chicago’s Dunbar Vocational High
School conducted a study of the Milwaukee experience in 1983. According to their
report, the number of white students enrolled in MPS declined by 40 percent between
1976, the year of Reynolds’ judgment, and 1979. It declined another 20 percent in 1980
to approximately twenty-nine thousand.175 Fuerst and Pupo concluded the main cause of
this white migration was Reynolds’ order that 18,000 of the 24,000 African American
students in predominantly black schools had to be bused (involuntarily, if necessary) to
white schools. However, like Rossell, they also concluded that the white exodus was not
totally due to racial concerns. Rather, according to their findings, the African American
students who were bused to white schools were not academically successful, and test
scores declined. Fearing a decline in educational quality, white parents removed their
children from MPS, according to Fuerst and Pupo.176
When studying elementary and middle schools, Fuerst and Pupo broke the city
into five regions—southwest, southeast, northwest, mid-north, and Hartford Avenue.
Five schools in the southwest region lost almost 60 percent of their white students from
1976 to 1979. It was the opinion of southwest principals that this migration was caused
by the hasty introduction of too many African American students into their schools
without giving white families a chance to adjust. However, Fuerst and Pupo also said it
was not totally due to racism. Rather, they pointed out that most middle-class African
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American parents kept their children in their neighborhood schools, so the southwest
schools got whoever was left over—mostly children of single parents who did not
indicate a school preference on registration forms and thus were randomly assigned.
According to these principals, the new students did not do well in school because their
parents rarely involved themselves in their children’s education. These principals said the
low-achieving African American students caused overall school performance to decline
and that middle-class white families bailed out and fled to the suburbs to seek better
schools—not to get away from African Americans.177
Fuerst and Pupo gathered more information from other schools that supported this
conclusion. The decline in white enrollment in southeast schools, for instance, was only
35 percent. Fuerst and Pupo speculated this was because fewer poor African American
students were bused there. Thus, reading scores did not change greatly after busing
began. The northwest schools also experienced a 35 percent decline in white enrollment,
though little white migration occurred in schools with middle-class African American
children—again because test scores at those schools remained unchanged, according to
Fuerst and Pupo. Indeed, some schools with stable racial levels in the mid-north actually
showed improvement in some test scores, because many of the lower-class African
American students were bused to the southwest side. The Sherman Park neighborhood is
a good example of this trend. Test scores improved as the neighborhood became racially
diverse, the middle class stayed in the neighborhood, and housing values remained
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steady.178 Sherman Park remains a strong, vibrant, racially diverse neighborhood in the
early twenty-first century.
Finally, at Hartford Avenue Elementary School, white enrollment declined from
75 percent in 1976 to 50 percent in 1979, and test scores dropped by 25 percent. In Fuerst
and Pupo’s view, it seemed unlikely that parents of Hartford students would pull their
children out of school for racial reasons, because Hartford is located on the UWM
campus, which is in a well-educated and politically liberal neighborhood. The decline in
test scores was the more likely cause of white migration, according to Fuerst and Pupo,
because these parents wanted their children to have the kind of education that would
prepare them for college.179
Thus, after all the studies by Rossell, Fuerst and Pupo, and others are synthesized,
it becomes clear that decline in educational quality, as well as racism, was a factor in
white migration. There is much anecdotal evidence that supports this conclusion.
African American parents viewed Catholic schools, for example, as a superior alternative
to MPS. They had tighter standards for discipline and academics. As one African
American parent with children in a Catholic school said: “To most teachers in the public
schools, [teaching is] a job. I wish my kids had come to [St. Agnes] sooner. There’s
more order, more homework.”180 Another African American parent said she was putting
her children into St. Leo’s Catholic School because it was the only way to avoid busing
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and keep them in the neighborhood.181
St. Leo’s 1977–78 school year was successful. It was racially integrated with
strong parent involvement—attendance at parent meetings was said to be 95 percent. The
waiting list grew to nearly double the enrollment, and two additional classrooms were
added in September 1978, even though 87 percent of the students in the school were not
Catholic.182
If academically talented students did not attend a parochial school, they might use
Chapter 220 to leave the city. Both city and suburban school officials acknowledged that
academically talented students were more likely to apply for Chapter 220 and were more
likely to be accepted into the program than other students. According to Nicolet High
School’s Dean of Students, all sixty transferees in 1986 were in the seventieth percentile
or above on standardized tests, while only 6 percent of MPS’s African American tenth
graders were in the seventy-fifth percentile or above.183 In other words, the magnet
schools may have been successful with the students they had, but the rest of the school
system could not demonstrate increases in achievement as talented students left the
district.
181
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The middle-class exodus from the city meant fewer white students were available
for specialty schools by the mid 1980s. Thus, only one in eight white students pursued
the magnet option in 1986. In any given year, 50 to 75 percent of all African American
students were bused out of their neighborhoods, while only 4 percent of white students
were bused into black neighborhoods. A crazy quilt-like pattern of busing resulted. The
average elementary school attendance area had its students bused to twenty-six different
schools, and in one extreme example, students from Auer elementary’s school attendance
area were bused to 95 of the 108 elementary schools in the city. Milwaukee Magazine
credited this busing as reducing neighborhood solidarity and safety—the “shotgun”
approach to busing, as opposed to a “pairing” approach, which may have been more
stable but also would have to offer fewer choice to African Americans. Deputy
Superintendent Bennett himself admitted at the time that he had created a “transportation
monster,”184 and state senator and future Milwaukee mayor John Norquist agreed and
urged the school board to reopen some closed neighborhood schools so students would
have the opportunity to attend them. He also said that the number of students bused in
and out of the district under Chapter 220 should be equal. According to him, MPS
would, therefore, have to work harder to attract white students.185
This anecdotal evidence was bolstered by a study released by the state of
Wisconsin’s Legislative Audit Bureau in 1984. According to the report, the number of
black students bused within the city was more than twice that of whites in the 1983–84
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school year,186 and almost five times as many African American students were bused
through the Chapter 220 program compared to whites.187 The study also showed that only
43 percent of applications for citywide magnet schools were from African Americans,
which it considered a small percentage,188 and that 62 percent of all white students
preferred to stay in their neighborhood schools.189 Furthermore, the study predicted that
MPS would re-segregate itself by 1990. This trend would be caused by a 33 percent
decline in white enrollment due to a reduction in the white birth rate.190 Armed with all
these facts, McMurrin’s critics moved against him in the mid-1980s and orchestrated his
departure from MPS. They also introduced more forms of choice for Milwaukee’s
students than ever before.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ERA OF FORCED CHOICE:
RETHINKING MAGNET SCHOOLS AND INTEGRATION, 1987–1995
The federal government set aside money for local districts to implement magnet
schools, despite their mixed success. Close to $30 million was spent through the
Emergency School Aid Act between 1975 and 1981. The federal government
appropriated additional funds through the Magnet Schools Assistance Program after A
Nation at Risk was published in 1983 and alleged that American students were years
behind their counterparts in the rest of the industrialized world. This time the goal was to
improve test scores, not integrate students, and $739 million in federal money was spent
on magnet schools between 1985 and 1994.1 The average magnet school received 10
percent more public funding than a non-magnet school in the same district in the 1990s.
Often, this money was used to hire additional staff, reduce the student/teacher ratio,2 or
give teachers supplemental training. Because most staff members consider a magnet
school a plum assignment, staff morale and commitment were usually high in magnet
schools.3
The number of magnet schools grew enormously in the United States during the
1980s, nearly doubling between 1982 and 1991. By the 1991–92 school year, more than
1
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230 school districts had magnet schools and were enrolling more than 1.2 million
students in them. Urban districts accounted for 85 percent of all magnet schools at that
time. Most of these districts were “majority minority” and majority low income.
According to a study by the United States Department of Education in 1991–92, 57
percent of all magnet schools were at the elementary level, 15 percent were middle
schools, and 22 percent were high schools.4 Most magnet schools specialize in particular
areas, such as math and science, computers, trade and technology, or fine arts. Some
magnet schools also use nontraditional teaching approaches, such as open classrooms,
individualized instruction, or Montessori methods. According to a 1994 report, about 12
percent of all magnet schools were designated “gifted and talented.”5 According to a 1999
report by the Department of Education, 76 percent of all districts with magnet schools had
a greater demand than available seats. Some districts use a lottery or a “first-come-firstserved” system to determine which students are admitted, while others use admissions
tests, auditions, or other academic criteria.6
Ian Harris conducted the first major study of the effectiveness of Milwaukee’s
magnet plan in 1983. Harris concluded that Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) had
provided a peaceful, mostly voluntary means for integration with a wide array of
curricular options. But Harris also identified four shortcomings:
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1)

MPS did not desegregate all schools, and those that remained
overwhelmingly African American had the lowest achievement levels in
the district.

2)

African American students bore a much larger share of busing than whites
did.

3)

African American students were bused out of their neighborhoods to
attend white schools, which denied them admission to some inner city
magnet schools.

4)

The integration plan did not provide adequate community involvement, as
evidenced by white resistance and the Coalition to Save North Division.7

Therefore, according to Harris’s study, the Milwaukee magnet plan did not achieve either
of its goals of intergation or improved academic achievement. In fact, given the degree of
white migration to the suburbs described previously (see chapter 4), the Milwaukee area
schools may have been even more segregated than ever before.
Four years later, in 1987, Superintendent Lee McMurrin faced an increasingly
vocal coalition of critics that included Howard Fuller, elected officials, and white
businessmen. Fuller continued to advocate for community control of education; elected
officials were concerned about young people’s lack of preparedness for the job market;
and white businessmen searched for a way to cut taxes through non-union labor. This
coalition of interests accused McMurrin of failing to improve the quality of education in
MPS and eventually drove him from office. McMurrin’s critics seemed to ignore the
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relationship between poverty and the decline in student achieve, and McMurrin’s
successors, including Fuller, proved equally incapable of improving student achievement.
Howard Fuller was one of McMurrin’s sharpest critics. Fuller began putting
together a coalition of African American community activists, white business leaders, and
leaders of nonsectarian private schools in 1984, with the aim of setting up a voucher
system in which parents would receive money from the state to use toward tuition at
private schools. Such a system would appease African Americans who wanted
community control over schools, business leaders who were looking for cheaper and
higher quality schools, and private schools in poor neighborhoods that needed money to
continue operating.8 Fuller also believed that white teachers were not effective in
teaching African American students.9 He continued to oppose unilateral busing (see
chapter 6), and he also criticized McMurrin’s magnet school plan for working to improve
only magnet schools, leaving all other students with low-quality education. He even
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called on McMurrin to resign early in 1987.10 Some whites agreed with Fuller because
they resented the high cost of busing.11 State representative Polly Williams, an African
American, resented unilateral busing because it broke up neighborhood schools and the
communities those schools anchored, so she proposed that all busing be voluntary.12 She
also supported the Fuller-endorsed voucher movement as a means to finally achieving
community control of schools.13
The voucher idea was not new. Legendary economist Milton Friedman
introduced the concept of market-based reform in 1955. His theory was that education
would improve if schools were privatized and had to compete against one another for
students and funding.14 Social scientist Christopher Jenks modified Friedman’s proposal
in the 1960s and advocated vouchers for low-income students, so they could attend
schools of their choice, and government regulation of those schools.15 Proponents of
vouchers would point to the decline in standardized test scores in the 1980s as
documented in James Coleman’s famous report Equality of Educational Opportunity and
would advocate for an alternative to public schools, an alternative that would use non-
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union labor that could be easily terminated for failure to adequately teach children.16
Locally, the Milwaukee school choice movement began in the 1970s with the
Independent Community Schools (ICS), most of which had been Catholic schools that the
Milwaukee Archdiocese closed (see chapter 6). Although the movement toward vouchers
subsided in the late 1970s and most ICS schools closed, as Milwaukeeans became more
aware of the lack of academic achievement in MPS in the late 1980s, they began to look
for an alternative, an alternative that would also give African Americans their long-sought
community control of schools.17 The movement toward “school choice” was stronger in
Milwaukee than anywhere else in the United States, perhaps because MPS did more than
virtually any other district to put students in magnet schools and disband neighborhood
schools, thereby taking control of schools away from the black community.18
Fuller was joined by several public officials in 1987, including County Executive
William O’Donnell, who said that few MPS students could participate in a Milwaukee
County summer jobs training program because they could not read at a grade-appropriate
level. He said that most youths were three or more grades below grade level and that the
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gap between reading level and grade completed widened as the students approached
twelfth grade.19 Milwaukee Development Commissioner William Drew said MPS was
“crippling class after class of graduates”20 and joined the chorus of individuals asking for
McMurrin’s resignation.21 McMurrin retaliated by calling Drew’s comment racist.22 He
also pointed to “competency tests” in reading, writing, and mathematics, which the school
board had recently added to the graduation requirements, as evidence of high standards.23
McMurrin also faced opposition from former assistant superintendent Gloria
Mason who, upon retiring, decided to run for the at-large seat on school board, which was
held by board president Doris Stacy, an ardent supporter of McMurrin, desegregation, and
magnet schools.24 Mason said she believed less attention should be paid to busing and
more attention should be given to academic achievement.25 She pointed to declining
graduation rates and standardized test scores as evidence of failure, though she stopped
short of asking McMurrin to resign.26 Mason recommended three methods by which
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MPS could improve: by reviewing and toughening the competency tests required for
graduation; by developing a program in the schools that would enable graduates to return
for further training if they lacked employment skills; and by decentralizing schools so
teachers had more independence and responsibility, parents had more choices in schools,
and local schools more freedom from the MPS central office.27 On a particularly
discouraging note, the competency tests showed that only 74 percent of the class of 1987
was ready to graduate. North Division was the lowest performing high school, with only
50 percent passing, while Rufus King, the most well-known magnet school, had a 96
percent pass rate, which was the best in the district. Critics pointed to these data as
evidence of the inequities of the magnet school plan.28 George Mitchell, a conservative
scholar and sharp critic of magnet schools, threw his support to Mason.29 Mason lost the
election by only 5 percent of the vote. She won votes from all races and neighborhoods
of the city, demonstrating that Milwaukee was primed for change.30
Criticism of McMurrin continued to mount after the election. The Milwaukee
Sentinel accused his critics of having a vendetta.31 Mitchell proposed a voucher system
that would have provided funds to low-income parents so they could send their children
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to any public or private school of their choice.32 He also continued to make public
statements about McMurrin, criticizing him for a new $100 million building plan, for not
having any sort of education plan, for having a top-heavy administration, and for having
low standards. He said, “As for results, the majority of students entering MPS high
schools either will drop out or be graduated with less than a C average. A major reason
for this, but not the only reason, is that the district is simply not well-run on almost any
basic measure.”33 McMurrin’s contract was set to expire at the end of June 1988, and
Mitchell urged the board to not give him a two-year extension.34
Additional criticisms came from teachers. They lamented lack of discipline in the
schools, oversized classes, low academic standards, lack of preparation time during the
day, low pay, lack of appreciation, and additional duties that were outside of their job
descriptions. As one fourth-grade teacher said, “I spend a lot of my time dealing with
kids’ emotions. We are supposed to be educating these kids, but we often end up as a
dumping ground.” She said she was trying to help a girl with some mathematics
problems when the student looked up and said, “My mommy just cut my daddy last
night.” The teacher said she wondered how she was supposed to deal with a child who
had those kinds of problems.35
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Parents voiced concerns that the admissions criteria for some of the best magnet
schools were too low. They said that the lottery system should be abandoned in favor of
strict admissions criteria that would lower the number of students accepted. Parents of
students who had been rejected from Rufus King High School36 and Golda Meir Gifted
and Talented Elementary were particularly vocal.37 There was also a concern that many
of the students who chose to attend Milwaukee Trade and Technical High School were
going there because it had a good reputation, not because they were interested in the
curriculum. Thus, they were taking seats away from students who actually wanted to go
into skilled trades.38
Doris Stacy remained on the school board but chose not to run for another term as
president. David Cullen, 27 years old at the time, was then elected. Some people
criticized the board for not being in control of the district and ceding too much power to
McMurrin, who had been superintendent for twelve years. Cullen responded by saying,
“The school board has to set its own agenda, and then determine whether McMurrin is the
person to lead us in that direction.”39
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McMurrin began to hint that he was looking for another job in July.40 The
Milwaukee Sentinel deplored “sneak attacks” by his critics and lauded his desegregation
efforts,41 as did the Milwaukee Journal.42 He ultimately accepted the position of
superintendent in Beechwood, Ohio, a wealthy suburb of Cleveland, by the end of the
month. Returning to Ohio, where had been a teacher and administrator for twenty-three
years, meant that he could complete enough years in the Ohio pension system to earn
$4,000 to $5,000 per month in retirement income, compared to about $1,000 per month in
Wisconsin.43 The school board agreed to let him out of his contract in a nine-to-nothing
vote, and several board members, including some of his critics, such as Joyce Mallory,
praised him for desegregation and the magnet schools he started. Mallory said she
admired him for the goals he set and said, “He stood for integration, and he fought for it.”
McMurrin, ever the kind-hearted gentleman, replied that it was the school board and
parents who made the magnet schools work: “What we attempted to do to integrate the
school system in 1976, 1977, and 1978 wouldn’t have worked if we didn’t have the
cooperation of the parents.”44
McMurrin’s critics ignored the fact that middle-class families were leaving the
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district. According to Marc Levine and John Zipp, Milwaukee lost more than 80 percent
of its manufacturing jobs between 1960 and 1985.45 Unemployment rose, as twenty-eight
thousand jobs left the city between 1979 and 1986, and the jobs that were left were low
paying and in the service industry. Meanwhile, the suburbs added thirty-three thousand
jobs in the same period.46 The new jobs in the suburbs went to whites, because African
Americans were confined to living in the city by various legal and illegal means (see
chapter 3). African Americans, therefore, sank deeper into poverty. 47
Indeed, by 1980, more than 37 percent of Milwaukee’s African Americans lived at
or near the poverty line.48 According to contemporary scholars, impoverished students
are less likely than their middle-class peers to have parents who read to them, who teach
them to pay attention and listen, and who supervise homework. Poor students may start
school not knowing how to spell their names, they may direct profanity or violent
behavior at teachers or peers, and they may not be able to pay attention to lessons; and
they are unlikely to complete homework assignments or study.49
The Milwaukee Journal compared a non-magnet elementary school to a magnet
45
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elementary school in 1986. Palmer, the non-magnet, had a poverty rate of 83 percent.
There were only about a dozen parents who volunteered to help at school, and teachers
referred about two hundred students to school support services. The population was
transient—296 students left the school and 290 entered it during the 1985–86 school year,
and teachers reported that their students read below grade level. Golda Meir, on the other
hand, was a middle-class school that was about half African American and half white. Its
list of parent volunteers was four pages long, and teachers referred only ten students to
support services. The population was stable, and its students were among the highest
performers in the district.50 Thus, it should not have been a surprise that magnet schools
did well while non-magnets did poorly.
MPS’s use of magnet schools did not change much in the years immediately
following McMurrin’s resignation. Deputy Superintendent Hawthorne Faison, an African
American, was named acting superintendent.51 Many African Americans saw Faison’s
promotion as a big opportunity to raise standards, decentralize the district, and return to
neighborhood schools.52 Fuller tried to seize his opportunity immediately after
McMurrin’s resignation and proposed that North Division High School, two feeder
middle schools, and seven (later five) feeder elementary schools leave MPS and become
their own school district. Fuller and his followers argued that African American
achievement would improve if students were taught by African American teachers and
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governed by a school board elected from the surrounding community.53 The plan was
very similar to the experimental one that was in effect for North Division from 1969 until
1972 (see chapter 3).
Milwaukee’s African American community was split on the issue. As explained
in chapter 3, there were three divergent streams of African Americans in
Milwaukee—business interests who wanted to cooperate with whites, integrationists led
by Lloyd Barbee, and black separatists led by Larry Harwell, who was an aide to Polly
Williams. The first group had fallen from power in the late 1960s, and Barbee had retired
to private life by 1987. That left the separatists as the dominant group. Polly Williams
and state representative Spencer Coggs supported the new district, as did alderpersons
Michael McGee Sr., Marlene Johnson, and Marvin Pratt and former assistant
superintendent Gloria Mason.54 They and their followers believed a return to
neighborhood schools would increase parent involvement, improve teacher morale, and
encourage the development of a focused curriculum that would reduce the dropout rate.
The plan’s supporters would have ended involuntary busing but continued voluntary
busing within the city and between the city and suburbs through Chapter 220.55 The
plan’s supporters said they were not against integration but still wanted control over their
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own schools. In other words, they wanted choices for African American families, choices
that had not existed under the previous, segregated system and choices that did not exist
within the magnet system. Their “Manifesto for New Directions in the Education of
Black Children in the City of Milwaukee” began with a quote from W. E. B. Du Bois:
...theoretically, the Negro needs neither segregated schools nor mixed
schools. What he needs is Education. What he must remember is that
there is no magic, either in mixed schools or in segregated schools. A
mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile public
opinion, and not teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad. A
segregated school with ignorant placeholders, inadequate equipment, poor
salaries...is equally bad. Other things being equal, the mixed school is the
broader more natural basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider
contacts: it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority
complex. But other things seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy,
Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that mixed school can offer.56
In other words, it was the view of Fuller and his supporters that integrated
education was better than segregated education in the best of all possible worlds. But this
was not that world, and it was the opinion of Fuller that until attitudes changed toward
African American students, they were better off attending their own schools, where they
could participate in and benefit from their own community and unique American heritage.
The plan’s supporters referred to MPS’s busing program as “madness” and criticized it
for breaking up the black community. They also pointed to Federal Judge Robert Carter,
one of the leading attorneys in the Brown litigation, who stated that the only way to
improve the lives of poor minority students was to focus resources on the schools they
were already attending. They rejected metropolitan desegregation, for in their view, it
would only worsen the problem of black underachievement by dispersing African
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Americans throughout the suburbs, as if they were not good enough to have their own
schools. They also, however, strongly supported the right of parents to send their
children to any Milwaukee-area schools if they chose to. This manifesto was endorsed by
twenty-seven locally prominent African Americans, including Mel Hall, president of the
Central City Scholarship Organization; Wesley Scott, executive director of the
Milwaukee Urban League (retired); and former Wisconsin Secretary of State Vel
Phillips.57 Governor Tommy Thompson and Assembly Speaker Tom Loftus, both of
whom were white, also gave their support to an independent North Division district.58
On the other side of the issue one found Marcia Coggs, Barbee’s protégée in the
state assembly, and state senator Gary George in opposition to the plan. Cecil Brown,
former co-chairperson of the Committee of 100 (see chapters 4–6); Acting Superintendent
Faison; and several prominent African American clergymen were also against it.59
Grover Hankins, general counsel for the NAACP, called proponents of the plan “apostles
of urban apartheid.”60 Among whites, Milwaukee School Board President David Cullen
vowed to challenge the bill’s constitutionality in court if it became law,61 and City
Attorney Grant Langley said it was against the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Amos decision. Perhaps most importantly, a Milwaukee Journal
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survey found that 62 percent of all likely Milwaukee voters were against the plan, only 27
percent supported it, and 11 percent were undecided. These findings cut across all age,
gender, and racial lines.62
The bill managed to pass the state assembly on March 17, 1988, by a sixty-one-tothirty-six vote,63 but a concerted effort of Gary George killed it in the Senate.64 Though
they lost the vote, black separatists continued to advocate neighborhood schools and
community control of public schools and vouchers for private schools in the 1990s.
With the North Division scheme defeated, it was time for the school board to
name a permanent superintendent. Faison was well liked by the teachers union in general
and especially by African American teachers. He won the union’s endorsement,65 but the
school board wanted to conduct a nationwide search,66 believing that Faison did not have
enough experience to run a school district as big as Milwaukee.67
Dr. Robert Peterkin emerged as the frontrunner. Like Faison, Peterkin was
African American, which appealed to the school board’s three African American
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members and Mary Bills, who was a white reformer. Peterkin was the superintendent of
the schools in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which had only about eight thousand students,
compared to MPS, which had one hundred thousand students. But he had also been
deputy superintendent in Boston, where he was credited with increasing standardized test
scores.68 Peterkin’s appointment in Milwaukee was approved on a nine-to-nothing vote
by the school board. He received rave reviews from the school board69 and the general
public.70 As school board member Jeanette Mitchell said, “It’s almost a dream come
true.”71
Peterkin faced several daunting challenges. He inherited a school system that had
lost most of its white middle-class students; test scores, attendance, and grades had
declined to an all-time low;72 and the state legislature and Department of Public
Instruction were threatening to reconstitute MPS into several smaller districts.73 But
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Peterkin promised to raise academic achievement74 and decided the best approach to
reform was one of decentralization. He broke MPS into six “service delivery areas,” each
with its own deputy superintendent who was responsible for high schools, middle
schools, and elementary schools. By moving administrators out of the MPS central
office, Peterkin hoped to put the administration directly in touch with the parents and
communities they served, which would lead toward increased accountability. Once
accountability was ingrained, achievement would improve.75 Racial diversity would be
achieved by incorporating a portion of the central city into each service delivery area.76
The plan failed to improve MPS and lasted only two years. There were essentially
two levels of bureaucracy, which was expensive and doubled the paperwork. It also
slowed the system down in some cases. Reports surfaced that the community
superintendents were reluctant to leave the comforts of their offices and get into the
schools to help people.77 The plan did nothing to reduce busing, and instead of making
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the bureaucracy more accessible to parents, it may have actually isolated them. As
George Mitchell said:
They (a family that lives in the Palmer Elementary School attendance area)
live in one attendance area, which is part of a new Service Delivery Area
headed by a new community superintendent. They are represented on the
School Board by the member from District Four. Yet their child likely
attends another school, in another Service Delivery Area, headed by
another community superintendent, represented by another member of the
School Board. These circumstances will be present in neighborhoods
throughout the city.78
The service delivery areas did not improve student achievement. In fact, student
achievement continued to decline.79 The average high school student had a 1.62 grade
point average,80 the average daily attendance in all schools was around only 90 percent in
1989,81 and 9,359 students were suspended from school in the 1988–89 school year.82
Peterkin proposed two solutions, both of which included magnet schools. The
first solution was called the Long-Range Educational Equity Plan, or the Willie Plan,
named after its principal author, Charles V. Willie, of the Harvard Graduate School of
Education. The city would have been split into two zones—east and west—under the
Willie Plan, with magnet schools and other opportunities placed in both halves. Students
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would have to chose a school in their zone, which should have reduced busing. The only
exceptions would be Rufus King, Riverside, Milwaukee High School of the Arts, and
Milwaukee Trade and Technology, which would remain citywide magnet schools.
Busing would have been bilateral, and the schools would have been integrated.83 Peterkin
hoped to reduce feelings among parents that there were only a few good magnet schools
in the district.84
The Willie Plan met opposition from white parents who felt threatened at the
possibility of losing their magnet schools. A crowd of about 175 parents and teachers
went to the auditorium at Marshall High School on February 27, 1990, to complain about
the plan. As a parent of a Greenfield Avenue Elementary Montessori School student said,
“You will see what a revolt is really like.”85 White parents liked their child’s magnet
schools and did not want to lose them. They predicted white flight, and asked the school
board to leave the school assignment process alone. Some African Americans whose
children attended magnet schools had the same concern; others, who did not have
children in magnet schools, worried that the Willie plan would limit their choices and
busing options.86 A third set of African American parents at another meeting urged a
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return to neighborhood schools.87 The Willie Plan was not approved, mostly due to white
opposition.88 Peterkin lamented, “People didn’t see what they were going to gain, only
what they were going to lose.”89
With the failure of the service delivery areas and the Willie Plan, the public was
beginning to lose faith in Peterkin. As Jean Tyler, executive director of the Public Policy
Forum, a local agency that studies public policies that pertain to metropolitan problems,
said, “I’d give him an A for effort, for understanding the major kinds of changes that need
to be taken to improve the Milwaukee Public Schools. But I’d also have to give him an
incomplete for his accomplishments so far.”90
Peterkin’s last attempt to improve MPS came in the form of a new magnet school.
Peterkin, himself African American, knew young black males were the largest “at-risk”
group in MPS. African Americans made up 55 percent of the student population in 1990,
and about half of them were male. MPS’s African American males had a 19.3 percent
dropout rate, compared to 6.2 percent nationally. They had a grade point average of 1.35,
compared to the district average of 1.6; only 2 percent had a 3.0 or higher. Eleven
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percent flunked a grade; and 17 percent were suspended in the 1989–90 school year,
compared to 7 percent of non-African Americans.91 Peterkin hoped that an immersion
program, focusing on African culture and self-pride, might help change these numbers.
In his words, “A population is literally dying, both educationally and physically. We can
wring . . . our hands or we can try something new.”92
The immersion program set off a storm of controversy that gathered national
media attention. Some people said targeting African American males for a “special”
school would be a return to segregation. Others said it ignored much more complex
issues involved in the lack of male achievement, such as poverty and the weakening of
the family.93 Dr. Kenneth Clark, who provided much of the social-psychological
research on segregation’s harmful effects on black students for the Brown decision, said,
“I can’t believe that we’re regressing like this . . . . Why are we talking about segregating
and stigmatizing black males?”94
Supporters of the plan disagreed with such statements. They saw integration as a
means to an end—quality education for all of Milwaukee’s children. But involuntary
busing was not working in their view, so they wanted to try another method that might
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result in better schools. Joyce Mallory, an African American member of the school board
and mother of a sixteen-year-old son, was one such person. She said she wanted to
“create a climate and a culture that says to all children, particularly black boys, that you’re
OK.”95 Ken Holt, another African American and principal of Alexander Graham Bell
Middle School, put it more directly: “The school system is going to have to be surrogate
parents. These kids see despair in the community. Dope pushers, not role models. They
don’t know how to be a man.”96
Peterkin, Mallory, Holt, and other supporters of the immersion plan were able to
put together enough votes on the school board to get a plan approved. Two schools—
Martin Luther King Elementary School (formerly Victor Berger Elementary) and
Malcolm X Academy (formerly Fulton Middle School, which had had academic and
behavioral problems for years)—were designated for the new program, but they were
open to all students regardless of race or gender. All would participate in the Afro-centric
curriculum and daily counseling sessions, and uniforms would be required. Once
approved, Peterkin set out to recruit a mostly black male staff—he wanted them to be role
models as well as teachers97—but as the controversy deepened and Peterkin fell under
closer media attention, his desire to remain on the job waned. He announced in late 1990
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that he would take a position at Harvard University the following fall.98
Malcolm X Academy did not do very well. Although its founders envisioned
well-ordered classrooms where students would take rigorous courses and improve their
self-esteem, what they got was students with some of lowest attendance, grades, and test
scores in MPS.99 Leon Todd, an African American integrationist who had been on the
school board in the 1970s (see chapters 4 and 6), returned to the board in the 1990s and
alleged that the school was teaching its students separatism and racism.100 There were
several attempts to close the school in the 1990s. Eventually, the enrollment shrank to
such a low level that a high school had to be added.101 The middle school component was
cut in the mid-2000s. Then the school became the African American Immersion High
School after a few years and merged with the small Metropolitan High School. It then
moved into North Division, which itself had been reconfigured as three small high
schools in 2005,102 and it still had some of the lowest performing students in MPS.103
Howard Fuller emerged as one of the top candidates for superintendent to replace
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Peterkin. He had put together an impressive résumé in the 1980s. Already known as a
civil rights advocate, leader of the Coalition to Save North, and a proponent of vouchers,
Fuller, who had a PhD, had served as dean of general education for the Milwaukee Area
Technical College, as the director of the Wisconsin Department of Employment Relations
under Governor Tony Earl, and as the head of Milwaukee County’s Department of Health
and Human Services. Thus, he was considered an expert in his field and had connections
all over the state. He also had endorsements from Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist,
County Executive Dave Schultz, and County Board Chairman Tom Ament. State law,
however, required a minimum of three years as a classroom teacher to be superintendent,
experience that Fuller lacked.104
The school board waited until after the spring elections to appoint a
superintendent. Deputy Superintendent Deborah McGriff, the only other serious
candidate for the job, was tired of waiting so many months for an appointment and
accepted the position of Detroit’s superintendent instead. That left Fuller,105 and with the
end of the school year drawing near, the state legislature and governor changed the law so
that he could become Milwaukee superintendent.106 Both the black and white
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communities rallied around him.107 The school board, wary of the man who had been
their greatest critic, searched for other candidates108 but could find none. The school
board unanimously elected Fuller on May 29, 1991.109 Fuller was also vested with more
power than any other superintendent before him, because the school board eliminated the
separate secretary-business manager position, which gave Fuller complete control over
district finances.110
Fuller had his work cut out for him. A report issued in 1992 by the Wisconsin
Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights Commission indicated that white
migration had continued in Milwaukee, though its acceleration had declined. According
to the report, 57 percent of MPS’s students were African American in 1991; 27 percent
were white; 10 percent were Latino; and the rest were Asian, Native American, or
“other.” This included 5,714 Milwaukee students who attended suburban schools
through Chapter 220. Of those students, 71.5 percent were African American.
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Conversely, only 873 white suburban students attended city schools.111 As a state, more
than 70 percent of all African American students attended segregated schools. Almost all
of these were in MPS.112
According to research conducted at the University of Chicago, Milwaukee-area
schools could be broken up into three classifications. The first was white, middle class,
and suburban. Their students were doing very well and were above the national medians
in several standardized categories. The second classification was the college-preparatory
MPS magnet schools. They were fairly well integrated and were also above national
medians in several categories but were not doing as well as suburban schools. Most of
their students were low to middle income. The third classification of schools, which the
vast majority of MPS students attended, were traditional schools dominated by lowincome, minority children. Their level of educational achievement was significantly
below that of students in the other two types of school and was below the national median
in most statistical categories.113 The average grade point average in thirteen of
Milwaukee’s fifteen public high schools was less than 2.0. More than one-quarter of the
courses taken in MPS high schools ended in failing grades, and the percentage of failures
was more than 30 percent in seven high schools.114 Only about 40 percent of freshmen
graduated from high school in four years. The rest dropped out or spent more than four
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years in high school.115
These facts caused several people, including the state assembly, the NAACP, and
Mayor John Norquist, to question the success of desegregation.116 In a survey by the
Milwaukee Community Journal, only 55 percent of white parents, 55 percent of African
American parents, and 52 percent of Latino parents believed the desegregation guidelines
should be continued.117 Howard Fuller, who had not yet become superintendent at the
time this research was done, said, “Milwaukee pursued a discriminatory implementation
of desegregation; and, in essence, what happened in Milwaukee was they stood the Brown
decision on its head.” In other words, Brown was supposed to improve educational
opportunities for African American students, but in Milwaukee’s case, desegregation had
put a tremendous burden on the students it was supposed to help.118
When Fuller became superintendent, he put forth a number of innovative reforms
to try to correct these problems. Almost immediately, he announced the closure of the six
service delivery offices, calling the experiment “noble” but inefficient and expensive,119
but he also turned over most school functions directly to the principals, including
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budgeting and personnel decisions, 120 so that MPS would be a “system of schools,” rather
than a school system.121 Cutting administrative positions also made more money
available to be used at the school level.122 He wanted high schools to be more rigorous,
so he asked the school board to increase the high school graduation requirements, to
require all ninth-grade students to take algebra, and to pass new policies to make schools
safer and discipline standards stronger,123 Hr also wanted parents to play a greater role in
choosing and being involved in schools.124 He planned to close schools and reopen them
with new staffs and programs, possibly as charter schools, if they were chronically low
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achieving.125 The teachers union interpreted Fuller’s plans for school reconstitution and
non-union charter schools as an attack on teachers. The teachers union continued to fight
with Fuller as it went into contract negotiations that year126 when he proposed a wage
freeze to help hold property taxes in check, which was a growing concern in Wisconsin in
the early 1990s.127 The union also remained concerned about staff safety in schools.128
Another reform involved school funding. At the time Fuller came into office, the
citywide magnet schools received $2,297 per pupil, while the neighborhood schools
received only $1,855 per pupil.129 The magnet schools drew mostly middle-class
students, who were often times white, while the neighborhood schools had mostly poor
students who were minorities. In Fuller’s view, poor students needed more money, and
Fuller, never a fan of magnet schools, decided to equalize funding. His proposal also
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included shifting money from high schools and middle schools to elementary schools to
try to raise achievement, even though high schools are more expensive to operate. Not
surprisingly, the students, parents, and staffs of the magnet schools and high schools
protested these cuts.130 Fuller eventually restored 30 percent of the cuts to the high
schools and middle schools but did not restore funding to the magnet schools.131
Fuller also proposed a return to neighborhood schools and said busing was a
failure that “destroyed communities.”132 He divided the city into five elementary school
districts, and required students to choose an elementary school in their district if they
were not going to attend a magnet school.133 He also proposed a ten-year $474 million
building plan for neighborhood schools, of which $366 million would be financed by
long-term borrowing. Fifteen schools would be constructed, and fourteen existing
schools would expand. State law required a referendum to get the loans. Mayor Norquist
and other public officials expressed doubt that the referendum would pass without MPS
cutting busing and showing “a dramatic increase in the quality” of education.134
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Early polling data made the chances of an affirmative vote look good,135 but
citizens began to have doubts when the financial costs of the building plan were
calculated. Therefore, when not battling the teachers union, Fuller spent the rest of 1992
and part of 1993 trying to promote his building plan and get the support of voters.136
County Executive Dave Schultz called it “a referendum on Howard Fuller.”137 Most
African Americans supported the plan, but many whites, especially those on the south
side and northwest side, opposed the plan because it would cause an increase in their
property taxes.138 The latter group prevailed, and the referendum was voted down by a
three-to-one margin.139 Lee McMurrin’s magnet school plan and the busing it required
would remain in place for at least the next few years.
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Fuller continued to push other reforms while he was superintendent, including a
school-to-work program,140 a classification system of schools as “high achieving,”
“improving,” or “in need of assistance,”141 and expanded school choice through charter
schools. Charter schools used non-union labor, because, Fuller said, the MTEA
hamstrung his efforts to be innovative and to fire ineffective teachers. The MTEA fought
back and forced Fuller to observe union rules at Edison Middle School, which was the
one independent charter school he able to start.142
The school board and the public at large seemed to support most of Fuller’s plans,
but some insiders resented Fuller’s disruption to their lives and felt alienated by what they
perceived as a heavy-handed approach to school administration. Relations with the
teachers union also continued to sour. When Fuller wanted to bypass seniority and
appoint additional African American teachers to the two African American immersion
schools, the teachers’ union objected, but Fuller did it anyway. The MTEA filed a
grievance and won.143
Fuller also introduced radical changes to the administration of North Division. He
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fired Cecil Austin, North’s principal, in April 1992 for being ineffective and replaced him
with a committee of teachers, parents, alumni, and business leaders. The committee was
given five years to turn North around and was given control over budgeting, scheduling,
staffing decisions, and curriculum, but the MTEA charged that the staff members had not
been elected to the committee and were under the direct control of Fuller. This violated
the teachers’ contract and collective bargaining process. Maxine Hannibal, a North
teacher who was appointed by Fuller as chairperson of the committee, said the teachers
on the committee lacked support from the union and central office administrators.144
Fuller eventually named a new principal in 1993.145 In return, the union agreed to the
creation of a new advisory committee of teachers, administrators, and union
representatives. It also waived portions of the contract and allowed North to have more
African American teachers than the usual level.146
The school board’s support for Fuller waned in the wake of his defeats. Fuller
had been hired on a unanimous vote in 1991, but two of his allies, Joyce Mallory and
Jeannette Mitchell, resigned in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Mallory’s position was
filled by Leon Todd in a special election in 1994. Todd had been a Fuller foe when Todd
was on the school board in the 1970s and had been particularly critical of Fuller’s
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proposal that the North Division neighborhood be its own school district (see chapter 6).
Todd continued to criticize Fuller in the 1990s.147
But the conflict did not stop there. Adding fuel to the fire, Fuller pushed for a big
expansion of charter schools. The teachers’ union raised objections because the program
took money away from public schools (and union salary increases) and gave it to nonunion public schools.148 As a result, MTEA lobbied hard and helped elect Leon Todd and
three other school board candidates, all of whom rejected the expansion of charter
schools, in April 1995.149 Fuller resigned in frustration two weeks after the election. He
blamed the teachers union in his resignation statement, saying their “scurrilous messages”
were designed to “smear any effort to bring genuine reform to the system.”150
Fuller may not have accomplished as much as he thought he would, but he left a
lasting legacy. Charter schools and choice schools flourished in the decade following the
Fuller administration, and MPS finally made the move back to neighborhood schools.
These schools and suburban schools would compete with magnet schools for
Milwaukee’s best students. This would be the third era of educational choice in
Milwaukee—the era of school choice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE ERA OF SCHOOL CHOICE:
FIVE MORE CHOICES, 1987–2011
Magnet schools did not provide the educational improvement for which
Americans had hoped. They did not integrate students at the level supporters had hoped
and did not lead to academic improvement. They also disenfranchised African
Americans who wanted community control over schools. Milwaukeeans began to look
for other educational options by the late 1980s, which were charter schools, “school
choice,” and open enrollment. MPS would counter with two additional
choices—neighborhood schools and small schools. These five reforms would give
Milwaukee parents and students an unprecedented level of choice in schooling.
Several national studies were conducted since the late 1980s that attempted to
determine the effectiveness of magnet schools. Some pointed out the successes of
magnet schools. William Boyd, who cited several conservative educational scholars,
found that magnet schools were part of an important package of choices for students and
families and that competition among magnet schools resulted in academic achievement.1
Magnet schools were also shown as effective means to engage students in fine arts,
technology, or Advanced Placement (AP)2 and could successfully matriculate students to
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college, if appropriate guidance counseling and other academic supports were in place.3
But the majority of recent studies show that magnet schools actually exacerbate
segregation. Jordan Rickles and Paul Ong studied five California metropolitan areas in
2002 and found that magnet schools tend to be integrated but leave traditional
neighborhood schools segregated.4 Lois Andre-Bechely found similar results in 2007,5 as
did Handel Wright and Sidonia Alenuma, who criticized magnet schools for trying to
recruit only middle-class students.6
Magnet schools may also segregate students within supposedly integrated schools.
Kimberly West did a legal study in 1994 and found that African American students were
almost always placed in lower-ability classes compared to whites.7 A 2001 study of a
high school in a mid-sized southern city with a magnet school inside a non-magnet
building (a “school-within-a-school” format) also found that whites were a minority in
the building but made up the majority of students in the magnet program. Non-magnet
students also received the distinct impression that their teachers would rather teach
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classes in the magnet program. They said their teachers had less enthusiasm than magnet
teachers and tended to use worksheets rather than teaching lessons.8 One teacher
reportedly referred to her non-magnet class as being full of “lazy Mexicans.”9 In 2002,
data from the National Center of Education Statistics showed that schools with large
numbers of students taking AP exams rarely had substantial numbers of African
American students.10
A study of a magnet school in Newtown, California, revealed similar findings.
One student referred to the “regular” program in his school as a “moron academy.”11 A
Latino student reported that the regular program actually retards intellectual growth: “The
white man, the white people that come here, they get better classes. I don’t know why.
Most classes, they’re easy for us. That’s why we become lazy, and we don’t work hard.
It’s boring. Most of us are getting Cs and Ds.” When asked why he did not work harder
and try to get in the magnet program, the student responded, “I wouldn’t see no [sic]
Hispanics there. I wouldn’t relate to nobody [sic] out there. One of the black girls in my
English class wanted to take an AP English class, and they wouldn’t give it to her. She
gets straight As, and they wouldn’t give it to her.”12 A third student said he was aware
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38–44.
9

Quoted in Bush, Burley, and Causey-Bush, 41.
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that he had higher test scores than some white students but still could not get into the
magnet program. An African American senior reached this conclusion: “A person . . .
should be able to have the same classes as any other student. It’s weird how in school
and in life we are taught not to discriminate or segregate, but yet we are going through
this every day at school.”13
A couple studies have also been done on magnet schools and segregation by
economic class. Timothy Duax found that magnet schools that tested applicants admitted
a disproportionate share of middle-class students, but magnet schools that admitted
everyone admitted only a few more middle-class students than neighborhood schools.14
More comprehensively, Salvatore Saporito and Deenesh Sohoni studied twenty-one of the
twenty-two largest school districts in the United States and found that neighborhood
schools have much higher concentrations of poverty than magnet schools.
(Unfortunately, Milwaukee was the one school district excluded from the study, because
Milwaukee did not report school-by-school poverty statistics at the time the study was
conducted.) Thirty-seven percent of students in these districts were poor, but 58 percent
of the students in neighborhood schools were poor. These students were almost always
African American or Latino.15
On the local level, a 1989 study of Milwaukee’s magnet schools produced by the
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Wisconsin Policy Research Institute reached conclusions similar to those of other cities’
studies. George Mitchell, the conservative author of the study (see chapter 7), was much
more critical of Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) than earlier work by Ian Harris had
been (see chapter 7). Mitchell showed that MPS spent $1,846 per pupil in the 1975–76
school year, a figure that had increased by 190 percent to $5,351 by 1987–88, while the
rate of inflation in that period was 114 percent. Most of the new revenue came from the
state, which increased per-pupil funding to MPS by 278 percent.16 But despite all this
spending, the Mitchell report argued that busing did not racially integrate schools. As
already shown in chapters 6 and 7, MPS employed a system of unilateral busing in which
African American students were bused either voluntarily or involuntarily to southside
schools, while white students were seldom bused against their wills. This policy was
strengthened by a construction plan that built more than 75 percent of all new schools in
white neighborhoods.17 As a result, nine times as many African American students were
bused compared to whites, and the few whites who were bused were usually bused to
white schools.18 When too many African Americans chose to stay in their neighborhood
schools, MPS closed neighborhood schools, so African Americans were forced to make a
choice they did not want. MPS attempted to use this one-way policy to curtail white
migration, but it was unsuccessful—African American enrollment increased by more than

16
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20 percent while white enrollment declined by more than 50 percent in the 1970s.19
Mitchell also argued that busing made community involvement and accountability
difficult, because the school board member who represented a child’s neighborhood
might not represent that child’s school.20
Mitchell also concluded that the magnet schools did not increase academic
achievement. Although students at the four citywide high schools (Rufus King,
Riverside, Milwaukee High School of the Arts, and Milwaukee Trade and Technical) had
grade point averages that were higher than the grade point averages of students at the
other eleven high schools, there was still an achievement gap between African American
and white students that was not much different from the gap at other MPS high schools,
where the average grade point average was in the D range.21 Test scores declined in
almost every MPS high school, and African American students failed almost one third of
their courses.22 African Americans had a dropout rate of 12.5 percent in MPS in 1985,
but it was substantially higher at three white southside high schools. Pulaski had a black
dropout rate of 14.3 percent, Bay View’s was 18.5 percent, and Hamilton—the whitest
high school in MPS—had a black dropout rate of 23.6 percent.23 African American
students did well in magnet schools, but they also did about the same in suburban schools
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when they were in the Chapter 220 program.24 In other words, magnet schools were
really no better than average suburban schools.
Generally speaking, most people were dissatisfied with the quality of education in
MPS. A survey conducted by the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee (UWM) asked a
sample of MPS teachers and parents to grade the schools on an A-B-C-D-F scale. Close
to 37.9 percent of teachers and 17.2 percent of parents graded their schools as D or F.
Sixty percent of teachers said they would not send their own children to their own
schools.25 Administrators said education happened at a rate of about half the time in their
schools because their schools had attendance rates of less than 50 percent. Students
might arrive to school to find their friends, then go to a shopping mall or other teen
hangout with them, before returning to school to get their free transportation home. Some
students went to class only once per week, and it was to pick up a bus pass. Those who
did attend class often did so without supplies and did not do any work. Many teachers
gave up under the circumstances, lowered their expectations, and showed videos rather
than teaching.26
When these data were synthesized, Mitchell concluded that magnet schools did
not improve academic achievement—the black-white achievement gap was about the
same for all Milwaukee students. The reason magnet schools appeared more successful
was that their students came from stable, middle-class families. Thus, black-white
segregation was replaced by a system of segregating the achieving from nonachieving
24
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students, with middle-class students getting into their desired Milwaukee magnet schools
or suburban schools and poor students with low levels of parent involvement going into
“traditional” MPS schools.27 As school board member and former principal Larry Miller
said in 2009, “We’re creating two school districts. One district offers schools that select
who can get in, and one takes everyone who applies.”28 Milwaukeeans lost faith in the
magnet plan and searched for alternatives. They were more concerned with academic
achievement than racial integration and would take advantage of three new
programs—charter schools, school choice, and open enrollment.
Charter schools are the most common alternative to traditional public schools in
the United States. Charter schools operate under a special agreement (or “charter”) with a
chartering authority that is often times a school district, city government, or university.
They are public schools but may be privately run and are exempt from most state and
local regulations.29 There were 4,600 charter schools serving 1.4 million children in
kindergarten through twelfth grade in the United States in 2010.30 Criteria for receiving a
charter vary from state to state, but generally speaking, the holder of the charter must
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exhibit some kind of commitment to educating children.31 Some charter schools are
sponsored by community groups, while others are sponsored by religious institutions or
ethnic organizations that are seeking to preserve their values or cultural traditions, though
charter schools usually do not teach specific theologies, which would violate the principle
of separation between church and state.32 Charter schools are usually easier to close than
traditional public schools, because the school closes automatically if the chartering
authority does not renew the charter. However, if a chartering authority attempts to
revoke a charter before the charter has elapsed, the authority may face a lawsuit for
breach of contract.33 Charter school supporters argue that not only can their schools offer
a superior education, but that their existence will prompt improvements in other public
schools to improve by forcing those schools to compete for students and funding.34
Charter schools garner high praise when they are academically successful and run by the
public school system, but they create controversy when they use non-union labor and are
run by for-profit companies.35 Charter schools have also been criticized in some states
where they are not required to accept students with disabilities or students who do not
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score well on standardized tests.36 There is also some evidence that charter schools may
contribute to racial segregation, as they do not typically provide transportation to
students, and therefore may market themselves to the neighborhood population or middleclass families that can afford transportation.37
Charter schools have expanded in Wisconsin since they were initially authorized
in 1993. Originally, only ten school districts were allowed to charter up to two schools
each, but that expanded to an unlimited number of schools in all school districts in 1995.
The City of Milwaukee, UWM, Milwaukee Area Technical College (MATC), the
University of Wisconsin–Parkside have been allowed to charter schools since 1997.
Some MPS charter schools and all non-MPS charter schools do not use unionized labor,
but as they are public schools, all teachers must hold some sort of valid teaching license
(see chapter 7).38 In terms of performance, some studies show that competition between
charter schools and regular public schools raises academic achievement in both types of
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schools,39 but most studies, including studies of Milwaukee charter schools, show no
difference. These studies usually attribute the lack of improvement to the fact that most
charter schools serve students of the same socioeconomic background as nearby regular
public schools.40
“School choice” is a euphemism for a voucher program that is more radical than
charter schools. The voucher idea was first popularized by the well-known economist
Milton Friedman in 195541 and allows low-income students to attend private schools at
public expense. Parents are issued a voucher, usually from the state, that they may use to
cover tuition at a private school, which choice supporters argue gives poor parents the
same level of choice in schools that wealthy parents already have. Like charter schools,
they are supposed to spur public schools to improve by providing the public schools with
competition. Voucher programs are active in Cleveland; Dayton, Ohio; Indianapolis;
Milwaukee; New York City; San Antonio; Washington, DC; and several other cities.42
39
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The Wisconsin State Legislature created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
in 1989. The program was originally limited to poor students in Milwaukee, and there
were caps on the number of students who could receive vouchers and who could enroll at
individual schools.43 The state took the money for the vouchers out of MPS’s budget,
even if the students had not previously been enrolled in MPS schools.44 The choice
program started slowly but reached its enrollment cap (about a thousand students) by
1995, the year of Fuller’s resignation.45 Parents overwhelmingly reported satisfaction
with the choice schools their children attended.46
The Milwaukee Archdiocese and Mayor John Norquist, a Democrat, soon began
to lobby the state for the inclusion of parochial schools in the school choice program,47 as
supporters of the Independent Community Schools had in the 1970s (see chapter 6).
Norquist blamed MPS for its students’ failures and went so far as to proclaim, “Get rid of
a system that stifles choice by parents of students and a system that has virtually no
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accountability for the employees of the system.”48 They were joined by the Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation,49 the Milwaukee Metropolitan Association of Commerce, and
several other business groups that wanted higher achievement at a lower price with nonunion teachers.50 Howard Fuller51 and state representatives Polly Williams and Antonio
Riley drummed up support in the African American community.52 Fuller and Williams
were two of the leading advocates of community control of black schools in the 1970s
and 1980s (see chapter 6) but shifted their priorities to encompass choice options. The
Milwaukee Archdiocese also lobbied very hard for the approach, seeing vouchers as a
way to save their schools, which had experienced a decline in enrollment since the 1960s
as white Catholics left the inner city for the suburbs. All of these people and
organizations stood a better chance of getting what they wanted if they worked together.
48
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The expanded school choice became law in 1995, but the Milwaukee Teachers
Education Association (MTEA, the teachers’ union) and American Civil Liberties Union
sued on the grounds that it violated separation of church and state.53 Finally, in 1998, the
United States Supreme Court ruled a similar program in Cleveland to be constitutional
and refused to hear the Milwaukee case, effectively approving the Milwaukee program.
The state legislature and governor raised Milwaukee’s enrollment cap to fifteen thousand
students in 1999.54 The state further raised the cap to 22,500 in 200955 and eliminated it
altogether in 2011. The income level was also raised to allow some lower-middle-class
families to participate, and any school in Milwaukee County was allowed to accept the
city’s “choice” students in 2011.56
Like charter schools, choice schools are supposed to encourage public schools to
improve through competition. They are also supposed to turn out a better product
(students) and a lower price (non-union teachers with lower pay and benefits compared to
public school teachers). There is some evidence that the first assertion may be true. One
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study showed that MPS made gains of 3.0 percent to 8.4 percent on standardized tests in
the late 1990s after the expansion of vouchers. Supporters of vouchers said those gains
were the result of public schools’ being forced to improve due to competition from choice
schools. Other urban districts in Wisconsin made gains of less than 3.8 percent.57
Another study, ten year later, found similar results, but those increases in test scores could
have been for any reason.58 Another study found that schools that faced high levels of
competition did not show much difference from the gains of schools that faced little
competition.59 Whatever the case, MPS test scores remain far behind scores in the rest of
the state. For example, according to the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts Exam, only
62.0 percent of Milwaukee’s third-grade students were proficient or advanced in reading
in 2010, compared to 80.0 percent of third-grade students in all of Wisconsin. The gap
widens as students age—40.2 percent of Milwaukee’s tenth-grade students were
proficient or advanced in reading in 2010, compared to 74.7 percent of all of Wisconsin’s
tenth-grade students.60
The second assertion is also only partly true. While no one disputes that private
schools may operate at a lower cost than public schools, according to a couple studies,
their students do only slightly better—less than 10 percent—than public school students
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on standardized tests.61 Studies have shown that choice schools have higher graduation
rates than public schools, but those studies did not disaggregate the data on students who
were enrolled on vouchers from those who paid tuition and came from higher income
families. Also, there was no evidence that students must meet the same standards as
public school students for graduation.62 Most other studies show there is no difference
between students in voucher schools and students in public schools.63 For years, some
choice schools successfully resisted efforts to make their students take state achievement
exams, but when actually forced to in 2010, data revealed that MPS students
outperformed choice school students.64 And even when individual choice schools did
exceed MPS, that could be due to some choice schools’ refusal to admit special education
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students or students with behavior problems.65
According to a major investigation of 106 choice schools conducted by the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in 2005, well-established private schools, such as Catholic
and Lutheran schools, seem to do at least as good a job as MPS—teachers worked hard,
students learned, and parents reported high levels of satisfaction—but other schools were
fraught with problems. Some schools did not have licensed teachers or even teachers
with high school diplomas, which is not a requirement for private schools. Other teachers
were not teaching or were teaching at levels below what their students should have been
able to do. Some schools could not produce a curriculum, and teachers did not have
grades in grade books after three months of school. Facilities were found to be
substandard. Interviews with parents showed that many of them were more inclined to
choose schools based on word-of-mouth rather than academic data. Some schools would
not let the reporters in their buildings. Some schools reported enrollments that were
higher than what they really were. This was sometimes because parents had accidently
enrolled their children in more than one school, but at other times, there was outright
fraud.66 For example, at the Mandella [sic] School of Science and Math, the school’s
founder reported artificially high enrollment, took $330,000 in public funds from the
school, spent part of the money on two Mercedes automobiles (one for him and one for
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his wife), and did not pay his teachers. In another case, $414,000 was missing from a
school that was supposed to have eighty students but had only fifty and barely had any
furniture or supplies. In a related story, Alex’s Academics of Excellence was opened by a
convicted rapist, and staff members allegedly used illegal drugs on school grounds.67
“Open enrollment” is the other main alternative to MPS in Milwaukee. In 1997,
the state of Wisconsin passed Act 27,68 which allows students to attend any public school
in Wisconsin as long as the school or district is willing to take them. While only 2,464
students took part in the program in 1998–99, 18,223 participated in open enrollment in
2004–05, and close to twenty-six thousand students participated in 2008–09. If those
students were in their own school district, they would have constituted the second biggest
school district in the state.69 State funding is adjusted to follow the students, and more
than $88 million was transferred in 2004–05,70 including $32 million out of MPS’s
budget.71 Half a million additional dollars were spent on transportation reimbursement to
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low-income families.72
Suburban districts like the program because they get students who want to enroll
in their schools and, hence, will probably behave and earn good grades and test scores.
The suburbs also like the money. Greenfield High School, in Greenfield, Wisconsin, for
example, had a student body that was 23 percent Milwaukee residents and received $2.5
million in additional state aid in the 2010–11 school year. As Greenfield superintendent
Conrad Farner said, “Literally, it’s keeping us alive. It’s absolutely critical to us.”73 The
Wauwatosa district, as another example, accepted more than seven thousand Milwaukee
students through open enrollment or Chapter 220 in 2010–11. Those students yielded
$10 million in state aid and a property tax reduction of about $2.5 million. St. Francis
High School, in St. Francis, Wisconsin, where 48 percent of its 580 students live in
Milwaukee, reaped an additional $2 million in state aid in 2010–11. The superintendent
of St. Francis said that without the aid the school would probably have to merge with
Cudahy High School.74 Meanwhile, Bay View High School, the MPS school in closest
proximity to St. Francis, had a neighborhood population of only 7.5 percent in 2010–11.
The rest of the students were bused in from other parts of the city.75 There are racial
implications to open enrollment too—of the 5,781 Milwaukee students using open
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enrollment in 2010–11, 61 percent were white,76 while Bay View High School had a
white enrollment of only 12.5 percent.77
In summary, a lot of children who live in Milwaukee do not attend MPS. The
number of students that MPS loses to charter schools, school choice, and open enrollment
exceeded thirty thousand in the 2010–11 school year.78 There were also 8,042 students
from Milwaukee attending suburban schools under either open enrollment or Chapter 220
(see chapter 5) in 2010–2011.79 Meanwhile, MPS had only 80,098 students in September
2011,80 or less than 75 percent of the city’s students. State aid was also reduced, as the
money followed the students to their new schools.
Charter schools, school choice, and open enrollment offer MPS significant
competition. So the district made two moves in the 1990s, both of which represented a
reduction in magnet schools. Those two changes were the Neighborhood Schools
Initiative (NSI) and the “small schools initiative.”
NSI was supposed to give parents the choice many of them really
wanted—neighborhood schools (see chapter 6). Advocates of neighborhood schools
pointed to tremendous academic success at Hi-Mount Elementary, Clarke Street
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Elementary, Fratney Elementary, and Andrew Douglas Community Academy middle
school,81 all of which served neighborhood populations that were traditionally thought of
as underachieving.82 Neighborhood schools had several potential advantages. Schools
could once again inspire neighborhood pride, as North Division had when it was a
neighborhood school (see chapter 6). They might also make it more convenient for poor
parents without automobiles to get involved in their children’s schools and would allow
children to stay after school for activities and tutoring. Logically, they would also reduce
the transportation budget. The school board voted unanimously to move back toward
neighborhood schools in 1997,83 and in 1999 made the bold move of hiring Hi-Mount’s
principal, Spence Korté, as superintendent, after the brief administrations of Fuller’s
former deputy superintendent Robert Jasna, Acting Superintendent Barbara Horton, and
outsider Alan Brown, who had been superintendent in Waukegan, Illinois.84
There was little action at first, but after the spring elections in 1999, there were
enough board members who supported a radical plan.85 At that point, African American
and Latino elementary school students were attending magnet schools and non-magnet
schools all over Milwaukee (see chapter 5). MPS would borrow $170 million to
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construct new elementary schools, build additions to overcrowded schools, and renovate
non-MPS buildings for school use. Ten thousand new seats would be made available for
students who wanted to attend schools in their neighborhoods. Once those students were
removed from the buses, that would leave open ten thousand seats at the schools in which
they were currently enrolled. That would enable additional students to choose
neighborhood schools, moving more students off buses. The effect would repeat several
times until an estimated twenty-seven thousand students were removed from the buses.
There would be a 45 percent reduction in busing, saving almost $25 million dollars at the
beginning. If these students stayed in neighborhood schools through high school, there
would be even greater savings and the new schools would be paid for in less than ten
years. Some people said the plan was a return to segregation, but MPS had few white
students left at that point with whom African Americans could integrate.86 Busing was
not doing much to facilitate integration, and as Polly Williams said, “We’re transfering
over 20,000 black children now from one black school to another black school.”87
According to poll data from 1999, 73 percent of people in the Milwaukee
metropolitan area favored neighborhood schools over busing, even when busing was used
to promote racial integration, a percentage that was consistent with earlier polling data
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from the 1960s (see chapter 3) and 1970s (see chapter 6).88 The legislature approved the
necessary bond issue, and Governor Thompson signed it in October,89 despite a warning
from the Public Policy Forum that the poll data were inconclusive and the plan from MPS
was not certain to work.90
The final plan received school board approval in August 2000.91 It called for only
$100 million in borrowing and predicted a decline of only twenty thousand bused
students and savings of only $15 million. The plan boosted the number of kindergarten
through eighth-grade (K–8) schools from ten to forty-seven in MPS. Some of them
would be converted from existing elementary schools, one would be converted from
Edison Middle School, and the rest would be new schools. The shift to K–8 schools was
prompted by parents who wanted to keep their children in a small environment.92 The big
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boost in K–8 schools necessitated the closure of several of the district’s middle schools.93
But things did not work out as planned. Parents, for all their demands to have
neighborhood schools, did not sign up in the predicted numbers—only 15.7 percent opted
to do so for the fall of 2001.94 Seventy percent of all students were still bused.95
Milwaukeeans also elected two new school board members who were opposed to the
Neighborhood Schools Initiative.96 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel said Superintendent
Korté’s job was in jeopardy.97 Korté, by most accounts, was an able administrator, but he
let the school board determine too many district policies, and the board had grossly
miscalculated parents’ desire to enroll their children in neighborhood schools.98 MPS
continued to be plagued by low test scores,99 a high school graduation rate of only 56
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percent,100 and an African American graduation rate of only 34 percent.101 Korté managed
to hold out for two years before resigning under pressure from the board in 2002.102
William Andrekopolous became the new superintendent that summer. He
promised to continue to decentralize the school district; to continue the NSI; and to raise
standards for teachers, administrators, and students.103 Construction of neighborhood
schools continued to boom into 2003, and Andrekoplous decided to nudge students into
them by limiting students’ choices at the elementary level to magnet schools and a few
schools in the region of the city in which each student lived.104 Students whose parents
did not meet enrollment deadlines were assigned to their neighborhood schools.105
Parents, however, still wanted a broad array of choices,106 while classrooms stood
100

Alan Borsuk, “MPS Graduates Just 56% of Class,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, March 11,
2000, and “9th Grade is ‘Parking Lot’ for Thousands of MPS Kids,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, April 16,
2000.
101

Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, “Report Shows Gap in Graduation Rates,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
November 14, 2001.
102

Alan J. Borsuk, “Citing School Board, MPS Chief Quitting,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June
15, 2002, and “Korte Had Enough after Performance Review Meeting,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June
16, 2002; Sam Schulhofer-Wohl and Tom Held, “Admirers, Critics Generally Agree that Job is a Tough
One,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 15, 2002; and Gregory Stanford, “MPS Takes One on the Chin,”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 15, 2002.
103

Alan J. Borsuk and Vikki Ortiz, “Andrekopoulos Gets School Chief Job,” Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, August 23, 2002, and “Full of Energy, New MPS Chief Ready to Tackle District’s Problems,”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, August 24, 2002. See also Proceedings, August 22, 2002.
104

Alan J. Borsuk, “MPS Ready to Shake Up System to Make Most of Tight Budget,” Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, December 9, 2003, and “Mission Not Yet Accomplished,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
August 25, 2003. See also Proceedings, August 28, 2003.
105

Sarah Carr, “MPS Overhauls Enrollment Process,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 19,

2004.
106

Alan J. Borsuk, “Building Program on Track in MPS,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 8,
2003; “MPS Seeks to Drop Plans for New School,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, September 10, 2003; Amy
Hetzner, “Some Fear Busing Cuts Put Students in Harm’s Way,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 13,
2003; and Gregory Stanford, “What Drives MPS Spending,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, December 10,
2003.

344
empty in many new schools and additions to old schools. The Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel visited every one of those schools in 2008, which is the first and, as of this
writing, only comprehensive review of the NSI. The Journal Sentinel found that
enrollment dropped at nearly half the schools that added classrooms. Reporters found
that excess classrooms had been converted to storage and detention areas, recreation
rooms, and teachers’ lounges or just sat empty. Students near Auer Avenue School, for
example, attended more than ninety different MPS schools, while its $2 million addition
went unused. In another example, Hi-Mount Boulevard School, of which Spence Korté
had been principal, added six classrooms when it expanded to a K–8, but Hi-Mount had
an increase of only thirty-four students by 2007. The new construction included a science
lab, but the school could not afford a science specialist.107
Clarke Street Elementary School experienced similar problems. The school had
high test scores and had reached enrollment capacity, so MPS built a $4.1 million
middle-school addition for it. But as staff positions and before- and after-school
programs were cut, the remaining teachers faced a workload increase, and the quality of
instruction suffered. Test scores declined, and families left the school. Enrollment
declined by thirty-three percent after the addition was built.108
One of MPS’s biggest failures was a partnership with Holy Redeemer Institutional
Church of God in Christ. MPS agreed to convert a warehouse near 35th Street and
Hampton Avenue into a school complex with space to accommodate 405 district students,
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which would serve as a satellite for the Thirty-Fifth Street School two blocks away. The
complex would include a new Boys & Girls Club and a private school for Holy
Redeemer, which was financed by the state’s voucher program. The building cost more
than $15 million. Holy Redeemer owned it and built it. MPS paid $7 million upfront to
lease space for fourth- through eighth-graders, essentially providing nearly half the
construction money. The district spent $4.5 million more on a second addition for
kindergarten through third grade at the original Thirty-Fifth Street campus near West
Hampton Avenue. But enrollment was so low that by September 2007, after being open
for three years and with twenty-one years remaining on the lease, MPS quietly moved out
and consolidated the school in the original Thirty-Fifth Street building. Thus, the district
gave a $7 million subsidy to a church to build a school that MPS was not even using, and
it still had to pay $223,000 to provide building maintenance. Wilson Wells, a parent
active at Thirty-Fifth Street School, said, “It was a waste of a lot of resources and money.
Now they are paying for the space, and it’s unoccupied. And they want to raise my
taxes.” MPS did not save money on busing, because parents still chose schools outside of
their neighborhoods. The district looked for other ways to save money and concluded
that it should cut art, music, physical education, and other electives, creating even more
empty classrooms.109
And that was not the only time MPS partnered with a church. MPS paired up
LaFollette Elementary School with Rockhill Missionary Baptist Church in 2003 at school
board member Charlene Hardin’s urging. MPS gave the congregation $740,000 to build
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a new church with four attached classrooms. Rockhill used the money to make a down
payment on construction and borrowed the rest. MPS planned to operate the school as an
extension of LaFollette for twenty years, even though LaFollette’s enrollment was
declining, which made the extension unnecessary. Rockhill was supposed to recruit
students from its congregation. Environmental problems caused a delay, so MPS allowed
the church to temporarily meet in LaFollotte’s new gymnasium, which itself cost
$900,000 to build, while a second contractor was recruited. The church and classroom
additions were finished in 2006, but the rooms were never used due to a further decline in
LaFollette’s enrollment. Rockhill’s enrollment declined too—it was down to just twenty
families.110 The school board voted in 2011 to close LaFollette at the end of the school
year.111
All total, the district spent $102 million on the NSI from 2001 until 2005. Thirty
million dollars of that sum was spent on major additions to schools where enrollment had
actually declined, and an additional $19.5 million went toward construction at schools
where enrollment gains had fallen far short of expectations. Interest payments will push
the final cost past $175 million by 2024 because most of the money was borrowed. Just
before the construction program was approved in 2000, MPS spent $57 million a year on
busing, but in 2007–2008 the district spent $59.5 million. The percentage of MPS
children attending their neighborhood schools actually declined during that interval, and
even the expanded schools that gained students got less than 40 percent of them from
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their designated neighborhoods—the rest were bused to school.112
The district based its construction decisions on misleading data. MPS paid for
phone and door-to-door surveys and held hundreds of community meetings before
developing the plan. According to the survey, seven out of ten parents who sent their
children to schools outside their neighborhood, mostly by bus, were very satisfied with
their choice, and three out of four parents said they did not consider their neighborhood
school a viable option. Parents were also asked to list what they wanted in their
children’s schools. Then they were asked whether they would choose a neighborhood
school if it had all those attributes. Fewer than half the respondents said they would be
“very likely” to do so. But the parents at the community meetings, which were poorly
attended, were very vocal about wanting neighborhood schools. The Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel implied that some board members, such as Charlene Hardin, may have ignored
enrollment trends so they could get construction contracts for their constituents. MPS
chose to ignore the survey data and went ahead with construction, a fact that surprised
Craig Maher, who oversaw the survey and later became a University of
Wisconsin–Oshkosh public administration professor: “MPS’s outreach effort failed in the
sense that the policy outcome did not accurately reflect the opinions of the citizens.” Or
as parent Tina Johnson, who was concerned about neighborhood safety, said, “You can’t
just build a facility and expect people to come when in between is a violent environment.
That’s why parents continue to opt for busing.”113
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MPS also failed to take other types of schools into account. Specifically, when
MPS surveyed parents, it did not consider that some parents had their children enrolled or
were planning on enrolling their children in magnet schools, charter schools, and choice
schools. Charter and choice were growing at substantial rates in the early 2000s. The
number of students in charter schools grew to more than five thousand by 2008, and
choice enrollment was at more than nineteen thousand. MPS did not factor any of that
growth into its demographic calculations, and so it built schools for students who would
not enroll in any MPS school.114
Simply put, the district acted as though it could stop students from leaving just by
building schools. It cut its marketing budget and told its schools to recruit students on
their own, but not all of them did. Reading scores declined at sixteen of the twenty-two
schools with new buildings or additions, which hindered enrollment. At Thirty-Fifth
Street School, for example, where no use was being made of classrooms that cost $7.2
million, the percentage of fourth-graders who were proficient at reading fell from 56
percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2007, and math scores declined from 40 percent to 33
percent. When interviewed, teachers cited disorganization in MPS, budget cuts, poverty,
and the lack of strong principals as factors in the decline of student achievement. These
are factors that cannot be addressed by new construction. In fact, the neighborhood
schools that did show increases were frequently in white neighborhoods on the south side,
which had higher numbers of middle-class students and had principals who were
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identified as strong. Parents flocked to these schools.115
In contrast to the southside schools, one found McNair Elementary at North 23rd
Street and West Fairmount Avenue. McNair was located in a residential neighborhood
with a low crime rate and light traffic. The school is physically attractive and has lots of
playground space, and a reporter from the Journal Sentinel observed that “teachers and
students appeared focused on appropriate activities and hallways were orderly. Principal
Willie Fuller was friendly, and so were teachers and students. A writing contest
sponsored by an outside group seemed to encourage students to take extra steps aimed at
achievement.” But reading proficiency scores slipped from 48 percent in 2002 to 42
percent in 2007, and math proficiency declined from 52 percent to 42 percent in the same
period. The addition on the school did not attract more students. In fact, enrollment fell
from 313 in September 1999 to 243 in September 2000—even as space for 162 more
students was added to the school. Funding from MPS decreased in proportion to the
decrease in enrollment. Art and music were dropped completely to save money, and
physical education was cut back to two days per week. The new library had a librarian
only one day per week. Six of the nine new classrooms were not used for conducting
classes, and six classrooms in the older sections of the building were also unused. The
additions cost $2.7 million.116 McNair closed in 2010 and reopened as a middle school
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and extension of Rufus King High School, which was less than two miles away.117 A
magnet school had won ownership over what was supposed to be a neighborhood school.
The failure of NSI and persistent exodus of students to non-MPS charter, choice,
and suburban schools combined so that, by 2005, MPS had capacity for more than
120,000 students but had about only eighty-six thousand. The school board then
proceeded to close several elementary schools, most of the middle schools, and Juneau
High School, despite the fact that it had built new schools and additions to others.118 The
closure of Juneau was particularly contentious. Built in 1933 on Milwaukee’s west side,
the school had a capacity of twelve hundred but had an enrollment of only 942. The staff
and students protested the closure at a six-and-a-half hour school board meeting to no
avail. The school board voted 5–4 to shut it down. The projected savings from closing
the school was $1.4 million.119 People began to criticize NSI, but Superintendent William
Andrekopoulos defended it: “When you build a school, you’re building it for over 100
years. If we would have put up shanties and put up temporary buildings . . . that would
have been very shortsighted.”120
In retrospect, people who feared that the NSI would be a return to segregation
were completely unwarranted in their assumptions. What Christine Rossell has said
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about magnet schools is also true of neighborhood schools: parents’ first choice is schools
with solid records of academic success in safe neighborhoods. If they do not observe
these qualities in their neighborhood schools, then they will send their children elsewhere
(see chapter 5).
MPS also pursued one last major reform strategy involving choice in the 2000s—
the Small Schools Initiative. The small schools movement began in the late 1980s in
urban districts that were looking for innovative ideas on how to meet the needs of
students who were not successful in traditional comprehensive high schools. Small high
schools typically have fewer than four hundred students and some have fewer than two
hundred. The schools may be in stand-alone buildings, such as a closed elementary
school or a rented space, or they may be in a multiplex—a building that used to house a
comprehensive high school but is reconfigured to accommodate three to six small high
schools. Each school is supposed to have a particular theme, much like magnet schools,
and it is hoped students will pick the schools for which they are best suited. Small
schools are supposed to foster a sense of connectedness among students and between
students and teachers. Classes rotate from one teacher to another, as in a middle school.
Because the enrollment is so small, students may have the same teachers for all four years
of high school. Sports, clubs, and electives are hard to offer,121 and budgetary decisions
121
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may be difficult because small schools cannot take advantage of economies of scale.122
Little notice was taken of the small school movement until 2003, when the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation donated $51 million to New York City to start sixty-seven
small schools. The Foundation gave millions more to other districts, including
Milwaukee, to establish small high schools in subsequent years.123
After studying small high school designs in Baltimore and New York, MPS
planned to create forty-five new small schools between 2003 and 2008 that would serve
about sixteen thousand students, despite inconclusive research on the effectiveness of
small schools.124 Originally, the district planned to convert seven of the fifteen high
schools to multiplexes, effectively abolishing a large portion of the magnet school plan.
The Gates Foundation committed more than $17 million to the effort, which would help
with modifying buildings and retraining staff.125
But the district converted only three high schools to multiplexes. North Division,
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once the medical and dental science magnet, was broken up into three schools in 2003,
which were called the School of the Humanities, the Truth Institute for Leadership and
Service, and the Genesis School of Business Technology/Trade, Health, and Human
Services. At the time, about half of North Division’s entering freshmen read below a
fourth-grade level, and the school’s attendance was only about two-thirds. District
officials hoped the small schools would foster a sense of belonging and that achievement
would improve.126 Washington (the computer magnet) and Marshall (the broadcasting
magnet) were broken up in 2004. South Division (tourism, food service, and recreation)
and Bradley Tech were allowed to remain comprehensive schools but were reconfigured
internally to create “small learning communities” in the schools, similar to the schools in
the multiplex but with one administrative structure.127
Although most district officials praised the moves, there were a few dissenters. A
few officials worried that, districtwide, the conversion to small schools was moving too
fast. Tom Balistreri, a School Board member and former principal of Rufus King High
School, said the initiative involved too many schools and was rushed through without the
opportunity to train new administrators and lead teachers: “The schools have not been set
up for success, and there’s no evidence that they are going to have a higher level of
achievement,” he said. John Schissler, who taught at Marshall for thirty-two years and
coordinated the school’s alumni association, predicted that the initiative would fail due to
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high costs: “I know they’ve tried it in New York and a few other large cities, but after 32
years teaching in MPS, all the new programs they’ve tried to implement, unfortunately,
have gone awry, especially as soon as the money dries up.”128 Jay Bullock, an English
teacher at Madison University High School, wrote a letter to the Journal Sentinel and
explained, “We have heard, from colleagues at schools such as Marshall, Washington,
and the erstwhile North Division, that the transitions are messy, support is insufficient,
and the teachers are shouldering responsibilities that take away from teaching duties.” He
also said that schools are much more likely to be successful if they are “developed from
the bottom-up, democratically,” and reform is not imposed from above.129
Data on the freshman class from the 2004–05 school year showed that plans were
not working out as expected. There were 9,857 students in ninth grade, but only 4,551
students in twelfth grade, or 46 percent of the ninth grade total, in 2004–05. The rest
dropped out or left MPS. Twenty-two percent of all freshmen were repeating the ninth
grade. Some of the repeating freshmen would never graduate—more than 40 percent of
the district’s dropouts were in grade nine. The ninth-grade suspension rate (number of
suspensions divided by number of students) was 48 percent, though that was because
many students were suspended more than once. The ninth-grade attendance rate was only
77 percent. District officials pointed out that those startling numbers were why they were
creating more K–8 schools and more small high schools, ignoring the facts that the
percentage of students in K–8s had already increased from 9 percent to 29 percent and
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that the percentage of students in small high schools had increased from 2 percent to 23
percent from 1999 to 2005 with no noticeable improvement in achievement, attendance,
or behavior.130
MPS opened more small high schools in 2005, including:
!

Alliance School, a school for gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered
students and other students who felt bullied in their previous schools

!

The Maasai Institute, which took its approach to education from the
culture and philosophy of an African tribe

!

Foster & Williams, which taught American Sign Language

!

The Milwaukee Learning Laboratory & Institute, which was supposed to
teach social justice, leadership, and service through participation in the
community

!

Three schools inside Washington: Washington High School of
Expeditionary Learning (a project-based curriculum); Washington High
School of Information Technology; and Washington High School of Law,
Education and Public Service (LEAPS)

!

Three schools inside Marshall: W. E. B. Du Bois High School, which took
over Marshall’s communications specialty; Milwaukee Academy of
Aviation, Science & Technology, where students were supposed to train in
aviation, aerospace, and aeronautics; and Marshall Montessori, a college-
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prep school that used the Montessori system of education131
Almost none of MPS’s plans worked out the way they were intended. One
problem was that students wanted sports, clubs, and electives, which the small schools
did not have the resources to provide. Hundreds of students enrolled in schools they
knew nothing about, then complained that they did not like the school’s specialty, and
other students were randomly assigned to schools that had low enrollments. Many of
these students were so far behind academically that they could not take classes in the
school’s specialty. Some teachers who had spent a year planning curriculua found that
they had to take a big step back and concentrate on reading and mathematics. But test
scores and attendance rates did not improve. Schools could not always meet the needs of
special education students—some did not have the equipment and others did not even
hire special education teachers.132 Teachers had to teach multiple subjects because the
schools were so small and could not afford full-time teachers in every area. That meant
teachers had to teach some classes for which they did not have licenses.133
Many of the small high schools were not successful in other ways. The Alliance
School received positive media attention for its efforts to make students feel comfortable
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in the face of bullying, but has not performed well academically and has been threatened
with closure.134 The Maasai Institute closed in 2008 with 150 students and four hundred
thousand dollars in debt.135 The school board voted to close Foster and Williams at the
end of the 2009–10 school year.136 The teachers at Milwaukee Language Laboratory &
Institute had to change its curriculum completely when they found out most of their
students lacked basic reading, writing, and math skills. The project-based classes they
envisioned never developed. Finally, escalating costs in the face of low enrollment and
staff cuts caused the nine remaining staff members to request closure by the school
board.137
The multiplexes could circumvent some of these problems by sharing resources,
but none of the schools inside North Division worked out well. Of the twenty-four
sophomores at the School of Humanities, only one was proficient in reading and none
were proficient in mathematics, according to state test scores. Humanities had a truancy
rate of 132 percent, indicating that there was a high turnover in the student body during
the year. To be specific, 189 students were chronically truant in a school that had an
official enrollment of 143. It had a 92 percent suspension rate in 2004–05, and there were
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eleven reported incidents involving weapons or drugs. The violence continued the next
year, and it got so bad that Superintedent Andrekopoulos ordered the school closed in
October for safety reasons. The school board ratified his decision at their next meeting.138
The Truth Institute struggled along for three more years139 and was finally closed in 2009.
Metropolitan High School, another small school that moved in after Humanities closed,
was itself closed in 2009. Genesis was allowed to continue at a new location. The
African American Immersion High School (formerly Malcolm X, see chapter 7) another
recent tenant, was allowed to take over the entire North Division building in 2009,140
despite the fact that the Department of Public Instruction had named it the lowest
performing school in the state in that year. African American Immersion was given the
name North Division in 2011.141
The small schools inside Washington High School still did not show significant
improvement either. Data from fall 2005 showed an attendance rate of only 45.5 at the
School of Expeditionary Learning and 59.7 percent at the School of Information
Technology, in contrast to a district high school rate of 72.5 percent.142 Washington High
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School LEAPS was put on the state’s list of lowest performing schools in 2010,143 and so
MPS closed it at the end of the school year. The School of Expeditionary Learning
closed the following year, and Washington School of Information Technology was
allowed to expand to fill the building, ironically returning it to McMurrin’s original
magnet specialty,144 although enrollment remained below capacity.
The schools inside Marshall did not fare any better. The aviation school closed in
2009 when it became apparent that there were budgetary shortfalls and that the students
were not actually being trained in aviation due to their inability to pass required classes.145
The Montessori school asked to be moved to the old Juneau High School to get away
from DuBois High School, which was plagued with violence.146 But the Montessori
school did not show enough improvement147 or high enough enrollment at Juneau, so the
school board voted in 2011 to close it, move the McDowell Montessori K–8 into Juneau,
and turn the McDowell program into a K–12 school.148 Du Bois ended up on the same
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list as Washington LEAPS in 2010149 and closed a year later.150
One small school, Ronald Reagan High School, was actually very successful.
Located in the old Sholes Middle School, Reagan grew from 127 students in 2003 to
more than one thousand in 2011 by locating itself on the far south side, appealing to
southside parents though the same rigorous academic program in use at Rufus King High
School, and by having a dynamic principal who expected the best from students, teachers,
and district administrators.151 But in growing to more than a thousand students, Reagan
may have demonstrated that big high schools are actually more effective than small ones.
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel ran a series of articles in 2006 examining MPS
high schools, both big and small. It found that, generally speaking, MPS graduates were
not as well prepared for higher education or employment as their suburban counterparts
were. The average MPS ACT score was 17.5 in 2004–05, compared to a statewide
average of 22.2. MPS students were not assigned as much homework as suburban
students, and the assignments were usually shorter. Students who had attended suburban
middle schools and MPS high schools reported that their middle school classes were
more difficult than their high school classes. There was variation within MPS too. One
student who transferred from Marshall to Riverside said, “A 4.0 in John Marshall is like
the equivalent of a 2.5 at Riverside.” The student successfully graduated and enrolled at
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the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee (UWM), but after he saw how much more
suburban students knew, he said, “I feel like [the MPS] kids have been cheated out of an
education.”152
Teachers said that they had to lower their expectations because students were
reading very far behind grade level. They reported that students were no longer
registering for advanced math or science classes153 and that teachers had to use low-level
worksheets because students were disruptive during lecture and engaged in horseplay
during group work. But even then, work was not submitted. Reporters found students
were disengaged no matter how big or small the school. Large groups of students walked
the halls all day long in the big high schools, though administrators and safety aides had
to constantly patrol the halls, looking for students. Classroom doors were locked, and
students were not allowed in the halls unless it was an emergency.154 Reporters believed
that small schools made better connections between teachers and students, but again, the
work was not very rigorous.155
UWM officials agreed that MPS students were often unprepared for college.
Seventy-two percent of MPS graduates who were UWM freshmen in 2004–05 required
remedial math classes, compared to only 25 percent of graduates from other districts.
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Twenty-two percent of MPS seniors who graduated in 1999 earned a UWM degree after
six years, compared to forty-three percent of other students. When looking only at
students in the top quarter of their high school class, 36 percent from MPS graduated
from UWM, compared with 59 percent of other students. MATC reported similar
achievement gaps, and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce said its
membership reported that MPS graduates were often late for work and did not put forth
much effort while there.156
When Gregory Thornton took over as superintendent in 2010, he promised big
changes in MPS, including higher standards, a more uniform curriculum, better
professional development for teachers, higher tests scores and graduation rates, more
students enrolling in college after graduation, safer schools, lower suspension rates, better
engagement with parents and community members, increased collaboration with teachers,
and more fiscal responsibility.157
As other schools continued to decline in both enrollment and academic
performance, MPS closed schools under Andrekopoulos and continued to do so under
Thornton in 2010. Of the forty-two small high schools that opened under the small
schools initiative, only twenty-three were still open that fall.158 Additionally, as the
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number of middle schools shrank due to competition from K–8 schools, MPS allowed
five middle schools to grow into what it called “6–12” schools or middle school/high
schools, giving students and parents even more choices.159 Samuel Morse Middle School
for the Gifted and Talented expanded to this format and moved into Marshall after the
small schools inside Marshall closed or moved.160 Custer High School closed after years
of low achievement and reopened as a multiplex with two 6–12 schools and one K–8
school.161 Bay View High School merged with Fritsche Middle School as a 6–12 school
too, but the new configuration of Bay View did not improve academic achievement, and
the school was plagued by a rash of violence in 2011. The Bay View neighborhood,
which is noted for its liberal values and commitment to the city and urban life, balked at
the idea of a high school that does not attract neighborhood students. Parents asked that
the current Bay View student body be removed, that a rigorous college-preparatory
curriculum be introduced for neighborhood students, and that an admissions test be
required for non-neighborhood students.162 Some people have accused Bay View parents
of being “elitist,” but Bay View parents say they just want what is best for their
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children.163
More changes occurred in 2011. All three of original multiplexed high schools
were each occupied by only a single school, the school board reopened Juneau High
School, and some of the middle schools as multiplexes, hoping that schools could share
resources and keep costs down. There were only six middle schools and eleven big high
schools left by 2011.164 Superintendent Thornton also introduced a “Long-Range
Facilities Master Plan,” which aimed to close even more underused schools and to
duplicate popular magnet programs, such as Montessori and Gifted and Talented, and
spread them around the city to reduce transportation costs.165 High school specialties are
barely mentioned in the plan, the website recommends that parents visit individual
schools to find out about their programs,166 and the MPS school catalog describes many
schools in vague terms, such as “college-prep,” “at-risk,” or “rigorous”167 that make them
sound mostly the same.
Thus, the city of Milwaukee moved into an era of unprecedented school choice in
the twenty-first century. It was far different from the school system that had existed a
century before with a neighborhood system and only a few citywide schools. It was also
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unlike anything Lloyd Barbee envisioned, with its reemphasis on neighborhoods and
reliance on religious schools to provide choice to families. And it was also very much the
opposite of Lee McMurrin’s plan for schools, with the abandonment of most aspects of
the magnet plan, the expansion of small high schools, and the exodus of students to the
suburbs.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION:
REFLECTIONS ON CHOICE
Milwaukee schools in the twenty-first century are a far cry from the
comprehensive schools and neighborhood attendance patterns of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The expansion of choice from no choice to forced choice to school
choice has been the theme throughout time. Lloyd Barbee sued the school board to
integrate students. The result was a magnet school plan that was supposed to induce
racial integration and increase academic achievement by giving students choices. But the
plan was difficult to implement, was not well received by parents (African American or
white), and did not meet its goals for most Milwaukee students. Charter schools, choice
schools, suburban schools, neighborhood schools, and small schools brought Milwaukee
even more choice but also did not improve education, if one controls for students’
economic background and upbringing. MPS, the state of Wisconsin, and federal
government did, however, spend a lot of time and money to offer students and families
these choices. It makes one wonder whether choice is really worth the price paid.
Psychologist Barry Schwartz explains it this way: Schwartz walked into a store
and asked to by a pair of jeans. The salesclerk asked, “Do you want them slim fit, easy
fit, relaxed fit, baggy, or extra baggy? Do you want them stonewashed, acid washed, or
distressed? Do you want them button-fly or zipper-fly? Do you want them faded or
regular?” Schwartz was stunned—all he wanted was a “regular” pair of jeans. He ended
up trying on all the styles and left with a pair that he liked, but he also left with feelings of
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wasted time, fatigue, self-doubt, anxiety, and dread.1
Schwartz concluded that although some choice is good, more choice is not
necessarily better. In fact, Schwartz says an overabundance of choice can lead to bad
decisions, stress, dissatisfaction, and even clinical depression. Schwartz writes that, by
some estimates, depression rates in the year 2000 were ten times that of 1900,2 and
suicide rates tripled between 1965 and 2000.3 The American standard of living was much
higher in 2000 than it was a century before. As the standard of living increased, so did
the choices offered to people. But expanding choice did not make people happy.4
Likewise, the idea of many choices in schools makes people feel good at first, but
education has not improved substantially in Milwaukee in the last forty years. In fact,
many people argue that the schools are worse than ever, and the thought of the problems
with education in Milwaukee makes people tired, frustrated, and depressed, as Schwartz
was when he tried to buy a pair of jeans. It also makes one think that perhaps Milwaukee
and Wisconsin should offer a one or two-choice model of district organization and simply
concentrate on providing a really good education to students.
Furthermore, choice, in a school context, assumes that parents are well informed,
but many parents are not, as explained in chapter 8. Consider, as Schwartz does, that most
respondents to a recent medical survey claimed said they would want to choose their own
treatment if they developed cancer, but an overwhelming number of cancer patients do
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not actually choose their own treatment. They defer to their doctors, assuming their
doctors know best.5 Yet advocates of choice in urban education somehow think that
parents, who often times were not successful in school, can make the best choices for
their children with almost no guidance.
Nonetheless, civic leaders and business interests often insist competition and
choice are essential components to a business model to education.6 According to the
2011 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), Milwaukee Public Schools
(MPS) had lower reading and mathematics scores in grades four and eight than seventeen
or eighteen other urban school districts. Only 38 percent of fourth graders and 47 percent
of eighth graders were reading at or above grade level, and only 57 percent of fourth
graders and 42 percent of eighth graders were doing mathematics at or above grade level.7
Furthermore, the MPS four-year graduation rate was only 62.8 percent in 2011, compared
to a statewide rate of 87 percent.8 But, as chapter 8 explained, charter schools and choice
schools do about the same as MPS schools. It would seem then, that competition and
choice do not actually improve achievement. Therefore, people who advocate a “business
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model” should be mindful too that methods of manufacturing (teaching), quality of
management (administration), and competition (choices), while important, do not make
up for lack of quality materials (students).
When it comes to student quality, numerous studies have pointed to the link
between poverty, family background, and student achievement.9 Milwaukee was the
fourth poorest city in the United States in 2010, according to the U.S. Census Bureau10
After checking the poverty list against the NAEP list, it is revealed that there is strong
correlation between poverty and student achievement. Both liberal and conservative
scholars agree that family background also makes an important difference. For example,
parents who were successful in school usually raise children who are successful in school,
and parents with advanced degrees will usually have children with advanced degrees.
Stable, middle-class families are more likely to have parents who monitor homework, get
involved at their children’s schools, and teach their children the values of hard work,
good attendance, and school-appropriate behavior.11 No amount of choice or competition
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Schools: The Challenge of Location and Poverty, National Center for Education Statistics, Office of
Educational Research and Improvement (July 1996); Susan B. Neuman, Changing the Odds for Children at
Risk: Seven Essential Principles of Educational Programs That Break the Cycle of Poverty (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2009); Susan B. Neuman, ed., Educating the Other America: Top Experts Tackle Poverty,
Literacy, and Achievement in Our Schools (Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes Pub., 2008); and Beth Lindsay
Templeton, Understanding Poverty in the Classroom: Changing Perceptions for Student Success (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2011) are some of the recent books on this topic.
10

Bill Glauber and Ben Poston, “Milwaukee Now Fourth Poorest City in Nation,” Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, September 28, 2010.
11

There are an abundance of studies on the relationship between family background and
educational achievement. Some of the recent ones, from both ends of the political spectrum, include
Daniele Checchi, The Economics of Education: Human Capital, Family Background and Inequality
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (March 27, 2006); Dalton Conley and Karen Albright, eds.,
After the Bell: Family Background, Public Policy and Educational Success (London: Routledge,2004); W.
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can affect these family-related factors in a child’s success in school.
There is also some evidence that choice may harm some students by segregating
students based on ability level. Specifically, as explained in chapter 8, magnet schools
and private schools may only want to enroll the intelligent, motivated students and may
try to prevent students with disabilities, behavior problems, and low test scores from
enrolling. In 2009–10, for example, 20.1 percent of MPS high school students were
classified as special education, but Custer High School’s percentage was 30.8, while
Rufus King High School’s was 14 percent and Ronald Reagan High School’s was 10.1.12
Custer was closed by the school board at the end of the 2010–11 school year (see chapter
8), while Rufus King and Ronald Reagan were named the number one and two schools in
Wisconsin by U.S. News & World Report in 2012.13 Certainly, one can understand why
schools would want to restrict who can enroll, especially in light of the movement to tie
teacher pay to student test scores. And one can also understand why MPS allows certain
schools to have admissions criteria. MPS needs academically talented students to stay in
the city and not use the state’s open enrollment law to attend suburban schools. When
Reagan’s principal, Julia D’Amato, was asked about enrolling more special education
students at her school, she said that would mean she would have to take fewer regular
education students who wanted to enroll in Reagan’s college-bound program. She

Norton Grubb, The Money Myth: School Resources, Outcomes, and Equity (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 2009); and Timothy M. Smeeding et al., Persistence, Privilege, and Parenting: The
Comparative Study of Intergenerational Mobility (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011).
12

Erin Richards, “MPS Wants to Even Out Special Ed,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November

23, 2009.
13

“Best High Schools in Wisconsin,” U.S. News & World Report, http://www.usnews.com/
education/best-high-schools/wisconsin, available June 4, 2012.
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warned, “These children will leave the district.”14
Milwaukee’s movement toward more choice was intended to give students equal
educational opportunities. Lloyd Barbee wanted integrated schools, Lee McMurrin chose
to do that through magnet schools, Howard Fuller and business leaders countered with
vouchers, and the state of Wisconsin also offered charter schools and suburban schools as
options. All of these movements fall under the mantle of “choice.” But while the choice
of where to attend school is ostensibly vested in the students and their parents, the
enrollment practices described here make one wonder who is doing the choosing—the
students or the schools. These practices also raise questions about the fairness of setting
up a hierarchy of schools, a hierarchy that runs counter to the comprehensive school
movement of the early twentieth century. Surely that was not what reformers intended.

14

Quoted in Erin Richards, “MPS Wants to Even Out Special Ed,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
November 23, 2009.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1.
SCHOOL BOARD FACTIONS, 1963–791
Liberals

Conservatives

1963
–65

Clare Dreyfus
Cornelius Golightly
Elisabeth Holmes
Lloyd Larson
Frederick Mett2
John Pederson
Evelyn Pfeiffer

President Lorraine Radtke
Thomas Brennan
Margaret Dinges
John Foley
Edward Krause/Patrick Fass3
Frederick Potter
Milan Potter
Harold Story

1965
–67

Clare Deyfus
Walter Gerken
Cornelius Golightly
Elisabeth Holmes
Lloyd Larson
Frederick Mett
Evelyn Pfeiffer

President John Foley
Thomas Brennan
Margaret Dinges
Patrick Fass
Frederick Potter
Milan Potter/Lillian Sicula4
Lorraine Radtke
Harold Story

1

These factions were relevant only on racial integration. The school board frequently dealt with
curriculum, appointment of administrators, the budget, school construction/repair, and legal matters. The
voting records indicate that the factions were not present on these other issues. Also, the terms “liberal” and
“conservative” are used here in the traditional sense of the words, not the connotation prevalent in the early
twenty-first century—liberals wanted change, while conservatives resisted change. Some of the liberals and
conservatives could be considered moderates and occasionally voted with the other faction and elected
presidents. Some board members switched sides as the context of the racial integration debate changed.
2

Elected to fill a vacancy left by George Hampel Jr., who resigned October 31, 1963.

3

Patrick Fass was elected after Edward Krause died on April 17, 1965.

4

Lillian Sicula was elected on April 5, 1967, after Milan Potter resigned.
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1967
–69

Clare Dreyfus
Walter Gerken5
Frederick Mett
Lloyd Larson
Donald O’Connell
Evelyn Pfeiffer
John Stocking6

President Margaret Dinges
Russell Darrow7
Thomas Brennan
Patrick Fass
John Foley8
Adele Horbinski
Frederick Potter
Lorraine Radtke
Lillian Sicula
Harold Story

1969
–71

Clare Dreyfus
Harold Jackson9
Lloyd Larson
Frederick Mett
Donald O’Connell
Evelyn Pfeiffer
John Stocking

President Patrick Fass (to Sept. 1, 1970)
President Thomas Brennan (after Sept. 1)
Russell Darrow
Margaret Dinges
John Foley10
Adele Horbinski/Virginia Stolhand11
Frederick Potter
Lorraine Radtke
Harold Story

1971
–73

Pres. Harold Jackson (to Nov. 22, 1972)12
Pres. Ronald San Felippo (after Nov. 22)
Anthony Busalacchi
Clare Dreyfus/James Wojciechowski13
Lloyd Larson
Frederick Mett/Doris Stacy14
Donald O’Connell
Evelyn Pfeiffer
Robert Wegmann

Thomas Brennan
Russell Darrow
Margaret Dinges
Frederick Potter
Lorraine Radtke
Virginia Stolhand

5

Resigned November 30, 1967.

6

Elected to fill Foley’s position.

7

Elected to fill Gerken’s position.

8

Resigned June 4, 1968.

9

Elected to fill a vacancy created by the resignation of John Foley.

10

Resigned October 27, 1969.

11

Virginia Stolhand was elected after Adele Horbinski resigned on July 11, 1969.

12

Resigned November 24, 1972.

13

Clare Dreyfus died on November 8, 1971; James Wojciechowski was elected March 8, 1972.

14

Frederick Mett died on May 17, 1972; Doris Stacy was elected June 6, 1972.
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1973
–75

President Ronald San Felippo15
President Donald O’Connell
Anthony Busalacchi
Lloyd Larson
Maurice McSweeny
Evelyn Pfeiffer
Doris Stacy
Robert Wegmann/Clara New16

Thomas Brennan
Arlene Conners
Russell Darrow/Stephen Jesmok17
Margaret Dinges
Gerald Farley
Edward Michalski18
Frederick Potter
Lorraine Radtke

1975
–77

President Donald O’Connell (1975–76)19
Joseph Koneazny20
Marian McEvilly
Maurice McSweeny
Clara New
Lois Riley
Doris Stacy
Leon Todd

President Evelyn Pfeiffer (1976–77)
Thomas Brennan
Anthony Busalacchi
Margaret Dinges
Gerald Farley
Stephen Jesmok
Edward Michalski
Lorraine Radtke

1977
–79

Joseph Koneazny
Marian McEvilly
Maurice McSweeny
Lois Riley
Doris Stacy
Leon Todd

President Anthony Busalacchi (1978–79)
President Evelyn Pfeiffer (1977–78)
Thomas Brennan
Margaret Dinges
Gerald Farley
Stephen Jesmok
Edward Michalski
Lawrence O’Neil
Lorraine Radtke

15

Resigned as president on September 24, 1974. Resigned from the board on January 7, 1975.

16

Robert Wegmann resigned on May 31, 1974; Clara New was elected on September 3, 1974.

17

Russell Darrow resigned on February 6, 1974; Stephen Jesmok was elected on May 6, 1975.

18

Elected May 6, 1975 to complete the term of Ronald San Felippo.

19

Resigned on December 15, 1976.

20

Appointed to fill Donald O’Connell’s position on the board.
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Table 2.
AFRICAN AMERICAN FACTIONS
Integrationists
Llyod Barbee
Cecil Brown
Marica Coggs
Gary George
Cornelius Golightly
Leon Todd

Community Control Advocates
Jake Beason
Spencer Coggs
Howard Fuller
Robert Harris
Larry Harwell
Marlene Johnson
Gloria Mason
Michael McGee
Marvin Pratt
Polly Williams
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APPENDIX B
Table 3.
Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (Grades 2, 4–8) and Tests of Achievement and Proficiency
(Grades 10, 12) in Reading (1966–1994)
Percentage Scoring “Average” or “Above Average/High”
Grade 2

Grade 4

Grade 5

Grade 6

Grade 7

Grade 8

Grade 10

Grade 12

1966–67

-

61

-

64

-

63

-

-

1967–68

-

62

-

61

-

61

70

66

1968–69

-

64

-

61

-

60

69

64

1969–70

-

65

-

62

-

58

69

60

1970–71

-

62

-

57

-

55

66

55

1971–72

-

62

-

56

-

53

63

54

1972–73

-

66

-

59

-

55

65

52

1973–74

-

61

-

56

-

53

64

62

1974–75

-

-

66

-

63

-

74

72

1975–76

-

-

65

-

63

-

73

71

1976–77

-

-

64

-

64

-

70

73

1977–78

-

-

65

-

66

-

70

76

1978–79

-

-

66

-

64

-

69

72

1979–80

-

-

68

-

66

-

73

73

1980–81

-

-

72

-

67

-

75

69

1981–82

68

-

71

-

69

-

70

64

1982–83

77

-

72

-

73

-

70

66

1983–84

82

-

76

-

75

-

71

64

1984–85

81

-

74

-

76

-

74

62

1985–86

85

-

75

-

76

-

73

62

1986–87

52

-

39

-

37

-

41

-

1987–88

43

-

37

-

39

-

38

-

1988–89

42

-

36

-

40

-

38

-

1989–90

43

-

38

-

43

-

40

-

1990–91

43

-

37

-

41

-

37

-

1991–92

-

-

38

-

-

-

-

1992–93

-

-

38

-

-

-

-

-

1993–94

-

-

38

-

-

-

-

-

Source: Milwaukee Public Schools Office of Research and Assessment. Note: This table indicates general
trends only. Changes in tests and the method of reporting scores in 1974, 1981, 1986, 1988, and 1991
make it impossible to make exact comparisons across the entire time period.
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Table 4.
Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (Grades 2, 4-8)
and Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (Grades 10, 12)
Mathematics (1966–1998)
Percentage Scoring “Average” or “Above Average/High”
Grade 2

Grade 4

Grade 5

Grade 6

Grade 7

Grade 8

Grade 10

Grade 12

1966–67

-

63

-

58

-

61

-

-

1967–68

-

65

-

56

-

60

68

73

1968–69

-

70

-

54

-

56

73

75

1969–70

-

71

-

58

-

55

72

72

1970–71

-

66

-

55

-

53

69

74

1971–72

-

66

-

54

-

50

70

72

1972–73

-

62

-

55

-

57

68

73

1973–74

-

63

-

54

-

56

68

76

1974–75

-

-

65

-

63

-

77

86

1975–76

-

-

66

-

63

-

75

84

1976–77

-

-

64

-

64

-

72

85

1977–78

-

-

68

-

66

-

74

84

1978–79

-

-

70

-

64

-

72

84

1979–80

-

-

74

-

66

-

75

81

1980–81

-

-

80

-

67

-

76

81

1981–82

80

-

83

-

74

-

69

70

1982–83

83

-

82

-

78

-

70

72

1983–84

85

-

83

-

81

-

71

71

1984–85

82

-

82

-

81

-

75

81

1985–86

87

-

83

-

81

-

76

79

1986–87

64

-

55

-

55

-

52

-

1987–88

60

-

78

-

48

-

37

-

1988–89

56

-

48

-

38

-

37

-

1989–90

48

-

47

-

38

-

41

-

1990–91

52

-

46

-

38

-

39

-

1991–92

-

-

47

-

-

-

-

-

1992–93

-

-

45

-

-

-

-

-

1993–94

-

-

47

-

-

-

-

-

1994–95

-

-

41

-

-

-

-

-

1996–97

-

-

43

-

-

-

-

-

1997–98
42
Source: Milwaukee Public Schools Office of Research and Assessment. Note: This table indicates general
trends only. Changes in tests and the method of reporting scores in 1974, 1981, 1986, 1988, and 1991
make it impossible to make exact comparisons across the entire time period.
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APPENDIX C
Note: The data in figures 1–9 are from the District and School Report Cards, Milwaukee
Public Schools Office of Research and Evaluation, accessed June 24, 2011,
http://www2.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/acctrep/mpsrc.html. State data are from“Wisconsin’s
Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), accessed June 24, 2011,
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/data. The percentage white and percentage poor reflect the
entire school, but the percentage proficient at reading and percentage proficient at
mathematics are only for grades 5, 8, and 10. Schools with grades kindergarten to grade
8, grades 6 to 12, and grades kindergarten to 12 are listed in multiple figures.
Table 5. Milwaukee Magnet Schools with Grade 5 Students, 2009–10
%
WHITE

%
POOR

% PROF.
READING

% PROF.
MATH

Elm Creative Arts

20

60

75

71

La Escuela Fratney

11

78

62

70

French Immersion

21

65

90

86

German Immersion

66

33

95

88

Golda Meir Gifted and Talented

30

38

95

91

Hayes Bilingual

2

97

52

47

Milwaukee Sign Language

10

80

60

65

Morgandale Bilingual Center

11

74

72

67

Spanish Immersion

22

55

85

69

Wis. Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

16

86

57

52

MPS Grade 5 All Schools

12

81

58

54

Wisconsin Grade 5 All Schools

76

37

80

78

SCHOOL
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Table 6. Milwaukee Magnet Schools with Grade 8 Students, 2009–10
%
WHITE

%
POOR

% PROF.
READING

% PROF.
MATH

Golda Meir Gifted and Talented

30

38

93

90

Lincoln Middle School

4

86

65

44

Milwaukee School of Languages

27

60

83

75

Milwaukee Sign Language

10

80

57

32

Morgandale Bilingual Center

11

74

78

47

Morse-Marshall Middle/High School

4

77

80

72

Roosevelt Middle School

5

79

75

57

Wis. Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

16

86

78

69

MPS Grade 8 All Schools

12

81

63

50

Wisconsin Grade 8 All Schools

76

37

84

78

SCHOOL

Table 7. Milwaukee Magnet Schools with Grade 10 Students, 2009–10
%
WHITE

%
POOR

% PROF.
READING

% PROF.
MATH

Bradley Tech High School

5

82

35

18

Milwaukee High School of the Arts

21

65

57

29

Milwaukee School of Languages

27

60

66

60

New School for Community Service

6

76

N/A

N/A

Reagan High School

32

64

76

60

Riverside High School

7

71

56

45

Rufus King High School

18

54

76

71

Wis. Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

16

86

48

43

MPS Grade 10 All Schools

12

81

40

29

Wisconsin Grade 10 All Schools

76

37

76

70

SCHOOL
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Table 8. Milwaukee Elementary School Value-Added Data, 2009–10
SCHOOL

READING

MATH

Elm Creative Arts

3.3

3.2

La Escuela Fratney

2.7

3.6

French Immersion

4.5

3.4

German Immersion

3.6

3.9

Golda Meir Gifted and Talented

4.3

4.6

Hayes Bilingual

3.7

3.3

Milwaukee Sign Language

2.4

3.2

Morgandale Bilingual Center

3.8

3.8

Spanish Immersion

3.8

2.7

Wisconsin Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

3.9

3.7

Magnet Elementary School Average

3.2

3.5

MPS All Schools

3.0

3.0

READING

MATH

Golda Meir Gifted and Talented

4.1

3.5

Lincoln Middle School

3.0

2.1

Milwaukee School of Languages

3.8

3.8

Milwaukee Sign Language

2.4

3.2

Morgandale Bilingual Center

3.2

2.2

Morse-Marshall Middle/High School

3.8

2.8

Roosevelt Middle School

3.2

2.9

Wisconsin Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

4.0

4.7

Magnet Middle School Average

2.8

2.5

MPS All Schools

3.0

3.0

Table 9. Milwaukee Middle School Value-Added Data, 2009–10
SCHOOL
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Table 10. Milwaukee High School Value-Added Data, 2006–07
SCHOOL

READING

MATH

Bradley Tech High School

3.2

3.2

Milwaukee High School of the Arts

2.9

2.3

Milwaukee School of Languages

4.2

3.8

New School for Community Service

N/A

N/A

Reagan High School

4.2

3.8

Riverside High School

2.7

2.3

Rufus King High School

4.7

4.5

Wisconsin Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

2.1

3.5

Magnet High School Average

3.4

3.3

MPS All Schools

3.0

3.0

Note: MPS surveys its students, parents, and teachers about school climate in four areas. Figures
7–9 show the average of the three surveys. High scores indicate successful schools. A 4.0 is a
perfect score.
Table 11. Milwaukee Elementary School Climate Data, 2009–10
RIGOR

SAFETY

ENVIRO
NMENT

Elm Creative Arts

3.5

3.2

3.5

3.2

La Escuela Fratney

3.4

3.3

3.6

3.4

French Immersion

3.4

3.2

3.3

3.1

German Immersion

3.1

3.1

2.9

3.2

Golda Meir Gifted and Talented

3.6

3.3

3.5

3.3

Hayes Bilingual

3.4

3.3

3.4

3.2

Milwaukee Sign Language

3.2

3.0

3.0

2.8

Morgandale Bilingual Center

3.5

3.3

3.5

3.2

Spanish Immersion

3.5

3.3

3.5

3.1

Wis. Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

3.3

3.2

3.3

3.1

Magnet Elementary School Average

3.4

3.2

3.4

3.2

MPS All Elementary Schools

3.3

3.1

3.2

3.1

SCHOOL

GOVERN
ANCE
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Table 12. Milwaukee Middle School Climate Data, 2009–10
RIGOR

SAFETY

ENVIRO
NMENT

GOVERN
ANCE

Golda Meir Gifted and Talented

3.6

3.3

3.5

3.3

Lincoln Middle School

3.1

3.0

3.1

2.9

Milwaukee School of Languages

3.3

3.0

3.2

3.0

Milwaukee Sign Language

3.2

3.0

3.0

2.8

Morgandale Bilingual Center

3.5

3.3

3.5

3.2

Morse-Marshall Middle/High School

3.1

3.0

3.1

2.7

Roosevelt Middle School

3.2

3.0

3.1

3.0

Wis. Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

3.3

3.2

3.3

3.1

Magnet Middle School Average

3.3

3.1

3.2

3.0

MPS All Middle Schools

3.3

3.1

3.2

3.1

RIGOR

SAFETY

ENVIRO
NMENT

GOVERN
ANCE

Bradley Tech High School

2.9

2.8

2.9

2.9

Milwaukee High School of the Arts

3.1

3.0

3.2

2.9

Milwaukee School of Languages

3.3

3.1

3.3

3.1

New School for Community Service

3.3

3.2

3.4

3.4

Reagan High School

3.4

3.2

3.3

3.2

Riverside High School

3.2

2.9

3.0

3.0

Rufus King High School

3.3

2.9

3.1

3.0

WI Conservatory of Lifelong Learning

3.2

3.1

3.1

3.1

Magnet High School Average

3.2

3.0

3.2

3.1

MPS All High Schools

2.8

3.1

3.1

3.0

SCHOOL

Table 13. Milwaukee High School Climate Data, 2009–10
SCHOOL
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